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ABSTRACT  
   
There is much at stake with the smart city. This urban governance movement is 
predicated on infusing information-and-communication technology into nearly all aspects of the 
built environment, while at the same time transforming how cities are planned and managed. The 
smart city movement is global in scale with initiatives being rolled out all over the planet, driven by 
proponents with deep pockets of wealth and influence, and a lucrative opportunity with market 
projections in the billions or trillions of dollars (over the next five to ten years). However, the smart 
city label can be nebulous and amorphous, seemingly subsuming unrelated technologies, 
practices, and policies as necessary. Yet, even with this ambiguity, or perhaps because of it, the 
smart city vision is still able to colonize urban landscapes and capture the political imaginations of 
decision makers. In order to know just what the smart city entails I work to bring analytic clarity to 
the actions, visions, and values of this movement.  
In short, the arc of this project moves from diving into the "smart city" discourses; to 
picking apart the ideologies at its heart; to engaging with the dual logics—control and 
accumulation—that drive the smart city; and finally to imagining what an alternative techno-
politics might look like and how we might achieve it. My goal is that by analyzing the techno-
politics of the smart city we will be better equipped to understand these urban transformations—
what logics drive them, what they herald, and what our role should be in how they develop. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Living in a city means more than just being an inhabitant, a dweller. The city also lives 
through us. It changes who we are. It affects our experiences of the world, perceptions of 
ourselves, relationships with others, routines of everyday life, and imaginations of what is 
possible. The ways in which cities are built and planned are choices about more than just real 
estate and management. They are also about creating subjects and society. As urban sociologist 
Robert Park remarks, “If the city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he is 
henceforth condemned to live” (Park 1967: 73). But, the creators and condemned are not 
necessarily the same, nor do they stand on equal ground.  
This dissertation is a study about a group of creators that are organized around realizing 
the idea of the smart city—and the people, places, and socio-technical systems that plug into that 
model of urbanism. It is about their quest to lay claim over how cities are designed and governed. 
It is about their ideals, methods, and outcomes. And it is about how urban society already is, or 
might be, changed by these transformations. While the smart city movement is relatively new—
really only coming into itself in the mid-2000s (Hollands 2008)—it has already emerged as an 
influential global force. Its corporate architects have been energetically crafting a series of 
frameworks, technologies, and policies that can be applied to cities around the world. The 
movement’s reach is expansive; cities ranging from Zhenjiang in China (IBM 2012c) to Kansas 
City in the USA (Cisco Newsroom) have taken up the mantle of smartness by partnering with tech 
firms like IBM and Cisco. Perhaps their ideas and initiatives are already present in your own city 
or town.  
A striking amount of effort has been channeled into selling a smart vision of the future 
city. Those who can guide how cities are developed are poised to reap the benefits. Their 
interests and values are woven into the urban fabric. Indeed, cities have long had a magnetic 
allure for those driven by the most basic of motivations: power and profit (Harvey 2009). “The 
promise of durability has attracted kaisers, kings, mayors, and other megalomaniacs to the built 
environment,” writes urban planner Rachel Weber. “The physical-technical ensemble of the city—
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buildings, sewers, roads, monuments, transport networks—conveys a sense of fixity and 
obduracy that appeals to the political desire to make strong, lasting statements” (Weber 2002: 
519). Smart urbanism relies on an additional ensemble—algorithms, sensors, data, control 
centers, digital networks—that provides mayors, executives, and engineers with the ability to 
extract value and extend power over the city and its people. 
 
Get Smart 
The smart city movement is dynamic and ongoing; it is not something we can capture in 
total. It seems that every month there is a new major development. For instance, as I was writing 
this dissertation, the White House launched a “smart cities initiative” in September 2015 that will 
invest over $160 million into creating more than “25 new technology collaborations to help local 
communities tackle 21st century challenges” and “come up with solutions to everyday problems” 
(Correa 2015: np). A few months after announcing the initiative, the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) released a report called, “Technology and the 
Future of Cities.” This report lays out the political economic stakes of smart cities: 
Combined, the innovations that are increasingly within reach provide an opportunity to 
revamp how cities operate at all levels and for all stakeholders. […] In reality, the nations 
of the world are in a race to transform their cities and reap the rewards, many of which 
will be economic―new products, new companies, and new skilled jobs, which, along with 
improved urban quality of life, create a virtuous circle that attracts talented new residents 
and additional businesses from around the world. This is a race the United States cannot 
afford to lose. […] A coordinated effort has the potential to help the United States seize a 
new, multi-trillion-dollar business opportunity, including technology exports (PCAST 2016: 
9). 
 
The crowd of people who want to claim their own (large) piece of the multi-trillion-dollar 
pie is ever expanding and entangled. The potential conflicts of interest, mutual wheeling-and-
dealing, and overlapping social networks are hard to keep track of. For instance, one of PCAST’s 
members is Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Alphabet, the holding company for Google and 
other subsidiaries—including a new one called Sidewalk Labs, which in April 2016 announced its 
plans to get into the business of developing and constructing smart cities. According to The Wall 
Street Journal, Sidewalk Labs will seek cities—“likely economically struggling municipalities 
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grappling with decay”—where it can take over districts and turn them into places “heavily 
integrated with technology” (Brown 2016: np). 
The injections of tech will also be accompanied by changes in urban governance. “One 
key element,” reports WSJ, “is that Sidewalk would be seeking autonomy from many city 
regulations, so it could build without constraints that come with things like parking or street design 
or utilities” (Brown 2016: np). The idea is to make these city districts into living laboratories. They 
will be sites of experimentation with real people behaving in real ways and trying to lead real 
lives. These are prime conditions for testing technologies, like self-driving cars and ubiquitous 
sensing, that Alphabet is eager to roll out. For Sidewalk Labs—and by extension the corporate 
empire it is part of—the ultimate plan is then to build a smart city from scratch. We can speculate 
that such a Googletopia might one day stand as the capital of Silicon State (forget a mere valley). 
The White House and Alphabet are only two of the numerous actors angling to carve out 
their role in the smart sector. And they aren’t even the largest or most ambitious contenders. For 
instance, India is in the early stages of a major undertaking to build 100 smart cities, by both 
upgrading existing cities and building new ones (Datta 2015). To do so they are partnering with 
other governments and corporations from around the world. And, as we will see in the next 
chapters, corporations like IBM and Cisco are far ahead of their competitors in setting the terms 
for the smart city. With a movement so potentially lucrative and transformative, it is not surprising 
that a whole slew of players, from small startups to giant institutions, are gearing up to embrace—
and create—the smart era. 
Indeed, if we look at the numbers, it is safe to say the smart city is booming. A 2013 
report, released by the United Kingdom’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
estimated that “the global market for smart city solutions and the additional services required to 
deploy them [will] be $408 billion by 2020” (2013: i). Less conservative estimates place the smart 
city market into the trillions of dollars over the next five to ten years. There are constantly 
companies coming up with smart systems, consultants generating “thought leadership” about 
smart trends, and cities deciding how to take advantage of smart urbanism. According to urban 
futurist Anthony Townsend, “Looking smart, perhaps even more than actually being smart, is 
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crucial to competing in today's global economy.” Townsend explains that this desire for having 
the right image—even if it is just a veneer—may very well be “the real force driving mayors into 
the arms of engineers” (Townsend 2013: 10; cf. Wiig 2015). 
The smart city, however, is not just a band of geeks hacking the city. Nor is it only a 
branded image, empty of substance other than forums and press releases. It should be seen as 
an urban planning and governance movement. It is useful to think about the smart city in terms of 
a "movement" to underscore the overarching features that tie together seemingly disparate or 
independent initiatives. The movement is surely focused on integrating technology into the city 
and our lives, but it is also concerned with how cities are governed, the goals that motivate cities, 
and what urban society looks like.  
A global, transformative, capital-intensive movement such as this one requires—even 
demands—careful and critical study. We all have to be skeptical about what social and political 
changes come with technological changes. The effects of an ambitious project like the smart city 
are not contained to one place; they will likely reverberate throughout society, changing the 
conditions of life in cities and outside of them. We have to question the means and ends, the 
rhetoric and actions. There is too much at stake to not have a clear understanding of the smart 
city: of what discourses are propagated; of what initiatives are implemented; of what interests and 
ideologies drive it forward; of what outcomes we should expect from these systems in our cities; 
and of what our roles and rights, as the subjects of the smart city, are to influence, guide, and 
even resist a movement that seeks to (re)construct cities worldwide. This dissertation aims to 
bring clarity to this set of interlocking issues. Doing so requires analyzing the technological 
politics, or techno-politics, of the smart city.  
 
Techno-Politics  
As both a theory and topic for analysis, techno-politics orients my study of the smart city. 
Techno-politics is more than just engaging politically with technologies; it means seeing 
technology as a form of politics. According to Langdon Winner (1978: 323), a noted theorist of 
techno-politics, the central idea is that “technology is itself a political phenomenon.” This does not 
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only mean that technology is a thing in need of legislation that regulates its production, features, 
and uses. Techno-politics goes beyond that basic response. Instead, Winner explains, techno-
politics “begins with the crucial awareness that technology in a true sense is legislation. [This 
approach] recognizes that technical forms do, to a large extent, shape the basic pattern and 
content of human activity in our time. Thus, politics becomes (among other things) an active 
encounter with the specific forms and process contained in technology” (1978: 323).  
If technology is a type of legislation in society, then we must take seriously those who are 
the legislators. They are not merely engineers crafting better machines or innovators drafting 
novel plans. They are designing and creating the systems and codes that govern society. By 
neglecting the techno-politics of the smart city we allow a powerful force to reside in the shadows 
even while it structures urban life.1 The techno-politics become what I call political dark matter: its 
effects are real and it exists all around us, but we struggle to account for it in our analysis. My 
goal here is to detect and describe this dark matter, to provide the tools needed for examining its 
qualities, even if only by inference. This project is an urgent one, considering that the state of 
affairs Winner described in 1978 is unfortunately still the case to today: 
New technologies are institutional structures within an evolving constitution that gives 
shape to a new polity, the technopolis in which we do increasingly live. For the most part, 
this constitution still evolves with little public scrutiny or debate. Shielded by the 
conviction that technology is neutral and tool-like, a whole new order is built—piecemeal, 
step by step, with the parts and pieces linked together in novel ways—without the 
slightest public awareness or opportunity to dispute the character of the changes 
underway (1978: 324). 
 
When citizens are disenfranchised from influencing political processes, when they are 
shut out from meaningful channels of input and recourse, we rightly call such a regime 
authoritarian. In a democracy, we are accustomed to having at least some knowledge of how 
legislation is made. We elect and lobby the legislators. We hold them accountable and threaten 
their positions. We contest and organize against decisions that run counter to our values and 
                                            
1 In her book Extrastatecraft, Keller Easterling makes a similar argument about the role of 
infrastructure—not just roads and pipes, but also standards, zones, and protocols: “Contemporary 
infrastructure space is the secret weapon of the most powerful people in the world precisely 
because it orchestrates activities that can remain unstated but are nevertheless consequential. 
Some of the most radical changes to the globalizing world are being written, not in the language 
of law and diplomacy, but in these spatial, infrastructural technologies—often because market 
promotions or prevailing political ideologies lubricate their movement through the world” (2014: 4). 
  6 
politics. Of course these processes are not perfect, but at least we recognize the power and 
importance of legislation as a force in society. We recognize the necessity of being able to 
understand, influence, and protest this force. We are righteously outraged when those rights are 
revoked. Engaging with techno-politics, thus, shows us what we give up by not recognizing 
technology as legislation. 
Tony Benn, a longtime Member of Parliament in Britain, famously came up with five 
questions that should be posed to any powerful person:  
1) What power have you got?  
2) Where did you get it from?  
3) In whose interests do you exercise it?  
4) To whom are you accountable?  
5) And how can we get rid of you? 
 
Benn concluded that the last question might be the most important: “If you cannot get rid 
of the people who govern you, you do not live in a democratic system.”2 We would do well to ask 
those questions about the architects of the smart city, and about the technologies they construct. 
For they will have more power over our everyday life and urban society than many other 
legislations ever do. 
It is tempting to create gigantic systems and then marvel at their awesome power. After 
all, how could the proud creators of a smart metropolis resist using their creation’s capacity to the 
fullest extent? Yet, the bite back of unintended consequences—and the perversity of intended 
outcomes—does not always follow a karmic cycle wherein people get what they deserve. In the 
popular Frankensteinian stories about technology-out-of-control, the irresponsible creator must 
suffer the consequences of his hubris—and so too do those around him who are guiltless victims 
(Halpern et al. 2016). But in the real world, the elite creators gain more power from the systems 
they build and wield, further extending and entrenching their positions in and over society.  
 
 
 
                                            
2 Among many other places, Tony Benn can be found stating the questions in a 2001 
parliamentary hearing. Accessed May 1, 2016 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmhansrd/vo010322/debtext/10322-13.htm 
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Remarks on the Project 
In this dissertation, my disposition will be that of a critical inquirer, rather than an eager 
booster or dispassionate observer. I will be dealing with important issues that are already shaping 
society today and will play a role in what tomorrow looks like. I take seriously the efforts by 
various corporate and government advocates of the smart city to transform urban environments. 
Even if they do not fulfill all their promises, their success at spreading smartness around the world 
cannot be ignored. By analyzing the techno-politics of the smart city we will be better equipped to 
understand these urban transformations—what logics drive them, what they herald, and what our 
role should be. 
In addition to Winner, there are two other theorists who are present throughout this 
project: Donna Haraway and Gilles Deleuze. Their presence is often spectral; they reside in the 
background, casting their influence over my analysis in ways that are not always apparent. At 
times, though, I invoke them explicitly to help explain how smart urbanism leads to strange 
entanglements of people, things, environments, codes, and information. I summon their theories 
to show how new systems of monitoring and regulating society are created, even without us fully 
being aware of them. And I conjure them to not only clarify the consequences of smart urbanism, 
but to point us to new ways of reconceptualizing our relationship with the city.  
Moreover, it is crucial to not fall into the trap of treating the smart city as a thing created 
ex nihilo. It exists at the convergence point of multiple lineages. It is a descendant of cybernetic 
urban planning, which had its heyday in the 1970s and sought to use feedback systems and 
control sciences to make cities operate more efficiently (Townsend 2013). It also emerges from 
the shift in urban governance, which also began in the 1970s and has not slowed down, towards 
an entrepreneurial mode that is marked by inter-city competition, public-private partnerships, and 
growth imperative (Harvey 1989). We can see traces and characteristics of other urbanism 
movements represent in the smart city. That does not mean it is only new wine in old bottles. The 
fact that the smart city is largely corporate driven is a meaningful difference from other 
movements.  
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At the same time, the smart city comes out of decades of technological trends that push 
for more information, more processing, and more connection. There is a tendency when talking 
about technology to espouse its novelty. In the media, press releases, and popular discourse we 
are told that: Nothing has ever been like this before and nothing will ever be the same after! 
Those same sentiments are applied to the smart city, and since I am largely focusing my attention 
on the contemporary it might seem that I support those sentiments of total novelty and newness. I 
want to nip that in the bud right away.  
There are certainly some things that are new here, like the ability for corporations to not 
only sell you a thing, but also constantly monitor your interactions with that thing. However, there 
is also a lot that is built on the past. It may modify or tweak what exists, and it may reproduce and 
protect the status quo, but it is unlikely to obliterate the existing order and install an ahistorical 
replacement. Maciej Ceglowski, a programmer and commentator, quells this tendency (with 
reference to Silicon Valley): "We have to stop treating computer technology as something 
unprecedented in human history. Not every year is Year Zero. This is not the first time an 
enthusiastic group of nerds has decided to treat the rest of the world as a science experiment" 
(2016: np). Yet, we must also be careful not to take this historical sensibility as a 
reason to ignore those experiments or become resigned to them. By all means, we 
have to do our best to study and steer them—while also keeping in mind that change contains 
both the past and the present. 
 
Project Outline 
I begin in chapter 1 by examining the discourses around the smart city. This label can be 
nebulous. Just what does “smart” mean? The term is difficult to pin down for a number of 
reasons: it contains numerous initiatives, concepts, and narratives; it is an attractive label used by 
a variety of actors; and it is strategically ambiguous so it can be widely applicable and dynamic. I 
bring analytic clarity to the actions, visions, and values of this movement by focusing our attention 
on two dominant organizations in the smart city sector: IBM and Cisco. By conducting a deep dive 
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into each company’s large body of discursive materials (e.g. reports, speeches, marketing, 
editorials, etc.), I identify an overarching narrative that structures the smart city vision. 
Part of the smart city movement’s attractiveness comes from the way it is explicitly 
framed as pragmatic, neutral, and non-ideological. Advocates of the smart city style use carefully 
crafted—and endlessly repeated—rhetoric to veil how deeply ideological these urban 
transformations really are. Yet, the choices about how smart cities are built, deployed, and 
maintained are very much political decisions about the world. They involve value-ladened 
choices, competing interests, and power dynamics. I show, in chapter 2, that the smart city 
reflects and reinforces two ideologies: technocracy and neoliberalism.  
What, however, do these discourses and ideologies mean on the ground, at the level of 
operations and implications? To answer that question I detail two interrelated, techno-political 
logics that underlie many of the various practices and systems related to smart cities. Chapter 3 
focuses on the logic of control, which constructs the city as a “system of systems,” a form of 
networked urbanism in which people and places can be totally connected, surveilled, measured, 
manipulated, predicted, and policed. Taken at the urban scale, the city becomes a cocoon of 
connectivity that engulfs us—or, alternatively, it becomes a web that ensnares us—as smart 
technologies are integrated into our everyday lives. Chapter 4 focuses on the logic of 
accumulation, which demands we extract all data, from all sources, in whatever ways possible; 
we will then sort it out later and trust the analytics to create “actionable insights” and generate 
value. These data systems fuel a political economic project I call dataveillance capitalism. The 
smart city is a key site for collecting and capitalizing on big data about anything and everything. 
In the final chapter, I hope to provide notes toward imagining alternative arrangements of 
the smart city and, in doing so, invigorate the critique and action necessary to build smart cities 
that will contribute to ideals like social justice and human flourishing—rather than elite interests 
and value extraction. The smart city is a future-in-the-making. While the dominant visions we will 
explore are offshoots of deeply rooted structures in society, they have not yet settled and 
stabilized as inextricable parts of the smart city. There is nothing inherent in these systems that 
dictates they can only be driven by logics of control and accumulation. We must not mistake a 
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contingency for inevitability. I thus offer an opening salvo for a critical techno-politics that can 
push back against the smart city, can empower people to contest these regimes, can nurture our 
relations with people-places-technologies, and can create space for us to imagine alternatives.  
The descriptive and normative elements of my dissertation come together in the service 
of an overarching argument: If making the city is a way of making those who live within the city, 
then our right to make ourselves is also a right to produce the city. Therefore, we need a new 
paradigm for urbanism that institutes a techno-politics of liberation and nurtures the relationship 
between people-places-technologies—a paradigm I call the cyborg city. 
In short, the arc of this project moves from diving into the “smart city” discourses, to 
picking apart the ideologies at its heart, to engaging with the dual logics—control and 
accumulation—that drive the smart city, and finally to imagining what an alternative techno-
politics might look like and how we might achieve it. 
Onwards. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT SMART CITIES 
This isn't just a metaphor—but, then, you know that. You are here because you 
understand that new intelligence is being infused into the way the world literally works—
the systems and processes that enable physical goods to be developed, manufactured, 
bought and sold; services to be delivered; everything from people and money to oil, water 
and electrons to move; and billions of people to work and live.  
– Samuel Palmisano (2010: np), IBM’s former Chairman, President, and CEO 
 
Just what is the smart city? What is this thing that seemingly exists in a liminal space 
between marketing and product, imagination and implementation, becoming and being? The 
answer is not clear. There is no single definition or conception that those involved in making and 
studying the smart city agree to. This lack of precision is unfortunate since many of you reading 
this work likely live in, near, or will soon be part of a place that is trying to get smart. Knowing 
what that actually entails—and how it will effect everything from how you get around the city and 
interact with people to how you are governed as a citizen and access city services—is important. 
Sometimes advocates and analysts respond to the definitional question with examples of 
smart cities. They will point to wondrous cities of tomorrow like Songdo in South Korea or PlanIT 
Valley in Portugal. These are places where the future is being made, cities built from scratch with 
“smartness” installed from the start. They are brimming with millions of sensors and networked 
infrastructure, where there truly is a “killer app” for that—whatever that happens to be. Only one 
problem, they still largely exist in different stages of development. So perhaps the respondents 
will choose to emphasize actually existing examples, like Rio de Janeiro’s NASA-esque control 
center installed by IBM or Barcelona’s interconnected environment, courtesy of Cisco. Here are 
places where “smartness” is created through retrofits. Often these are done over time in 
piecemeal fashion; tweak something here, reorganize something there. Sometimes, though, they 
are done at large-scale and in relatively fast manner, such as by quickly overhauling and/or 
appending new systems to the operations of city infrastructure. Yet, presenting a few cases still 
doesn’t really answer the original question. We are left with a few example cities that have been 
labeled smart, but still no understanding of the thing itself and what ties these initiatives all 
together. 
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It is not uncommon to see academics and companies take a different explanatory avenue 
by trying to establish rigid definitions of what it takes to be a “smart city.” Some of these can get 
comically pedantic in their quest to create the essential criterion. For instance, researchers from 
various technical universities in Europe devised a definition made up of six characteristics, 31 
factors, and 74 indicators—which they then used to rank “medium-sized cities” on their level of 
smartness (Giffinger et al. 2007). Other definitions are more open and outcome-based. “By 
definition,” write two executives from Cisco, “Smart Cities are those that integrate information 
communications technology across three or more functional areas. More simply put, a Smart City 
is one that combines traditional infrastructure (roads, buildings, and so on) with technology to 
enrich the lives of its citizens” (Chambers and Elfrink 2014: np). Such attempts at answering the 
question can quickly become unreal descriptions, resulting in academic exercises of hyper 
specificity or broad gestures at a vague label. 
These examples and definitions never really quite tell us about the “smart city.” To be 
sure, we start seeing some commonalities. It is apparent that smart cities have something to do 
with installing information technologies and communication networks into the urban landscape. 
However, the underlying foundation that is most necessary, most consequential, and most often 
missing from the recourse to specific examples and hard definitions is an understanding of the 
vision being sold, the movement being built, the world being made, the futures being opened up 
and closed down—that is to say, those aspects that make up the politics of the smart city. You 
can proclaim a city is smart because it has installed sensor arrays in its networked infrastructure, 
or because it feeds big data into advanced analytics giving real-time outputs, or because the 
city’s various systems are displayed on a bevy of screens in a central operations room. And 
maybe it is smart! But that does not tell us much about what all that tech is for, why it is desirable, 
and for whom? 
Of course, the very word “smart” is an overt linguistic tactic. The brand itself provides 
supporters an a priori advantage. Who wants to reject being “smart”? Who wants to wear the 
dunce cap because they are “dumb”? The word “smart” conjures up human characteristics like 
intelligence, knowledge, and rationality. Smart people—and, thus, smart things—can quickly react 
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to circumstances, they can understand complex things, and they are often correct. The term has 
been applied to advanced technology for quite a while. For instance, an informational retrieval 
system developed in the 1960s at Cornell University was given the acronym SMART: System for 
the Mechanical Analysis and Retrieval of Text. Not only is “smart” associated with high-tech it has 
become increasingly common in the cultural lexicon over the last several decades. It is brilliant 
marketing. Take a familiar word with a history of the kind of positive connotations you want and 
apply liberally. 
While it would be clumsy to use scare quotes around “smart” throughout this chapter, let 
alone the whole dissertation, you might imagine invisible ones when you encounter the word 
(here and elsewhere). “Smart” is not just a neutral word or a shallow adjective. It is used in a 
highly contextual way and represents a whole paradigm of how to think about technology, politics, 
and urbanism. So when I use “smart” and its varieties, I don’t mean to be uncritically taking on 
this label. I use it to refer to this paradigm. 
 
IBM and Cisco 
Some very powerful organizations are driving forward the ideals and actions of “smart-
ification.” Smartness is not a marginalized viewpoint being pushed by small grassroots groups 
who are struggling for change. Nor is it simply an off-hand remark from some mayor, which a few 
techies then began to propagate in blog posts. The smart city movement is, in short: global in 
scale, with initiatives being rolled out all over the planet; driven by proponents with deep pockets 
of wealth and influence; and a lucrative opportunity with market projections in the billions or 
trillions of dollars (over the next five to ten years).  
If we want to know where that movement comes from, what it means, what it stands for, 
and what it works toward, then a foundational place to look is at the leaders of the movement. It is 
here, by looking at their actions, their visions, and their values that we come to some kind of 
understanding about what the smart city is. So who are these leaders? 
There are many businesses and government agencies that have begun to frame and 
implement smart city initiatives. There’s no shortage of organizations that want to establish 
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themselves as members of the movement. It has become an increasingly crowded space over 
the last handful of years, with more and more organizations deciding they have a stake in getting 
smart. However, a small number of firms dominate the sector. And at the forefront are two 
longstanding technology corporations that have both made a conscious shift towards becoming 
the gurus of all things smart—creating the ways we understand, imagine, and enact smartness—
IBM and Cisco. Both of these tech giants pivoted towards smart cities around the same time, 
doing so years earlier than many other current competitors. IBM’s top executive at the time, 
Samuel Palmisano, announced the company’s vision for a “Smarter Planet” in a 2008 speech to 
the Council on Foreign Relations. This program includes a slew of interrelated projects that tack 
“smarter” onto a range of topics, from cities and government to energy and electronics. Cisco was 
not far behind, announcing its “holistic blueprint for Smart+Connected Communities” in 2009, 
which also ties together different but related sectors like transportation, government services, and 
security (Cisco 2011). 
No other companies outcompete IBM and Cisco when it comes to capital invested, 
projects initiated, revenue generated, regions entered, marketing produced, research developed, 
and so on. If there is any group that has the greatest ability to set the terms for how the smart city 
movement plays out, it is these two companies. In the business parlance, IBM and Cisco are well 
established “thought leaders” of the smart city. Rankings about market size and other metrics 
consistently put these two companies at the top. For instance, since at least 2013 Navigant 
Research, a market analysis and consulting firm focused on tech trends, has been ranking “smart 
city suppliers” according to ten criteria: “vision, go-to-market strategy, partners, product strategy, 
geographic reach, market presence, sales & marketing, product performance & features, product 
integration, and staying power.” While other companies move around the leaderboard and jockey 
for positions, IBM and Cisco retain the top two positions, respectively. According to Navigant’s 
criteria, they are the only suppliers categorized as “leaders.” (See Figure 1 for the Navigant 
Research leaderboard released in 1Q 2016.) 
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Figure 1: Leaderboard of 16 Smart city Suppliers.  
Credit to Navigant Research (2016). Used with permission. 
 
Moreover, whether intended or not, IBM and Cisco’s approaches to the smart city are, at 
times, complementary. Whereas IBM focuses heavily on software and consulting services like 
data analytics and strategic planning, Cisco’s specialty is installing and maintaining hardware like 
network infrastructure. There is overlap, but rather than driving each other out of the market they 
are able to coexist and even play off each other. As urban futurist Anthony Townsend (2013: 63) 
writes, "If Siemens and Cisco aim to be the electrician and the plumber for smart cities, IBM's 
ambition is to be their choreographers, superintendent, and oracle rolled into one." While other 
firms like Siemens will have roles to play in the overall analysis, in this chapter I will primarily be 
directing our focus on how IBM and Cisco are shaping the smart city movement.  
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Their status as renowned (and revered) thought leaders is important. The smart city is a 
world-in-the-making. It exists in a halfway space/time: partly existing in a possible future and 
partly being built in the present. Thus, these corporations must simultaneously operate within 
different temporal contexts—they are performing the future in the present (Pollock and Williams 
2010). “Stories are typically used as a way of making sense of the past and present, and are only 
then extended to cover coming possibilities. The smart city works in the opposite way, recruiting 
the future as a call for action in the present.”3 The technologies that are supposed to be integral 
to making a city smart are not necessarily valuable in and of themselves. Rather, the visions, 
ideals, and transformations that the tech is meant to coax into being—with IBM and Cisco’s 
guiding hands—is what city leaders are purchasing. But that purchase is a bet on the future, a bet 
that smartness will operate in the way they expect and want. 
IBM and Cisco both recognize that dynamic and work hard to take charge of how the 
smart city develops in the urban environment and in the minds of city leaders. One way to do 
that—a method that each company has taken up with gusto—is to control the discourse by 
producing and propagating framework manifestos, white papers, technical reports, policy briefs, 
opinion essays, and so on. These ready-made materials spread their message to anybody who is 
looking for a vision to latch onto, a solution for a problem, or anything else they promise to 
deliver. Additionally, IBM and Cisco are doing more than spreading a gospel of smartness; they 
are establishing themselves as what some scholars call “obligatory passage points” (Callon 
1986). A recent journal article about the corporate storytelling of the movement argues that “the 
discourse about smart cities can be interpreted as a tool to make certain actors and technologies 
[obligatory passage points] or key actors in the development and implementation of specific forms 
of urban management solutions” (Söderström et al. 2014: 309). In other words, if you want to 
think about the smart city, implement initiatives, and coax this urban future into being, then you 
must pass through IBM and/or Cisco’s concepts, frameworks, and solutions. To reinforce this 
ownership claim, IBM has added legal bite to its terminology by trademarking a slew of phrases 
                                            
3 This sentence and the preceding one are from an early unpublished draft of James White’s 
2016 article, “Anticipatory logics of the smart city’s global imaginary.” 
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that take the form “Smarter X,” including planet, city, commerce, energy, healthcare, public 
safety, water, and traffic. These discourses, then, are an important place to look for an 
understanding of just what the smart city—as a vision and a plan of action—is all about. 
To that end, in this chapter I take a deep dive into each company’s large body of 
discursive materials. I report on the results of my close reading and holistic analysis of IBM and 
Cisco’s documents and initiatives. These documents include speeches, white papers, technical 
reports, solutions briefs, point of view papers, financial reports, essays/editorials, and 
advertisements. (See Table 1 (IBM) and Table 2 (Cisco) in the Appendix for lists of the 
documents’ types and titles.)  
There are, of course, limitations to any study. I did not conduct interviews or ethnography 
at a smart tech firm and I did not participate or observe the workings of a control room. I relied on 
a large corpus of textual sources from the companies, media, governments, academic research, 
consultants, and wherever else I could dig up relevant information about various dimensions of 
the smart city. One consequence of this approach is that I stay at a fairly high level throughout the 
analysis. I argue that my methods are appropriate for the goals of my study, which is to bring 
clarity to the smart city movement and to sharpen the critical theoretical tools at our disposal. It 
also means I must try to balance the tension between ideals and reality, marketing and 
implementation. I try to do this by paying serious attention to both sides of that tension and to the 
points where they meet. I did not take anything uncritically and tried to preserve context. I don’t 
necessarily privilege ethnography and I don’t think we should degrade textual methods. Both are 
valuable techniques and sources for inquiry. Both provide performances of truth that censor and 
emphasize according to their audiences. Both are useful for revealing different perspectives and 
information. It is true that I’m limited to what I could find and what is already produced—but there 
was no paucity of sources for me to investigate. I am particularly interested in questions about 
how the smart city movement forms an identity, projects itself to others, establishes values and 
goals, and binds together its tenets and actions into a coherent platform (or at least tries to). For 
my own purposes, the methods and sources I chose worked well for exploring those questions. 
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I treat the smart city—its texts and technologies, initiatives and ideologies—as an object 
in need of description and interpretation. In canonical work on interpretive social science, Charles 
Taylor (1971: 3) has stated that interpretation in the social sciences “is an attempt to make clear, 
to make sense of an object of study” that is in “some way confused, incomplete, cloudy, seeming 
contradictory—in one way or another, unclear.” Just as skilled commentators can interpret 
literature, judicial opinions, and works of art, both the rhetoric of the “smart city” and the actual 
city itself can productively be treated as expressive texts and text-analogues, which must be 
interpreted in order to clear away the haze of ambiguity. By undertaking a close reading of these 
documents and placing them in their proper context, we will then have a shared foundation to 
build on.  
To be clear, I do not aim to provide the essential definition of the “smart city,” and neither 
am I looking to the corporations to provide that singular essence. My goal is not purification: 
showing you what really is a smart city and what does not pass some standard. Indeed, there is 
deliberate ambiguity in how “smart” is used. By not tying smart to a specific definition, there is 
room to move things in and out of the smart category—dumb today, smart tomorrow. This 
ambiguous quality can make the smart city a moving target that is hard to pin down. It is not 
dependent on adherence to a definition; it is represented through the discourses and practices 
that constitute its existence, both conceptually and materially. Since smartness is never put in a 
neat box with distinct parameters, as we engage with the subject it can seem to be hazy and 
monolithic. This sense is not (just) an artifact of analysis, but rather part of the territory. And it is 
something we will have to wrestle with and take into account as we explore various visions and 
manifestations of smartness. 
In brief, I treat the smart city as a vehicle for selling and implementing technological 
systems that are wrapped up in normative beliefs, social structures, and political relationships. 
And so a major goal here is fleshing out how these powerful players are framing the smart city, 
embedding certain values into those frameworks, and actively shaping what this influential 
movement might mean and become. If I were to look at the technologies alone—attempting to 
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parse out which ones are “smart” and which ones are not, as so many other analysts try to do—I 
would be overlooking the ideological glue that holds these disparate things together.  
This shared, but sometimes nonobvious, ideology is why the smart city label can be so 
nebulous and amorphous—seemingly subsuming unrelated technologies, practices, and policies 
as necessary. In 2008, geographer Robert Hollands published a key article on the “smart city” 
label, with the cheeky title “Will the Real Smart City Please Stand Up?” He argues that the label 
has been so effective at obfuscating and dazzling that, “Not surprisingly, there are few analyses 
of smart city discourse from the point of view of more critical urban perspectives.” Yet, even with 
this ambiguity, or perhaps because of it, the smart city vision is still able to colonize urban 
landscapes and capture the political imaginations of elite decision-makers. 
 
The Corporate Focus 
A quick note of justification for those who worry my focus here on corporations has 
blinkered me from seeing other important dynamics and actors in the mix: Preemptively 
expressing such a worry, one group of geographers recently warned, “There is, however, a 
tendency within critical accounts to see the smart city as a kind of universal, rational and 
depoliticised project that largely plays out according to the terms of profit-maximising, 
multinational technology companies” (Shelton et al. 2014: 14). This observation is an astute one. 
It is a tendency certainly worth not falling into. And even though I will be, in this chapter and the 
next, mostly focusing on the discourses and ideologies of smart cities as they pertain to a 
corporate-driven model, I hope to show that in no way are they universal, rational, and 
depoliticized projects. To the contrary, they are far more complex, with multi-stakeholder 
networks and values beyond mere profit-maximization.  
We should also be careful not to make the critic’s conceit and underplay the role of 
multinational technology companies. Even if they do not have an iron-fisted ability to set the 
terms, they certainly have a strong hand in establishing important parameters for what it means to 
be a smart city. Other than the corporate model, one recent study by Hollands (2015: 70) 
concluded, “there exist no large-scale alternative smart city models, partly because most cities 
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have generally embraced a pro-business and entrepreneurial governance model of urban 
development.” As an urban planning and governance movement, a lot of effort is expended on 
pushing and pulling “smartness.” Tech corporations work hard to push smartness as a crucial 
enhancement for the city. City leaders and investors pull smartness into their orbit as they look for 
quick fixes to economic, political, and social ailments (Angelidou 2015). These corporations did 
not just stumble upon an existing market for which they could fill the needs. They, rather, have 
worked hard to create this market and to shape it in certain ways. And, to be sure, the city leaders 
involved are not merely dupes who are swallowing whatever the technology corporation actors 
feed them. They too have their own wants, desires, worldviews, cities they must govern, and 
constituents they might be beholden to. Understanding the smart city requires looking at the 
corporations driving it forward, looking at the cities whose demands influence the services and 
systems developed, and looking at the deep partnerships that are formed between corporations 
and cities. 
Even then, a skeptical reader might still ask whether the people and institutions shilling 
these corporate visions are straw men—albeit ones filled with fistfuls of cash—built up for the 
purpose of tearing down. Aren’t their ideals and frameworks so problematic as to not even be 
worth taking seriously? To a critical eye they might be obviously troubling, but systematically and 
convincingly proving why, all while keeping in mind their seemingly oligarchic positions, still 
requires careful attention. There is no doubt that, in the incisive words of historian Leo Marx 
(2010: 577), “Contemporary discourse, private and public, is filled with hackneyed vignettes of 
technologically activated social change—pithy accounts of ‘the direction technology is taking us’ 
or ‘changing our lives.’” However, as Marx would surely agree, not all hackneyed vignettes are 
created equal, and they certainly do not have equal influence and power. While some vignettes 
might provide ammunition for heated discussions at the dinner table or encourage divisive op-eds 
by newspaper columnists, others inform and smuggle in the politics of global elites. When 
captains of industry and leaders of government treat them seriously, so should analysts and 
critics. 
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Thus, there is a need for deeper analyses of these corporate actors, especially the ones 
who have been very successful at implementing their ideologies, guiding government actions, 
rolling out techno-political forms of public-private governance, and filling their coffers with the 
profits—all while having immense impact on (urban) society.  
With a movement that is still dynamic and evolving, there’s no way to pin down a stable, 
rigid definition. We don’t have the benefit of looking retrospectively at something that has already 
reached an endpoint. It is still a fundamentally contested discourse, and any attempt, such as 
mine, to get analytical clarity on the discourse is subject to disagreement and problematization. 
Analysts always make choices. We have to choose where to take samples of the process-in-
action. We should do so in a way that helps us all develop a shared understanding that is 
grounded in actual—and actually influential and existing—ideals and initiatives. My premise, then, 
is that by providing description and analysis oriented toward the doings of powerful actors, we are 
at least more likely to develop an account of what is happening that does not quickly become 
ephemeral. 
 
A Tale of (Two) Smart Cities 
There are many useful ways I could explicate what I found in the documents. I could 
perform a critical, detailed reading of their respective manifestos (my own term for the type of 
master plan documents that each company has produced). Since these documents are meant to 
be holistic and self-contained, they appear to be ready subjects for inquiry, just sitting there 
waiting to be parsed out. The problem with that approach is that it would narrow the analysis by 
neglecting the loads of other relevant documents that might, as a whole, create a different view of 
the smart city. I could, then, thematically organize the data by finding broad or specific themes 
that cut across the two collections of documents. This approach would provide some external 
structure to the mass of texts by taking it, with all its details, commonalities, and differences, and 
fitting it to themes, which make it quick and easy to understand the key aspects of the discourse. 
A thematic organization would be straightforward; it would get to the point and start answering 
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those fundamental questions of what the smart city—at least the overlapping, influential 
perspectives from IBM and Cisco—is really all about.  
What follows is similar to a thematic analysis, but rather than bringing my own external 
structure of themes I will organize the analysis according to the narrative structure that forms the 
backbone of the smart city vision. In other words, many of the documents that IBM and Cisco 
produce tell a story about the smart city—a story that follows a common narrative structure. And 
that narrative structure has meaning in itself. It says something about the larger context, origin, 
and purpose of these smart city visions. It helps us see how these documents are not just 
examples of corporate marketing or technical reports. They are also detailing the features of a 
future they hope to build.   
The narrative begins with crises, the catalytic catastrophes that cities will inevitably face 
now and in the near future. From there come the theories for how to transform cities into smart 
places, which do not contribute to crisis or fall in its wake, but rather stand strong and thrive. That 
is where the smart solutions come into play and provide the interventions, systems, and services 
for real change. But, without implementation strategies, the framework and solutions won’t come 
to fruition and the smart city won’t be actualized. After all that we at last reach the outcomes and 
learn about all the beneficial enhancements the newly minted smart cities will enjoy. 
This narrative about the “smart city”—crises, theories, solutions, implementation, 
outcomes—shows us much more than if we were to simply hone in on the technological systems 
that are touted as the sine qua non of smart urbanism. To be sure, those systems are a 
necessary part, and we will get into their nuts and bolts, networks and sensors. However, it is 
critical to recognize the way in which many seemingly disparate technological, social, political and 
economic elements are all threaded together to create a holistic movement. In other words, these 
two projects—IBM’s “Smarter City” and Cisco’s “Smart+Connected Communities”—are weaving a 
complex story about where we are now and where they want to take us in the near future. 
As I describe the different elements of the smart narrative, I will largely take on the voice 
of its creators. I will report the assertions and arguments contained within the discursive material. 
There will be occasions when I step into the reporting, but those should be clear instances of 
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where I am providing my own commentary or pulling in other analysts to flesh out the smart city 
vision.  
 
Crisis as Catalyst 
The story begins by establishing that we—as people, as a world, as city leaders—are 
confronted with a number of daunting problems and crises. They threaten our very way of life, 
forcing us to discover new ways of doing things as the old ways become obsolete and insufficient. 
As Cisco informs us, “Cities and communities around the world face intractable challenges,” 
which include: population increase and rapid urbanization “placing massive pressure on city 
infrastructures,” the continuation of austerity budgets that cause cities to be “limited in their ability 
to respond to these pressures,” and the catastrophes promised by climate change “forcing cities 
to develop sustainability strategies” (Falconer and Mitchell 2012: 2). The inevitability of crisis is 
certain. Some of these crises are battering us now and show no sign of subsiding on their own. 
Some of them exist in a foreseeable future. But their existence further down time’s arrow doesn’t 
mean they are any less urgent. All of them will hit cities; some of them will do so particularly hard. 
At stake is nothing less than our fate: “It’s clear now that the future of cities is the future of the 
planet. So it’s essential that solutions be found,” says IBM (2013: 2). 
We are told that preparation for crisis, perceived or actual, is not cynical, but smart. 
“Cities face a range of challenges and threats to their sustainability across all their core systems 
that they need to address holistically,” write IBM researchers, in their manifesto “A Vision of 
Smarter Cities” (Dirks and Keeling 2009: 3). The cynics are the ones who stand by and do 
nothing when the smart systems—systems necessary for survival and thriving—are at their 
fingertips. The status quo of business-as-usual cannot overcome these challenges. Instead, we 
must see crisis as a chance not to despair, but to “seize opportunities and build sustainable 
prosperity by becoming smarter” (Dirks and Keeling 2009: 3). And those (dumb) cities that refuse 
to install “next generation systems that work in entirely new ways”—and do so at a pace that is 
“revolutionary, rather than evolutionary”—will inevitably cave under the strain of crisis, becoming 
artifacts of the past” (Dirks and Keeling 2009: 4).  
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In this crisis narrative, cities play multiple roles. They are the cause of crisis, and the 
victims of crisis. IBM, Cisco, and others then use this dynamic to sell the smart vision as a way of 
making cities the answer to crises. No city, rich or poor, escapes the need for smart restructuring. 
“In both mature and emerging markets,” says a consulting report sponsored by Cisco, “city 
authorities are facing a number of significant challenges” (Green 2011: 1). Thus the mission is to 
stave off doom for not only city-clients, but ultimately the whole planet. In recent work on the 
anticipatory logic embedded in the smart city vision, urban geographer James White succinctly 
explains how the smart city often marshals three interrelated crises to justify urban 
transformation: 
As the number of urban dwellers rises, it is imagined that the allocation and management 
of resources will become evermore difficult. These trends will be exacerbated by the 
effects of climate change, and complicated by ongoing financial and fiscal austerity. In 
the interest of protecting citizens and their way of life, it is up to city governments to take 
action today to avert the disastrous outcomes of these crises. Faced with an increasingly 
unpredictable and hazardous future the smartest cities will be those which best prepare 
for imminent insecurity. (White 2016: 574). 
 
It is worth briefly going through each of these overarching crises because they set the 
stage for the smart city, providing a larger motivational backdrop for this imaginary to play out. 
There are certainly other crises that can be found in the literature, although, as White accurately 
points out, they can typically be treated as sub-sets—smaller crises that fit into one or more of the 
three broader categories.  
 
Urban Age 
The world is rapidly urbanizing. City populations are exploding. The urban infrastructure 
and public services we rely upon will encounter additional stress from the mass influx of people 
into cities around the world. This crisis will strain and cripple the already degraded and/or lacking 
infrastructure—the “legacy systems”—that many cities are simply making do with. The scenario of 
collapse, in which infrastructure and public services crumple under the weight of rapid 
urbanization and increased population, is a grave possibility. The corporate documents, usually 
near the very beginning, often roll out a series of statistics and percentages about rates of urban 
migration and growth. For instance, Samuel Palmisano, IBM’s former Chairman, President, and 
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CEO, began a 2010 speech at the SmarterCities Forum in Shanghai by proclaiming, “In 2007, we 
crossed a major threshold. For the first time ever, more than half of us were city dwellers. By 
2050, that number will rise to 70 percent. We are adding the equivalent of seven New York Cities 
to the planet—every year.” 
This urban age rhetoric is common, and it is not hard to see why. “We should be proud of 
this unprecedented urbanization,” Palmisano goes on (2010: np). “But it is also a huge strain on 
the planet's infrastructure.” Similarly, Cisco says we are now in the “urban century.” And if this is 
the case, then entire urban “system of systems”—e.g., transportation, buildings, water, power, 
public safety, emergency responses, and more—must eventually be redesigned and made 
smart(er). They have to be able to handle that strain and thrive in spite of it. Suddenly, IBM, 
Cisco, and other companies have a huge unmet need to fill. You can hear the whooshing sound 
of markets opening up and competitors rushing to fill them. 
What really matters with this crisis and the others is they provide a way of seeing the 
world that people can understand. It seems intuitive that we are now an urban world. City leaders 
are likely feeling the pressure of urban growth and straining infrastructure, and this thesis 
provides a nice causal story for why. It is a global shift that they must contend with, and others 
have to face the same problem. They are not in it alone, and it is not their fault. What will be their 
fault, however, is if they choose to do nothing about it or choose to take on the wrong framing of 
problem-and-solution. Crisis unifies people and organizations against a common goal. 
 
Austerity in Effect 
Cities around the world must grapple with economic crises like fiscal austerity and fierce 
competition. Budgets are tight and the financial system is weak. As Cisco establishes, “fragilities 
in the global financial system threaten to stall, if not reverse, years of economic progress.” The 
financial crash in 2008, adds IBM, has “ushered in a systemic and prolonged economic 
adjustment that has severely crippled the ability of governments to deliver expected services to 
citizens, let alone push for innovative, new services” (IBM 2012b: 1). Yet, the imperatives cities 
face have not waned: provision of services, competitiveness with other cities and regions, 
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attractiveness to industry and talent, and consistent economic growth. Governments face 
pressure to ground themselves in “models of economic efficiency and fiscal sustainability” 
wherein doing more with less is “the new normal in government” (IBM 2012b: 1). 
The smart city vision holds this maxim—“do more with less”—at its core. The smart city’s 
lineage can be traced back to the 1980s and 1990s when the New Urbanism movement began 
theorizing the idea of “smart growth” as an antidote to sprawl. Moreover, there has been talk of 
ICT-infused urban places (e.g., computable cities, cyber cities, wired cities, and so on) for 
decades—with the label “smart city” first appearing in the mid-1990s (Söderström et al. 2014). 
However, one thing that the smart city has taken to heart, arguably much more so than its other 
technological cousins, is a faith in an entrepreneurial mode of urbanism (Harvey 1989). While the 
basic ideas have been around for some time, the smart city as such—particularly as a 
corporatized model—did not begin really being taking off and gaining cachet until the mid-2000s. 
Arguably, we can view the smart city as the inevitable child of a longtime marriage between a 
zealous entrepreneurial politics and a utopic technological culture (Barbrook and Cameron 1996), 
which was then baptized in the aftermath of the financial crash. The crash, coupled with a 
subsequently weak fiscal system and the promise of more crisis events, gave immediacy to the 
dangers of not being prepared to succeed in a post-crash, austere, competitive world. 
Meeting increased demands and managing austerity will require instituting new forms of 
urban governance that, according to Cisco, “take advantage of information and communications 
technology (ICT) to increase efficiencies, reduce costs, and enhance quality of life” (Falconer and 
Mitchell 2012: 2). This means adhering to what IBM calls the “foundations of efficiency” and 
applying the mantra throughout a city’s operations by instituting “force multipliers” like advanced 
analytics, public-private partnerships, constant innovation, and data monetization, as well as 
improving security, safety, and stability to create good business climates.  
 
Climatic Catastrophe 
The world faces environmental disasters brought about by climate change and intensified 
through unsustainable practices. Cisco sets the scene by pointing out that “rapid climate change, 
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regardless of the cause, threatens our way of life by impacting the weather, agriculture, and much 
more” (Evans 2012: 1). What’s more, cities are, as a Cisco-sponsored report by the consulting 
firm Ovum emphasizes, “uniquely vulnerable to the consequences of climate change”— putting 
their populations, their infrastructure, and their prosperity at further risk (Green 2011: 10). Cisco, 
in particular, continually pushes a position nominally based on incorporating the most common 
three pillars of sustainability—economics, social, environmental—into the ways cities are built, 
operated, and managed. Without implementing smart sustainability solutions that improve 
productivity while reducing impacts and inputs—through increased measurement, efficiency, 
optimization, resilience and growth—cities will continue to be part of the problem, rather than the 
answer to climate change and other disasters. 
These visions marshal climate change to argue that the smart city is not only sustainable 
for the environment, but also realizable as a sustainable business model. Thus, confronting 
climate change via sustainability measures means something different than decreasing 
emissions, developing alternative green energy, or (blasphemously) transitioning toward a less 
growth and expansion model. Climate change is largely taken to be a crisis for the economy—the 
environmental and social risks are largely threats insofar as they endanger the business climate 
and “economic vitality.” “This approach,” says IBM, “recognizes that information provides one of 
the greatest opportunities for making the planet smarter, and becoming smarter leads to new 
ideas, efficiencies, and equally important, new possibilities for our planet’s sustainability” 
(Biciocchi and Phillips 2015: 3). Since climate change is a crisis of global scale, the smart(er) 
reactions it requires must also occur at a planet wide level. 
In short, a different report by Ovum sums up how crisis is the catalyst for the smart city 
narrative:  
Population growth, urbanization, and global warming are fueling an increasing focus on 
the challenges facing the world's cities. As the global population heads towards 7 billion 
we are discovering that more people want the benefits of urbanization than our 
economies, societies, and the environment can necessarily sustain. Accommodating the 
future billions will require cities that make smarter use of resources to deliver more with 
less (Hodgkinson 2011: 1). 
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Given the general crisis framing we can read the smart city as a tragic story, as opposed 
to the typical interpretation of it as the ultimate manifestation of an urban techno-utopia. To be 
sure, those utopic elements are still present, especially in the dreamscapes of smart cities that 
are built from scratch on empty plots, networked and sensored from the outset, summoning the 
future where nothing stood before. Yet, when we consider the smart city as a piecemeal project of 
securing against the uncertain or even catastrophic future, it begins to take shape as an 
abandonment of hope in the face of urban crises. Our best bet is pragmatically maintaining 
stability and technically controlling for uncertainty. “In this way,” White (2016: 582) argues, 
“response to extreme and exceptional events—such as are imagined to be brought on by weather 
shifts and domestic insecurity—might be efficiently managed, and the city quickly returned to a 
state of normalcy.” At times the movement uses the rhetoric of revolutionary transformation, but 
the evidence betrays a tragic reluctance to strive for something grander than the entrenchment 
and expansion of the established structures of (urban) society. 
 
Theories of Technological Transformation 
These crises—and the choices made about which ones to marshal and what elements to 
emphasize—are the backdrop for the real descriptive and prescriptive work of the smart city 
movement. Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics and champion of free market 
capitalism, famously said, “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that 
crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around” (2009: ix). The 
work of establishing crises, then, is one way to precipitate demand for ideas and frameworks that 
can be used for guiding change. IBM and Cisco are not blind to this dynamic; they stoke it in 
order to justify the smart city. Their respective discourses lay out more or less cohesive, and often 
overlapping, frameworks that tie together different concepts and technologies. Their frameworks 
reconceptualize cities as places conducive to and in need of smart systems. However, their ideas 
are not merely “lying around,” but are intentionally put in the hands of city leaders and decision-
makers as ready-made panaceas for urban problems. 
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We can think of these frameworks as their theories of the smart city—ways of 
approaching, knowing, governing, and developing urban environments. As “thought leaders” in 
the field, both corporations have produced copious amounts of literature building out theories and 
terminology that provide cohesive frameworks for how they understand the smart city. They both 
share an urban theory of the city as a “system of systems” (IBM) or a “network of networks” 
(Cisco). This theory is meant to be a description of how cities exists, of how they are knowable, 
and of how their infrastructures and services operate. Each company then fleshes out a 
prescriptive theory—a technological politics—of how to develop smart city initiatives. For IBM it is 
the three i’s of instrumentation, interconnection, and intelligence. For Cisco it is the Internet of 
Everything (IoE). I will focus on these overarching theories because they run throughout both 
company’s various writings, making them crucial parts of the smart city narrative. Both companies 
have produced other theories and sub-theories, but none are more holistic than the three I’s and 
the IoE. Moreover, there are interesting and revealing similarities between the two theories; these 
connections will become apparent. 
 
System of Systems 
In order to cope with the great urbanization “mega-trend” and other such events—while 
prospering even in the face of new challenges—civic leaders “must start to consider cities as 
complex ecosystems and adjust strategy, governance and operations accordingly,” says IBM. 
Seeing the city as a complex ecosystem means taking a perspective that recognizes how 
“multiple core systems and various stakeholders” interact with each other and provide the central 
services needed for cities to operate. Framing the city as a complex ecosystem—a system of 
systems—then means transforming governance strategies by taking advantage of synergies in 
the systems and by ensuring “complexity can be reduced to a manageable level” (IBM 2011a: 3). 
In a 2011 speech entitled “Smarter Cities: Crucibles of Progress,” IBM’s Sam Palmisano said, 
“Smarter city leaders think in terms of systems. When you understand that the world has become 
pervasively instrumented and interconnected it inevitably leads you to see our planet not as a 
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collection of countries or industries, but as a system of systems.” With a  “smarter planet” on the 
line, there is no limit to the scale of systems we should be thinking at. 
When IBM rhetorically asks, “What makes a city?” They point to a three-pillar model 
consisting of three sub-parts each: planning and management (public safety; buildings and urban 
planning; government and agency administration), infrastructure (energy and water; 
environmental; transportation), and human (social programs; healthcare; education). IBM 
elaborates by stating, “A city is an interconnected system of systems. A dynamic work in 
progress, with progress as its watchword. A tripod that relies on strong support for and among 
each of its pillars, to become a smarter city for all.”4 Together, the system of these nine 
components is the city—a fully integrated entity wherein all information and infrastructure can be 
combined, processed, optimized, and controlled (Söderström et al. 2014). 
Similarly, Cisco talks about the city as a “network of networks,” and implores city leaders 
to focus “on end-to-end solutions that are integrated across disparate or siloed systems” 
(Chambers and Elfrink 2014). A “jurisdiction profile” Cisco produced about Barcelona, Spain—
one of the corporation’s flagship cities for piloting smart initiatives—explains that, “Underlying 
Barcelona’s approach to its Smart City efforts is the idea that the city functions as a “network of 
networks.” In the profile, Julia Lopez, Barcelona’s coordinator of Smart City strategy and 
coordinator of the ICT International Office for Urban Habitat, “indicated that an initial part of the 
city’s strategy development was to consider how it could connect the different city- affiliated 
‘networks’— for example, transportation, energy, and technology. From this, a blueprint was 
established” for how to develop a smart city using the network of networks (Cisco 2014e). 
It makes sense that Cisco would be particularly focused on “networks,” considering they 
see their longtime specialty—hardware—as being the key to unlocking smart solutions for urban 
environments. In the 1980s, they were among the major tech giants that created the hardware 
needed for disparate networks to interoperate with each other and become, what Cisco now calls, 
                                            
4 Accessed November 21, 2015: 
http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/sg/en/smarter_cities/overview/ 
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“today’s all-encompassing Internet.” The smart city is the new frontier for that mission (Cisco 
2010). 
 
IBM: Instrumented, Interconnected, and Intelligent 
For IBM, remaking cities—transforming them into their smarter incarnations, taking 
advantage of the “opportunity of sustainable prosperity”—will be done using a suite of “pervasive 
new technologies [that] provide a much greater scope for instrumentation, interconnection and 
intelligence of a city’s core systems.” The “three I’s” constitute the theoretical framework for IBM’s 
“smarter planet” initiatives; with these technological principles, we are told, “cities can better 
understand and control their operation and development.” 
Each ‘I’ is a layer of technologies and services that build on top of each other to form the 
full smarter city. The bottom layer, instrumentation, is “made up of sensors, actuators, 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and distributed intelligent sensors. This technology is 
based around control engineering and has a large amount of physical infrastructure” (Kehoe et al. 
2011). The main purpose of instrumentation is “data capture and control” by using devices to turn 
the city into a source of proliferating data streams. The middle layer, interconnection, clusters and 
integrates the cities systems by embedding computational power into things and linking them into 
communication networks made up of billions and trillions of other things—allowing for data and 
commands to flow to and from anywhere. This process also fuses different data sources so they 
are “transformed into event-related information,” which empowers managers “to monitor the [city] 
domain effectively” (Kehoe et al. 2011). The top layer, intelligence, then applies advanced 
analytics and sophisticated software to make sense of the data produced from the networked 
systems. The analyzed data can then be used to create performance dashboards, control 
interfaces, and optimization schemas. 
IBM sees the three I’s as the key to unlocking competitive advantage, creating value, and 
enhancing “economic vitality”—indeed, for them it holds “the potential for transforming the entire 
economic development framework” (Dencik 2013). The sphere of relevance for IBM’s framework 
extends beyond cities; entire nations and regions must recognize the transformations underway. 
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“From how we manage infrastructure and utilities, to how education, health and social services 
are delivered to better meet the needs of citizens and business, we are witnessing a dramatic 
shift in how economic development can be achieved,” said IBM. “Ushered in by a convergence of 
technologies that use the power of data, we are now able to improve locations in a smarter way” 
(Dencik 2013). Riding the wave of this powerful convergence, harnessing the power of data to 
produce wealth and progress, not being crushed by the global techno-economy’s awesome 
force—all of this requires embracing IBM’s capacities for building smartness through 
instrumentation, interconnection, and intelligence.  
 
Cisco: Internet of Everything 
Cisco’s framework is an explicit expansion of the ongoing technological trend known as 
the Internet of Things (IoT), in which physical objects, ranging from household appliances to 
industrial machinery, are embedded with sensors and computation so they can connect, 
communicate, process, and/or transmit information with or between each other through the 
Internet. The IoT is very much the essential technological platform for transforming cities into their 
smart incarnations. As we have seen, IBM also heavily relies on this “next phase” of ICT to create 
its frameworks and solutions. Cisco proclaims that they see the Internet of Everything (IoE) as 
more than just a new term for an existing “phase” or “era,” rather it is an evolution in technological 
progress: “As things add capabilities like context awareness, increased processing power, and 
energy independence, and as more people and new types of information are connected, IoT 
becomes an Internet of Everything—a network of networks where billions or even trillions of 
connections create unprecedented opportunities as well as new risks” (Mitchell et al. 2013). 
For Cisco, the IoE incorporates more than just physical things; it brings together four 
components: people, data, things, and process. First, people will connect not just through device 
interfaces, but also with wearables, implantables, and simply by existing in sensored 
environments. They will become nodes on the Internet, like “a constantly emitting activity system” 
(Evans 2012). Second, data will no longer be simply gathered and streamed to a central source 
for analyzing and processing; it will be made into information by being combined with context, 
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fused with multiple sources, and used intelligently in the network. Third, things in the IoE, like 
sensors, devices, and the stuff on which they are attached “will sense more data, become 
context-aware, and provide more experiential information to help people and machines make 
more relevant and valuable decisions” (Evans 2012). Fourth, process works to ensure the other 
three components make relevant connections, create value, and enhance intelligence. Being 
successful in a smart world where everything is connected means more than just managing to not 
be “buffeted by chaotic network effects,” it also requires business and government leaders to 
harness the “power of connections and exponential growth” (Evans 2012). 
The IoE opens up unprecedented opportunities (and new risks) thanks to its ability to 
unlock value, create information, and extend control. As two Cisco executives assure us, “The 
foundation of the city of the future will be the Internet of Everything, and those embracing this 
technology are leading the way.” Cisco predicts the IoE will significantly impact our lives in at 
least three ways. First, connections will be automated so that people will no longer need to 
proactively connect to networks. Second, the intelligence embedded within sensors and devices 
will, in real-time, filter relevant information and apply analytics, enabling “fast personal 
communications and decision making” (Evans 2012). Third, the IoE will uncover new sources, 
patterns, and applications of information about individuals, cities, and more.  
What’s more, says Cisco, “From a public sector leadership perspective, cities can be 
viewed as microcosms of the interconnected networks that make up IoE” (Mitchell et al. 2013). So 
by embracing the IoE and a network of networks view—or, for IBM, the three I’s and a system of 
systems view—the city ceases to be a chaotic, unknowable, and uncontrollable place. It becomes 
the opposite, at least for a cadre of elites. I am reminded of a quote from a Sherlock Holmes 
story, in which the detective describes his nemesis, the mastermind Moriarty: “He sits motionless, 
like a spider in the centre of its web, but that web has a thousand radiations, and he knows well 
every quiver of each of them” (Doyle 2012). The frameworks that IBM and Cisco have created 
theorize the smart city as a grand network with city leaders and tech corporations sitting at its 
center—analyzing the flows of data and commanding the radiations of control. 
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Smart Solutions 
These urban theories of the smart city are not merely descriptions of how cities exist. 
They establish the foundation for “smart solutions” that lead to control of the city, optimization of 
its operations, and extraction of value. IBM and Cisco’s smart urbanism theories inform these 
solutions, which are in turn vehicles for their politics and worldviews. The solutions—made up of 
systems and services, technologies and governance—are ultimately what corporations are 
selling, implementing, and maintaining for their city-clients. The goal is to turn the city into a 
“platform” for integrated ICTs and service models provided by the tech corporations. 
There are numerous examples of solutions, which are applicable to nearly every aspect 
of the urban environment and city life. Since they typically represent the on-the-ground, concrete 
actions of corporate actors and city leaders we will be engaging with many different ones 
throughout the book. For now, it will be useful to describe four of the major (and mutually 
reinforcing) types of solutions that IBM and Cisco are touting. 
But first, we should recognize that the language of “solutions”—like that of “smart”—is not 
just a frivolous word choice, but rather it tells us something important about how Silicon Valley 
frames the world. The technology critic Evgeny Morozov (2013b) calls this kind of thinking 
“solutionism”—the belief that all the world’s problems, even “problems” that should not be thought 
of as problems, can be solved with a technological solution. “These aren’t harmless verbal 
frames,” explains fellow critic Ian Bogost (2015). “They are signs of our willingness to allow a 
certain kind of technological thinking to take over all other thinking. And that’s a real problem, in 
the sense that word used to mean, and still could.” By recasting everything as a problem waiting 
for a technological solution, especially issues that are fundamentally social, the space shrinks for 
philosophical reflection and political contention. For now, I will use the solutionist language in 
order to remain consistent with the discourse I’m describing. But we should keep in mind just 
what these word choices really mean and how they shift our framing of the world—changing the 
way we think and the types of actions we undertake. Every time we encounter somebody 
hawking a “solution,” it would probably be a good thing if we paused for a minute and thought 
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about this curious language and all its context and subtext. And perhaps ask whether people 
might actually be discovering certain problems in order to solve them in certain ways. 
 
Control Rooms 
The centerpiece solution of the smart city is a control room, which many of the major 
corporate players have their own version of. IBM calls it an Intelligent Operations Center (IOC); 
similarly Cisco has the City Operations Center (and Siemens prefers the term City Cockpit). The 
control room’s centerpiece is usually a large grid of screens that might take up an entire wall, 
while the room is filled with rows of terminals and chairs filled with city managers and data 
scientists. The control room is the central clearinghouses for city data and the source of 
commands for various city systems.  
This software solution is, according to Cisco, “highly applicable to IoT and the Internet of 
Everything (IoE) where control rooms are the ‘brain’ or ‘engine’ enabling real-time analysis and 
operations” (Cisco 2014d). This cybernetic brain/engine of the city creates a “platform” that offers 
numerous capabilities, leading to a “unified management experience for city infrastructure, 
simplifying control room operation and system integration, minimizing total cost of ownership, and 
increasing operational efficiency critical to rapid decision-making” (Cisco 2014d). The control 
room achieves this lofty goal by providing city managers, technicians, analysts, and decisions 
makers with an “Executive Dashboard” that unifies reports, metrics, indicators, analytics, and 
other tools for the purpose of showing historical, real-time, and anticipatory information about the 
city, which is used to inform how agencies plan, monitor, and respond to the whole urban system 
(IBM 2012a).  
An IBM “solution brief” document about the IOC illustrates how a system of systems view 
allows IBM to “help organizations integrate information from disparate, instrumented systems and 
create an intelligent, interconnected environment that fosters collaboration, enhances efficiencies 
and sponsors effective decision making” (IBM 2011b). To that the end, the IOC “offers integrated 
data visualization, real-time collaboration and deep analytics that can help city agencies prepare 
for problems, coordinate and manage response efforts and enhance the ongoing efficiency of city 
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operations” (IBM 2012a). The IOC is the ultimate, holistic “software solution” needed to manage, 
control, and direct the city. “The solution helps transform raw data—collected from sensors 
located across the city, historical databases, existing applications and other sources—into 
actionable insights.” For instance, the IOC can be used to develop and execute “standard 
operation procedures,” which are “essential to delivering consistent, measured responses to 
unpredictable situations” (IBM 2011b). 
These tech corporations cast their version of the control room as the essential solution for 
integrating and enhancing the city as a whole. It is a large undertaking that requires real 
commitment; hence only a few cities on the frontier of smartness have installed them (e.g. Rio de 
Janeiro, Singapore, and Songdo). The purveyors hope to use these pilot cities as places to refine 
and showcase the control room’s capabilities to other potential clients.  
 
Networked, Sensored Infrastructure  
As we have seen, the IoT and IoE are the crucial technological application-cum-platforms 
for creating smart cities. Many of the smart solutions involve implementing initiatives that 
integrate sensor arrays, networked connections, data-driven “actionable insights,” and control 
apparatuses into a wide range of infrastructures. In other words, the many systems that make up 
the holistic urban system—“such as emergency management, energy, public safety, social 
services, water and transportation” (IBM 2012a)—must be made smart by becoming subjected to 
technological regimes of instrumentation, interconnection, and intelligence. 
Cisco describes its Smart+Connected Communities program as a “visionary answer [to 
the problems cities face]: using intelligent networking capabilities to weave together people, 
services, community assets, and information into a single pervasive solution. Smart+Connected 
acknowledges the essential role of the network as the platform to help transform physical 
communities to connected communities. It also encapsulates a new way of thinking about how 
communities are designed, built, managed, and renewed to achieve social, economic, and 
environmental sustainability” (Cisco 2010). Similarly, in a 2010 speech titled “Building a Smarter 
Planet: The Time to Act is Now,” IBM’s Sam Palmisano said, “Indeed, applying smarter 
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technologies to drive cost out of our legacy systems and institutions—doing more with less—will 
be critical to our near-term and long-term economic prospects. We will need to extend our 
infrastructure's useful lifetime, and we will need to ensure that next-generation systems are 
inherently more efficient, flexible and resilient.” Palmisano went on to say, “Within a Smart City 
context […] infrastructure will become a dynamic platform enabling continuous innovation” (2010). 
In short, these networked, sensored solutions boil down to constructing ICT-infused infrastructure 
that grant city leaders and managers the ability to monitor and manipulate the flows of matter and 
energy that circulate throughout the city—whether it be people or electricity.  
 
Data / Analytics 
The lifeblood of the smart city is data. Many of the solutions are based on either creating 
and collecting data or processing and using data. “Smart City technologies integrate and analyze 
massive amounts of data to anticipate, mitigate, and even prevent many problems,” says a Cisco-
sponsored consulting report (Clark 2013). “This data is leveraged, for example, to intelligently 
reroute traffic and reduce accidents, identify crime hot spots and target resources for crime 
reduction, and connect citizens at work or out on the town” (Clark 2013). The prevailing attitude is 
that a city should collect as much data as possible, store it in cloud servers, and figure out what to 
do with it later. Achieving that data accumulation imperative typically means installing Internet-
connected sensor arrays throughout the city—which can gather almost any data imaginable, from 
air quality and ambient sounds to the biometrics and location of people.  
The idea that we should not collect as much data, as quickly, and from as many different 
sources as possible can come off as a baffling, even blasphemous, prospect. In 2010, Palmisano 
headed off the naysayers who feared we would drown in the tsunami of data: “You may be 
thinking that the last thing we need is more information raining down on us, more noise. But we 
now have the capability, with advanced software analytic tools, to extract value from data—to see 
the patterns, the correlations and the outliers. Sophisticated mathematical models are helping us 
begin to anticipate, forecast and even predict changes in our systems. That's the promise of a 
smarter planet.” Simply put, data is the dynamo driver of smart solutions. 
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As Ginni Rometty, IBM’s current Chairman, President, and CEO, said in a 2013 speech 
to the Lisbon Council, “[Data] is nothing less than the appearance of a vast new natural resource. 
Data promises to be for the 21st century what steam power was for 18th, electricity for 19th and 
fossil fuels for 20th – that is, the creator of enormous wealth and progress… And unlike those 
previous natural resources, this one is infinite.” Thanks to advanced analytics, data is promised to 
be a source of “actionable insights” that will change how decision makers understand the city. As 
Rometty (2013a) said, “A new generation of leaders is building a data-driven future.” They will be 
able to make pragmatic, factual decisions by incorporating the patterns, trends, and predictions 
that are derived from the vast stores of data. Moreover, “agencies can go beyond simply 
managing data to exploiting it” for all the value it is worth (Rometty 2013a), by, for instance, 
selling it to private sector partners or using it to prove that the city-as-portfolio is a sound 
investment decision for financiers. 
 
Urban Governance 
Cities must establish new governance models that are updated for the 21st century. 
These transformations must support and boost smart solutions; otherwise, any attempt to create 
a smart city—not to mention the city’s chances for success in a fiercely competitive landscape—is 
doomed to fall apart. Urban governance has many crucial roles to play in constructing a smart 
city: it serves as the foundation, providing a reliable base to build from; it serves as the scaffold, 
supporting smartness as it scales up; and it serves as the blueprint, directing the purpose and 
goals of smart initiatives. If cities want to survive “the fight for investment,” as Cisco calls it, and 
other inter-city competitions for resources and capital, they will have to become more 
entrepreneurial, grow larger (e.g. “megacities” and “mega-regions”), and take full advantage of 
smart solutions (Hodgkinson 2011). 
While actually existing smart cities might be rolled out in piecemeal ways, this does not 
dilute the need for urban governance that is driven by strong leaders and clear visions. A Cisco-
sponsored white paper by the consulting firm IDC Government Insights says:  
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To bring investments into alignment across departments, cities need leaders who will 
promote a digital master plan that spans the entire city […] The general characteristics of 
an overarching Smart City mission should include goals about sustainable economic 
development, a culture of innovation, open data, cross-department collaboration, and key 
services to provide a higher quality of life for citizens (Clark 2013: 16).  
 
Thus, mobilizing effective smart solutions will require orienting governance towards 
processes like implementing integrated ICT systems, collaborating with private-sector partners, 
and becoming generally entrepreneurial—which then leads to innovation, growth, and 
empowerment. 
What's important to recognize is that the smart city is much more than its technological 
systems.  It is also deeply entangled with—both as a product of and vehicle for—certain 
structures of urban governance. “Indeed,” said Rometty (2013a), “one consistent theme across 
most of our Smarter Planet engagements is the need to build not just technology, but 
constituency.” Thus, these solutions and initiatives are not just surface-level additions or mere 
tweaks; they induce much deeper transformations. 
 
Implementing Initiatives 
The visions of smart cities are constructed through discursive, technological, and 
ideological components. Making smartness a reality and implementing the initiatives requires 
using a plurality of methods. The implementation process is shaped by aspects such as the local 
context and social/physical structures of the target city, the challenges and desires that motivate 
city leaders, and the profitability and feasibility for tech corporations. As important as the visions, 
theories, and frameworks of smartness are, the purveyors must also focus on implementation 
strategies—after all, they eventually have to build and sell things. 
Cisco, for instance, admonishes other stakeholders for lagging behind on the “how” 
phase of smart cities. While urban experts and academics spend a lot of time thinking about 
“why,” and tech companies and consultants focus on “what,” city leaders need the most 
assistance with “how.” Cisco concludes that, “The debate is no longer about why a Smart City 
initiative is good for a city or what to do (which available options to choose), but instead about 
how to implement Smart City infrastructures and services, including the importance of a common 
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language and a structured approach to implementation” (Falconer and Mitchell 2012). This is a 
strong declaration: the debates are done, accept the smart city, start working on implementation. 
Cisco admits that both types of questions—“why” and “how”—“are important, but focusing too 
much on the ‘why’ will hinder quick adoption of solutions and initiatives” (Falconer and Mitchell 
2012). And really that’s the name of the game; we are constantly told the time to act is now, start 
piloting right away, adopt quickly, innovate and iterate. 
To better understand the different implementation methods—which might be coming to 
your own city soon, if not already—we can break them apart into three broad categories. I don’t 
mean to homogenize smart city initiatives by flattening their differences and ignoring their 
contexts. Each of the following categories contains multitudes. But this chapter is not the place to 
try to capture the complete and total picture of how implementation occurs. Rather, my intention 
is to use careful simplification with the aim of providing analytic insight into the overarching 
methods and plans for smart city implementation.  
 
Retrofit, Renovate, Renew 
By far the most common “actually existing” smart cities are those that are retrofitted and 
renovated with upgrades that transition them from dumb to smart. Many estimates place the 
number of cities and towns with explicitly labeled “smart” initiatives—at some scale, small or 
large—into the tens of thousands (or more) around the world. In these retrofit cases, a team of 
urban geographers recently observed, “the smart city is assembled piecemeal, integrated 
awkwardly into existing configurations of urban governance and the built environment” (Shelton et 
al. 2015). A Cisco report about retrofitting cities calls this “digital urban renewal,” a term they use 
“to encompass the different facets and approaches to the concept of a smart city” (Green 2011). 
Rather than stripping out “legacy systems” and replacing them with smart updates, many retrofits 
involve the “use of ICT as an overlay for existing infrastructure” and incremental changes to 
current institutions (Green 2011). 
There are many drivers and barriers for digital urban renewal. On the demand-side, 
getting smart is the ready panacea for overcoming austerity, managing the urban system, and 
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becoming an attractive place for capital to flow into. These goals are achieved by using 
“networked infrastructures to improve economic and political efficiency and enable social, cultural 
and urban development” (Hollands 2008). Hence, smart retrofits promise to provide city leaders 
with the means necessary for achieving their entrepreneurial ends. On the supply-side, drivers 
include “a number of technology developments and new kinds of commercial and organizational 
arrangements have helped to make digital urban renewal initiatives easier to realize” (Green 
2011). There are also, of course, barriers that slow progress and change. According to Cisco, 
“The most fundamental obstacle to digital urban renewal is the limitations of municipal 
government” (Green 2011). They often lack the empowerment, resources, expertise, and 
perspective to implement smart initiatives—even in a piecemeal, retrofitted, renewal kind of way. 
And, more simply, some barriers “can be attributed to a fear of change.” 
 
Smart Shock 
Then there is the ‘shock therapy’ method—or, what we might call smart shock—in which 
a city undergoes a quick, large-scale integration of ‘smart’ ideals, technologies, and policies into 
an existing landscape. There are not as yet any cities that have experienced a full shock, but 
rather there are places where the smart city transition has occurred to a greater degree and at a 
more rapid pace than the typical retrofits. Two great examples are Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and 
Barcelona, Spain.  
In 2010, Rio partnered with IBM to install an Intelligent Operations Center, which 
according to urban geographer Rob Kitchin’s analysis, “draws together data streams from thirty 
agencies, including traffic and public transport, municipal and utility services, emergency 
services, weather feeds, and information sent in by employees and the public via phone, Internet 
and radio, into a single data analytics centre” (Kitchin 2014b). There were two unique catalysts 
that opened the way for Rio’s smart shock: the city would be hosting the World Cup in 2014 and 
the Olympics in 2016. Rio has long been sharply divided along socio-economic lines, and with the 
city’s being on the world stage twice in as many years, Rio was desperate for a way to clean up 
its streets and project an image as an advanced and stable city. With its control room, IBM helped 
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turn Rio into a system of systems ripe for optimization and securitization. Different parts of the 
urban environment can now be scrutinized at a more exacting level, thus amplifying the already 
existing practices of militaristic urban control, especially of poor and marginalized groups 
(Wacquant 2008). IBM and other tech corporations have created similar operations centers 
elsewhere for single agencies like police departments, but none have yet reached the magnitude 
of scale and integration as Rio’s system. Although, there is plenty of indication that Rio 
foreshadows the type of systems we can expect to see being rapidly built and deployed in other 
cities.  
In 2011, Cisco began a “strategic pilot program” with Barcelona to “transform” the city into 
a “blueprint for modern urban development,” which can then be exported to other cities. As of 
2014 Barcelona’s quest for smartness has resulted in 22 major programs with 83 separate 
projects that fit into one or more of the 12 urban systems. Barcelona is currently developing a City 
OS platform, which “will sit atop the city’s established network of sensor technology to collate and 
analyze data that is collected across the network” (Cisco 2014e). When it was implemented the 
stated overarching objective for the Barcelona Smart City program was “to improve efficiency of 
city services and to address sustainability and environmental concerns.” The idea that a city 
functions as a “network of networks” informs the approached used in Barcelona. According to the 
coordinator of Smart City Strategy for the City of Barcelona, the presence of a “top-down political 
vision” was necessary to achieve the “big, final push” for implementing these projects: “If you 
don’t have political willingness, it is impossible.” Additionally, the coordinator said, without a 
“strong and well-thought-out public/private partnership” to follow, these smart city developments 
could not have been done. 
 
Built From Scratch 
The idealistic models for the smart city are the built from scratch projects that are being 
constructed where nothing existed before. A canonical case is New Songdo in South Korea, 
which serves as a global test-bed (Halpern et al. 2013) and urban laboratory (Gieryn 2006) for 
implementing large-scale smart systems in the wild. Even the island it is being constructed on is 
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man-made, truly allowing it to be a city from nowhere. To boost its progress, Songdo was planned 
as one of three cities situated within the Incheon Free Economic Zone, meaning it is outfitted with 
policies that make it attractive to foreign investment and upper-class residents (Easterling 2014). 
At a cost of approximately US$40 billion, Songdo’s corporate and government backers hope to 
make it the world’s first fully smart city. “Songdo claims intelligence not from its inhabitants, but 
from the millions of wireless sensors and microcomputers embedded in surfaces and objects 
throughout the metropolis,” remarks Christine Rosen (2012), a philosopher of technology. As the 
designated technology partner for Songdo, Cisco provides its tech and helps shape its vision.  
Songdo is not the only dreamscape city attempting to come into existence from the 
imaginations of their designers and funders. Others include PlanIT Valley in Portugal and Masdar 
in United Arab Emirates. The built from scratch method of implementation seeks to build a zone 
of futurity. That is, a window into a grand, but plausibly potential, urban future. However, all of 
these examples are currently in some stage of construction and development, with Songdo likely 
the furthest along. None has yet to be fully brought online. “Building new, green cities from 
scratch is a great way to showcase potential solutions, but most people will never live in this kind 
of development,” Cisco recognizes (Green 2011). For now, the purpose of these ultimate smart 
cities is not so much to be the new paradigm, but rather to provide full-scale environments for 
testing smart technologies and governance on real people. And, as Cisco says, they are 
showcases: why just tell potential customers about the smart city with a pamphlet, when you can 
show them the vision in tangible form?  
 
Outcomes Orientated 
A self-proclaimed “pragmatic agenda for forward-thinking leaders”—as Palmisano put it in 
a 2010 speech at the venerable think tank Chatham House, the Royal Institute for International 
Affairs—the smart city is “not an aspirational vision, but rather a practical way to address the 
kinds of problems” that the world faces. The movement is explicitly outcome oriented. The ability 
to get things done and achieve tangible benefits is an integral part of the narrative used to sell the 
movement’s technological politics to world leaders, city managers, citizen groups, and whoever 
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else wields influence and makes decisions. After all, what good is a solution if it doesn’t solve 
anything?  
Yet, the outcomes they promise and the actual outcomes that arise are not always one 
and the same. Unevenness is an inevitable consequence of building socio-technical systems and 
governance institutions. And even when intention and action match up, it is not clear that the 
results are ones we should be striving toward. But before those judgments can be made, we need 
to understand what kind of intended outcomes smart city advocates marshal to justify their urban 
projects. In general, they can be grouped into a few major categories. These categories are not 
exhaustive; the opportunistic and optimistic promises common to the smart city movement 
occasionally marshal other types of outcomes. However, the following three are central to the 
smart city discourse. Many of the details here will be familiar by now since they are injected into 
almost every previous stage of the narrative. In later chapters we will critically explore these 
various outcomes, actual and projected, in a deeper way. 
 
City Systematic 
Once the city is remade into a system of systems—with everything thoroughly integrated 
thanks to instrumentation, interconnection, and intelligence—city agencies will have a suite of 
powerful new capabilities available to them. To use a different term common to the tech world’s 
lexicon, the city becomes an “ecosystem,” which IBM defines as a “complex web of 
interdependent organizations and relationships aimed at creating and allocating value.” The city-
as-ecosystem is “mutual and multiplicative,” meaning “the whole is greater than the sum of the 
individual parts” (Fleming et al. 2015: 11). With their technical know-how, IBM and Cisco (among 
others) promise to take the “hundreds of different systems and protocols that do not interoperate” 
and reconstruct them into a single network so that “significant opportunities for productivity, 
growth, and innovation can be unleashed” (Amato et al. 2012). City leaders and tech corporations 
can then enjoy the political, economic, and social transformations that both are yearning for—they 
are the apex of the ecosystem. A Cisco brochure called “Changing a City, a Country, the World” 
reveals the ambitious and totalizing nature of these intended outcomes: 
  45 
The foundation for the city of the future will be the network and the information it carries, 
enabling the delivery of vital services from transportation utilities and security to 
entertainment, education, and healthcare. Everything will be connected, intelligent, and 
green: from office buildings and appliances to hospitals and schools. Citizens and 
businesses will enjoy unprecedented levels of collaboration, productivity, and economic 
growth without compromising the environment. Managing and operating such a smart, 
connected community will be efficient, coordinated, and secure (2010: 2). 
 
In other words, the urban environment is restructured so that it is susceptible to amped 
up forms of networking, datafication, surveillance, control, security, partnerships, and much more. 
Managers will receive daily reports that crystallize the status of the city’s various systems, which 
then inform them how to manipulate and optimize urban processes. Analysts will subject the 
plethora of urban data to analytics and feed it into software in order to know the city, discover 
correlations, and create “actionable insights” for decision-makers. Police will use data fusion to 
obtain “situational awareness,” predictive analytics to direct where they send patrols before 
crimes happen, and other enforcement technologies to “monitor public areas,” quell “social 
unrest,” and “track suspects.”  
These activities are only a sampling of what these agencies and others will be able to do 
once they get smart and take advantage of the new urban system of systems. Remember that 
IBM’s umbrella project is called “Smarter Planet” and that Cisco portends the Internet of 
Everything. Those grand ambitions can lead to some visions of the future that are, well, a bit 
excited. Consider this prediction from Dave Evans, Cisco’s Chief Futurist and Chief Technology 
Officer: 
While it may seem out of reach today (and possibly laughable to some), IoE will 
eventually allow us to become better stewards of our finite resources by improving how 
we sense, understand, and even manage our environment. As billions and even trillions 
of sensors are placed around the globe and in our atmosphere, we will gain the ability to 
literally hear our world’s ‘heartbeat.’ Indeed, we will know when our planet is healthy or 
sick. With this intimate understanding, we can begin to eradicate some of our most 
pressing challenges, including hunger and ensuring the availability of drinkable water 
(Evans 2012: 6). 
 
Whether laughable or not, It is important to keep in mind that the scope of the smart city 
project does not draw discrete boundaries around individual cities. The potential for networking 
and sensing must extend beyond that arbitrary geography, laying the groundwork for smart 
“mega-regions”—and ultimately for layers of ICT that ensconce the globe. 
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Economic Vitality 
If smartness unifies the city, making it into a single totalizing environment, then what 
keeps this system alive and healthy is a drive for “economic vitality”—which is IBM’s term for a 
catchall economization of the city. Vitality means more than growth. It means brokering 
partnerships, or the new term d'art, “collaborations,” at all levels of the private-public sector. It 
means discovering new sources of “value creation” from urban data. It means establishing 
entrepreneurial principles at the core of city governance. It means embracing competition as the 
normal backdrop of society. It means using “emerging and disruptive technologies” to create 
“business and social environments that are connected and open, simple and intelligent, fast and 
scalable, innovative and reimagined.” Smart initiatives are an elixir for reenergizing, 
strengthening, and transforming the economic life of the city. According to IBM, the economic 
vitality they offer to invigorate cities with is necessary to survive, let alone to thrive: 
With global competition intensifying, and the disruption to global value chains increasing, 
the time to address the economic vitality challenge for the 21st century is now. ‘Opting 
out’ is not an option. Turning the transformative potential of new technologies and 
changing demographics into economic and societal value should be viewed as a 
tremendous opportunity for improving our cities, regions and countries in the years to 
come. To realize this opportunity, public sector organizations must challenge and change 
their traditional organizational mindset, make the right connections and drive forward to 
become the standout success story in the data-driven global economy (Fleming et al. 
2015: 15). 
 
This particular category of outcomes is often overlooked in analysis of smart cities—
again, the technologies easily become the focus while the political economic production of them 
is pushed out of frame. But economic vitality speaks to those who are hit hard by austerity, who 
face pressure from citizens and competitors, and who want to graduate in the global rankings. 
Some mayors are quite conscious of their image as innovators and cutting-edgers, for them the 
smart technologies are integral to cultivating that image. Yet, many others just want the easiest or 
cheapest or most reliable way to ramp up economic activity. If becoming a smart city means 
gaining efficiency, saving dollars, attracting investment, and beating competition then great—
those are outcomes anybody can get behind. (The importance of this political economic rationality 
will be further fleshed out in later chapters.) 
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Service Enhancement 
Smartness also entails enhancing city services and infrastructure through an application 
of new technologies and different principles. For instance, IBM argues that we need a shift 
towards “citizen-centric services” where the imperative is “to innovate service delivery and user 
interactions for public sector organizations” in ways that are “coupled with data capture and 
analytic tools.” The public sector must act like a business by treating service provision as an 
opportunity to gather valuable data. “Every front office interaction with a constituent—whether 
that’s a patient, a student or the citizen-customer—can generate data needed to serve the public 
more effectively, enabling citizen-centric services,” says IBM (Fleming et al. 2015: 8). This 
“reciprocal relationships” takes a cue from ICT-powered businesses that capture all possible data 
about their customer’s activities in order to make their services predictive, responsive, and 
personalized. In the data-driven urbanism that underlies the smart city vision, it is crucial that city 
governments and tech corporations possess (and perhaps share) huge stores of data. The 
benefits that come from a form of urban governance fueled by data far outweigh any downsides 
from the standard suite of privacy and security risks. And, anyways, a smart city will figure out 
how to fix and prevent those issues. 
Many of the enhancements are not fundamental transformations, but are rather added 
layers of ICT that augment the way things are already done. “Most smart city constituents,” says 
Cisco, “agree that it’s less expensive and easier to deploy ICT than to replace legacy city 
infrastructures” (Falconer and Mitchell 2012: 3). In this way, smart outcomes can be achieved 
without the accompanying sticker shock of big dollar signs. For example, Cisco (2014b) 
recommends installing a “remote expert” system for government services. Such a system would 
use real-time TelePresence, interactive touch screens, document sharing and printing to provide 
government services to citizens at remote “points of service.” (Cisco has invested heavily into 
TelePresence in the hope it will be a foundational technology that transforms many aspects of 
citizen life. They claim to be providing over 20,000 TelePresence units for Songdo to install in 
every home.) This system would provide many conveniences of e-government, but for people 
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who want or need to still have “face-to-face interaction with public service experts” (Cisco 2014b: 
1). Instead of coming to a central office, citizen can go to a “remote services center,” which might 
be based in libraries or post offices. 
A larger goal that many of these enhancements fold into is to turn the city itself into a 
platform for the proliferation of smart systems. That is to say, a place that supports the 
development and use of “killer apps” for solving urban issues and is oriented towards tech-
infused, corporate-partnered models of service. A Cisco-sponsored report by the consulting firm 
Ovum argues that a paradigm shift is occurring in how cities apply ICT. Rather than being a 
“‘build, customize, and own affair,” as it was in the 20th century, “ICT in the 21st century will be 
more of a ‘source and orchestrate’ affair. Increasingly powerful and useful applications and 
services will be available over the Internet and delivered via cloud computing models—no up-
front investment, pay-as-you-go” (Hodgkinson 2011: 25). These ICT services will, of course, be 
sourced from the tech corporations like IBM, Cisco, Siemens, Microsoft, and others. 
 
And So… 
We now see how the smart city narrative is structured: stoke a crisis (or three), theorize a 
framework for smart urbanism, marshal solutions to fix what ails city-customers, strategize about 
different implementation styles, and bring it all home with desirable outcomes. The structure of 
this story is a good vehicle for the techno-political content that IBM, Cisco, et al. are selling; it’s an 
understandable narrative that people can see themselves as characters within. And it has 
germinated quite successfully so far. As of 2013, Rometty said that IBM has been involved in 
“more than 2,000 Smarter Cities engagements,” in which IBM has helped “mayors and other 
urban leaders manage, analyze and use data for economic growth, increased profitability and the 
public good.” Whereas, a 2014 report from Cisco says they have “deployed solutions in many 
cities worldwide—some 120 deployments of varying sizes” (Cisco 2014c: 3). With places such as 
Barcelona, Chicago, and Dubai serving as “lighthouse cities”—like smart beacons in the dark—
because they have implemented multiple solutions. 
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With this shared foundation about what the smart city is—about the technologies, 
institutions, frameworks, and values that constitute it—we at least have some grasp of the 
otherwise nebulous concept. The question still remains, though, what does it mean? What are the 
politics and values and worldviews that are embedded in it? The smart city aims to redesign 
urban society. What type of city—and city dwellers—does this movement intend to produce? And 
whose ideological specs will that design follow? 
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CHAPTER 3 
IDEOLOGIES OF THE NON-IDEOLOGICAL 
The smarter enterprise you and I create […] will force economic growth and it will force 
societal progress. 
— Ginni Rometty, IBM’s Chairman, President, and CEO (2013c) 
 
In an age of advanced technology, inefficiency is the sin against the Holy Ghost. 
— Aldous Huxley (1995) 
 
 
Part of the smart city movement’s attractiveness comes from the way it is explicitly 
framed as pragmatic, neutral, and non-ideological. Its advocates claim to eschew partisan 
politics, in favor of embracing the technical rationality of getting things done. This is, of course, 
one of the oldest tricks in the ideological playbook. When somebody goes out of his way to 
proclaim a non-ideological position it is most likely evidence of, as Slavoj Žižek often says, “Pure 
ideology!” There is no better way to seed ideology than to have people believe they are escaping 
ideology. 
  Advocates of the smart city use rhetoric about rationality and pragmatism to veil how 
deeply ideological these urban transformations really are (Söderström et al. 2014). Samuel 
Palmisano (2011: np), for instance, doesn’t consider creating and selling smartness to be 
ideological work, and he proclaims that IBM’s partners in implementation act only out of 
pragmatism: “these city leaders are non-ideological. They get things done.” He continues, “If 
you’re a mayor, or a police chief, or the head of an urban school system, you don’t have the 
luxury of ideology. You have to be pragmatic.” This statement is, frankly, an odd one, especially 
in a time of mayors who rule their cities like CEOs, police chiefs who maintain militarized urban 
control, and school superintendents who prize prison-like security and factory-like efficiency. 
Perhaps what Palmisano means, then, is that these city leaders are mired by ideology—when 
they actually don’t have the luxury to be—and thus require the assistance of smart initiatives that 
can relieve them of ideology’s burden. Either way, the sentiment, which is repeated ad nauseam, 
is that ideology is incompatible with smartness. 
Ideology is not an evil spirit always threatening to possess you, unless you have the right 
incantations and rituals to ward it off. But it would certainly seem that way based on the way 
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ideology is used as a boogeyman that we must always be working to outrun and outsmart. This 
conception of ideology is unproductive and all too common. It needs to be corrected before we 
see how it has become an integral part of the smart city movement. 
In short, an ideology is a system of ideas, theories, symbols, beliefs, values, and aims—
which are often cultural and political in nature. In his seminal study on ideology, Clifford Geertz 
says “it is through the construction of ideologies, schematic images of social order, that man 
makes himself for better or worse a political animal” (1973: 218). Ideologies inform our 
understanding of how the world works, our actions in the world, and our views of how the world 
ought to be. Ideologies mediate our experiences of the world; they help us give meaning to those 
experiences. Ideologies are, Geertz writes, “maps of problematic social reality and matrices for 
the creation of collective conscience” (1973: 220). That is, they give us tools for navigating the 
complexities of society and for developing affinities with (and against) others. “Whether, in any 
particular case, the map is accurate or the conscience creditable is a separate question.” Our 
concern here should not be: Who is ideological? But rather: What is the content and 
consequence of an ideology? This question is becoming difficult to ask, though, because the 
default reaction—especially in the technological and political spheres—is seemingly to deny ever 
being tainted by ideology. 
In their quest to be the most non-ideological, these proponents all too often slip into the 
attitude memorably parodied by Geertz (1973: 194) as “I have a social philosophy; you have 
political opinions; he has an ideology.” Here the “I” might be smart city contractors; the “you,” city 
leaders; and “he” the various interest groups raising deeper concerns about the implementation of 
mass surveillance, data processing, and control. Take another speech by Palmisano (2010)—
who truly was a “thought leader,” in the sense that his clout and outspokenness helped him 
greatly influence the smart city movement’s direction—in which he asserted, “Building a smarter 
planet is realistic precisely because it is so refreshingly non-ideological.” Such statements 
exemplify Geertz’s observation that the deployment of the term ideology is one of the most 
ideologized practices of modern rhetoric. It is treated as a way of concealing the more 
contestable values and assumptions driving those dismissing their opponents as ideological. 
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To be clear, unlike these smart proponents I do not mean to use the term ideology as an 
automatic accusation, but rather in a critically descriptive capacity. If we are going to understand 
the implications of the smart city, we must not pretend that these city leaders and corporate 
partners are trading in politics for pragmatics. As if pragmatism itself is not also an ideological 
position. Palmisano (2011) expresses the conviction that, “We don’t have to wait for the resolution 
of the ideological debates to make our city systems smarter.” However, by following this line of 
argument we are only fooled into thinking we are sidestepping ideological debates—eliding the 
fact that the very act of making smart cities is the product of ideology. 
What I’m unsure about is whether the bold proclamation of neutrality is the result of 
duplicitous rhetoric directed at those who want to believe they are acting non-ideologically. Or, is 
it a knowing agreement that both parties, sellers and buyers, benefit from by covering the 
initiatives in a heavy veneer of neutrality? Or, are the advocates so deep in ideology that they 
don’t notice it, truly believing they are championing a neutrally pragmatic way of changing the 
world? Most likely it a combination of all three.  
Consider the way in which a Cisco-sponsored report justifies its choice of terminology by 
saying, “Ovum prefers to use the more value-neutral term ‘digital.’ […] To encompass the 
different facets and approaches to the concept of a ‘smart city’ we have used the phrase ‘digital 
urban renewal,’ which has the benefits of neutrality and novelty” (Green 2011: 6). Consider, too, 
Palmisano (2011) saying, “Think about it. What is the ideology of a transportation system? Of an 
energy grid? Of an urban food or water supply?” The intention behind these statements is to 
argue that smart initiatives—like building digital layers into infrastructure—are not bogged down 
by conflicting values. The motivations are unclear: are such things said with fingers crossed, with 
a wink, or with sincerity? This is worth thinking about, but we are unlikely to reach an answer 
without a healthy dose of speculation. 
Nonetheless, what’s really important is recognizing the fact that ideologies are integral to 
the smart city, regardless of rhetoric to the contrary. Of course, acts of “digital urban renewal” and 
infrastructures like the energy grid are ideological (cf. Levenda et al. 2015). At the most basic 
level they necessarily involve values, motivations, and aims that influence why one thing was built 
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in a certain way and not another thing in a different way. Resources and funds are directed 
towards those initiatives and not to something else. Some people benefit and some do not. Sets 
of outcomes are valued over different sets. Parts of the world are literally constructed according 
to the worldview and desires of some social groups, while others must adapt and conform to 
those constructions. 
These tradeoffs, antagonisms, and power dynamics are only post-ideological in rhetoric. 
And we are inclined to believe that rhetoric because it is easy to think of highly technical things 
like infrastructure as non-ideological and apolitical, yet the choices about how those things are 
built, operated, and maintained (or not) are very much political decisions about the world. I am 
inclined to think that Palmisano knows this too, but he is counting on many people to be swayed 
by his rhetoric and go along with his techno-political agenda.  
Knowing the ideologies involved is key to knowing what to expect with the smart city—as 
a movement, a concept, and a technology. I will argue that the smart city is infused with two 
dominant ideologies—technocracy and neoliberalism—both of which have suffused throughout 
society. They have become so commonplace that they often go unnoticed. Consider a well-
known vignette by David Foster Wallace (2008): two fish are swimming along, going about their 
day, when another fish swims by and says, “Morning, boys, how's the water?” The two fish swim 
a bit further, until one of them looks at the other and asks, "What the hell is water?" After relaying 
this vignette, Wallace says, “The immediate point of the fish story is that the most obvious, 
ubiquitous, important realities are often the ones that are the hardest to see and talk about” 
(2008: np). The same can be said about ideology. When it becomes the background condition of 
life, like the water to the fish, which we swim through and breathe in everyday, shaping the way 
we understand the world and our place in it, ideology takes on a quality of unnoticed neutrality.  
Now, to be clear, I’m not immune to ideology. While I am describing and probing 
ideology, I have not jumped out of the water. If anything I’m just choking on it more. I am able to 
analyze ideology—when, perhaps, most of us do not even notice it—through training in critical 
methods that orient how I approach studying society. These methods of inquiry include: 
submitting commonsensical positions to questioning and not taking the status quo for granted; 
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examining the motivations behind everyday things, thoughts, and actions; and scrutinizing the 
relationship between systems of ideas and beliefs with values and behaviors. In short, by not 
taking for granted the existing structure of society and by asking why people do what they do, the 
presence and influence of ideology becomes more apparent (Gramsci 1999). 
In what follows, I will point out the ideologies within the smart city movement by detailing 
their characteristics and implications. I may not provide the knockdown arguments against these 
ideologies. But I at least want to ask, “How’s the water?” And, in return, I hope you will be able to 
recognize that there is water all around us. 
 
Talking About Technology 
We routinely talk about technology as if it were a thing that happens to us. Peruse the 
technology section of any media outlet and you will find yourself reading about what technology is 
doing—giving us new capabilities, reshaping our social lives, disrupting stodgy conventions, 
overcoming barriers that restrain innovation. 
The one thing technology is not doing, it would appear, is being political. For many who 
work in or write about the tech sector, technology and politics are separate—and unequal—
forces. Even avowed techno-skeptics fall into this trap. In a recent essay in The Guardian, 
Cambridge University political scientist David Runciman (2014) maintains that “only politics can 
rescue you from bad politics,” but even so, he is compelled to admit that “the most significant 
revolution of the 21st century so far is not political […] Technology has the power to make politics 
seem obsolete.” If technology is, as he puts it, “dynamic, flexible and exciting,” politics is 
terminally gridlocked. These definitions can easily lead to a blanket defense of technology: Like it 
or hate it, at least technology is doing something. And at least the people who are its conduits are 
adhering to cool rationality, not ideology-driven politics.  
In his 2010 article “Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept,” the historian 
Leo Marx shows that this way of thinking about technology has a long lineage. He is concerned 
less with the effects of specific gadgets than with the origins and characteristics of the very idea 
of technology—and with the way we use that idea to conceal deeply political dynamics. He 
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writes, “We amplify the hazardous character of the concept by investing it with agency—by using 
the word technology as the subject of active verbs” (Marx 2010: 576).  We say, for example, that 
sensors will know the city, or that networks will transform urban society, or that smart systems will 
drive progress. The accompanying grammar—perhaps best exemplified in the title of Wired 
magazine founder Kevin Kelly’s book What Technology Wants—obscures the role humans play 
in inventing technology and shaping the uses to which it is put. 
This way of thinking becomes “hazardous” when it leads us to treat technology like 
something that is distinct from the human sphere but capable of acting on it powerfully. Marx 
continues, “By treating these inanimate objects—machines—as causal agents, we divert attention 
from the human (especially socioeconomic and political) relations responsible for precipitating this 
social upheaval” (2010: 577). Technology becomes an autonomous force, while politics is 
dismissed as a messy byproduct that must be extinguished. This supposedly purely technical 
position elides an important fact: technologies are fashioned from the beginning by human beings 
who make value-laden, political choices about what gets developed and how initiatives are 
implemented. Technologies are not in danger of being politicized, because they are political from 
the start, however carefully these politics are obscured. 
For instance, consider a technical process that can easily seem apolitical and neutral: 
algorithms. Although algorithms may be perceived as objective—after all, they are composed of 
math and logic—they are still social constructs and are therefore embedded with their creators’ 
biases, values, and politics. These aspects are not purged by the act of sitting down at a 
keyboard to crank out some code; they are, instead, part of what is programmed into the 
algorithm. Algorithmic operations are often difficult to discern, with results that sometimes even 
surprise their creators, and their mathematical form provides a sense of rational ordering. But this 
rationality does not invalidate the fact that choices have to be made about what type of data an 
algorithm will process, how it will weigh and treat certain variables, and how that data will be 
presented, interpreted, and operationalized, let alone considerations about why somebody 
decided to even make the algorithm in the first case. Even so, the finished products—the 
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algorithms and their results—are still routinely discussed in purified parlance, as if they tap into 
some higher technical power from which they channel value-free objectivity. 
The language of apolitical, non-ideological technology ends up shutting down our ability 
to debate the values, purposes, and uses of technology, whether that technology is bits and bytes 
or bricks and mortar. Rather than a politics of technology, we are left with bad faith claims to 
neutrality, which forecloses whole ways of understanding the world, building the world, and 
imagining future worlds. This foreclosure has helped the tenets of technocratic ideology spread; 
we scarcely recognize how it impoverishes our common ways of thinking and talking about the 
world.  
 
Technocracy: Methods and Metaphysics 
The ideology of technocracy has developed over long periods of history. Canonical 
instances run from Plato’s discussion of philosopher-kings to Francis Bacon’s conception of 
scientific utopia to Thorstein Veblen’s vision of an engineered society (Gunnel 1982). However, 
both advocates and critics use the term without conceptual precision. Appeals to “technocracy” 
resemble Justice Potter Stewart’s famous intuitive definition of pornography. Apparently, we are 
supposed to know it when we see it. Such vagueness, unfortunately, can impede our ability to do 
more than to slap a label onto things that we feel like are technocratic. Clarity of application and 
implication are both needed. 
Technocracy can be thought of as a kindred spirit to authoritarianism, but with a 
pragmatic drive focused on rationally solving society’s problems—or, at least what they conceive 
of as “problems.” At its core, technocracy is a methodological ideology, “a belief in the ability to 
arrive at the optimal answer to any discussion through the application of particular practices,” 
writes sociologist Miguel Centeno (1993: 312) in an essay on the “new leviathan” of technocracy.  
Unlike force wielding, iron-fisted dictators, technocrats derive their authority from a 
seemingly softer form of power: scientific and engineering prestige. No matter where technocrats 
are found, they attempt to legitimize their hold over others by offering innovative proposals 
untainted by troubling subjective biases and interests. Through rhetorical appeals to optimization 
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and objectivity, technocrats depict their favored approaches to social control as pragmatic 
alternatives to grossly inefficient political mechanisms (Ellul 1967). Indeed, technocrats regularly 
conceive of their interventions in duty-bound terms, as a responsibility to help citizens and society 
overcome vast political frictions. What technocrats promise, therefore, is transcendence: 
scientifically sanctioned freedom from human frailty. “In this process,” continues Centeno (1993: 
308), “the technocratic model of objective necessity replaces the decisionistic model of politics, 
which leads to the ‘scientification of politics’ and inevitably produces an authoritarian political 
framework.” 
The technocrat’s preferred means—namely, technological fixes, social engineering, and 
bureaucratic management—are based on metaphysical convictions. At bottom, says philosopher 
of technology Andrew Feenberg (2011: 3), technocrats believe that “there is always a correct 
answer to every technical question and every question can be formulated as a technical one.” 
This conviction presupposes a world where social and political values can be ignored, 
downplayed, or recast as equations balanced by what Anand Giridharadas (2011: np) aptly calls 
the “algorithmic imagination”:  
The most striking thing about the technocrats, though, is the nature of their imagination—
algorithmic imagination, if you will. Such an imagination conceives of human problems as 
fundamentally solvable, so long as we have the tools to find the objective right answer. 
Technocrats tend to ask questions of ‘how,’ not ‘why.’ Their world may be rife with design 
problems, but it appears all but devoid of moral or philosophical ones. 
 
Remember that Cisco scolded various groups, like urbanists and academics, for focusing 
too much on questions about why smart cities, and for not expending enough energy on how to 
make them reality. For the technocrat, the smart city is a fait accompli—all that’s left is for 
everybody else to accept it. 
Even though we are here talking about contemporary technologies and politics, the 
modern instantiation of technocratic mandates can be traced back to the Technocracy Movement 
founded by Howard Scott in the early 1930’s (Akin 1977). The movement’s grand vision was to 
replace politicians with rationally minded engineers who could set about redesigning society. 
Although the movement had limited impact, its ideas never died. For example, during the 
Kennedy administration there was a resurgence with repeated calls for the “end of ideology.” 
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Today, there are ever-present attempts to kick-start formal organizations that empower technical 
experts to operate influential levers of the political machine (Tullis 2013). The smart city 
movement, with its explicit focus on urban development and governance, carries on this 
lineage—but in a revamped way. It doesn’t so much seek to eradicate politicians and replace 
them with engineers as it seeks to provide tools and theories that change how politicians govern. 
In other words, this version of technocracy is not advanced by revolutionary party politics or 
demolition of political structures, but rather through the pragmatic, insidious remolding of politics 
to suit its values and goals. 
A common response from the denizens of Silicon Valley5 when they are presented with 
these concerns about technocratic control is that if you don’t like the outcomes of a technology 
then toss it away and stop using it. The problem is this line of reasoning neglects the fact that 
technical devices and systems are nearly inescapable, and it masks the ways that Silicon Valley’s 
corporations routinely overextend their influence. They are no longer content with just building 
gadgets and apps: now they intend to save the world. Evgeny Morozov (2013b: 1) throws this 
savior impulse into sharp relief:  
Silicon Valley is guilty of many sins, but lack of ambition is not one of them. If you listen to 
its loudest apostles, Silicon Valley is all about solving problems that someone else—
perhaps the greedy bankers on Wall Street or the lazy know-nothings in Washington—
have created. 
 
What’s more, these efforts are not limited to the developed world. Silicon Valley’s 
attempts at solving poverty in developing countries are often ineffective or even harmful—in large 
part due to their preoccupation with thrusting existing technologies into poor areas. For instance, 
the smart city is an ambitiously global movement; its purveyors see a role for their systems and 
services in any city worldwide. And if smart initiatives don’t work out according to plan, the blame 
does not lie with inappropriate methods. The problem resides with the people that won’t or can’t 
accept the process of “building a smarter planet.” According to Palmisano (2010: np), 
“Technology may be ready, but your culture may not be.” In such cases, it is easy to dismiss the 
                                            
5 Silicon Valley is taken here to mean more than just the geographic location. The place might be 
its beating heart, but I use it as a metonym: shorthand for the larger techno-political ideology that 
is shared by people and institutions based in other places. This is similar to the way we talk about 
Wall Street to refer to the financial sector, without literally meaning only the street in New York.  
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culture as “conservative, which leads to some built-in resistance to change.” Questioning or 
resisting technocratic impositions is merely a sign of anti-progress backwardness, a reactionary 
Luddism not to be taken seriously. As the story goes, workers throwing wrenches into machines 
was due to fear of competition and machinic progress—and most certainly not a response to 
owners exploiting labor to meet inhumane metrics of productivity. 
Increasingly, government officials around the world are ready to accept technological 
progress. They are more than willing to step aside and let technologists tackle deep social 
problems—problems that are inherently political, economic, and social in nature—with 
technological fixes. 
The promise of technocratic efficacy can be seductive. Take, for instance, a revealing 
remark within a pamphlet produced by Princeton’s Wilson Center called “Dawn of the Smart 
City?” In one of the collected essays, Alex Washburn (2014: 2), former NYC Chief Urban 
Designer said, “Singapore has an enviable ability to get things done.” Now, this could be tossed 
away as an off-hand comment, nothing worth noting. However, doing so would either betray an 
ignorance of the city-state’s methods or normalize the desire for intensely technocratic 
governance. Both are problematic. In 2014, Singapore’s government announced its blueprint for 
becoming a “smart nation” by ramping up integration of ICT—like sensors arrays, data analytics, 
and the Internet of Things—into the urban landscape and in citizens’ homes (Yu 2014). These 
smart developments are likely to amplify Singapore’s existing ability “to get things done” through 
a toxic combination of ubiquitous surveillance, social engineering, and authoritarian powers.  
It is true that Singapore has been able to rapidly develop from a small island into a global 
hub, but doing so didn’t occur naturally. In this chapter’s epigraph, the remarks by Ginni Rometty 
about how IBM “will force economic growth” and “will force societal progress” are specifically 
referring to the company’s budding partnership with Singapore’s government. By working with 
Singapore, IBM will be able to refine their smart methods and exported them elsewhere. Siemens 
has also worked with Singapore to install a “City Cockpit”—their own version of the central control 
room—that, according to a Siemens report titled “Real-Time Government,” “enables the mayor 
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and other decision-makers to track and analyze processes in their city in real time” (Bartsch 2011: 
94). 
It is troubling that getting smart means forcing growth and forcing progress; we should 
question what those goals actually mean to technocrats when they have to use force to achieve 
them. And it is remarkable that such bold authoritarian intentions can be said publicly and passed 
off as a perfectly fine way of conducting business and running government. Yet, not only are they 
accepted, city leaders around the world are clamoring to be more like Singapore—desiring their 
own technocratic fiefdoms (Grabar 2015). 
Turning a whole city-state into a “social laboratory” (Harris 2014), where people are just 
another variable to be monitored and manipulated, hardly seems enviable. But to the technocratic 
mindset—which has, to some extent, become an engrained part of how we think about 
technology and society—we have plenty to learn from Singapore’s success. It is a model city that 
portends the smart vision of the future. 
Admittedly, at face value, the technocratic path might sound ideal: it can cleave through 
the gridlock of political contention and focus on engineering progress. However, when socio-
political problems are outsourced to the Silicon Valley tech corporations entry points for 
democratic interventions are shut off. Consider this passage from a report by IBM, in which the 
company shares lessons learned while partnering with mayors to actually develop and implement 
smart initiatives: 
City leaders understand that citizen engagement is essential to understanding the wishes 
of their constituents—not to mention getting re-elected. But some of the typical methods 
yield unsatisfactory results. Traditional community meetings, for example, tend to attract 
people with extreme positions. So the process of engaging citizens needs to be 
rethought. The public needs easy, open and continuous access to a wide variety of data 
and planning information, and people must be brought into a project early so they can 
participate in designing it (IBM 2013: 4). 
 
This is skillful rhetoric. It hits the marks of citizen engagement and access to public data 
and early participation. Yet, the framing reveals the technocratic ideology. Mayors need to do 
these things if they want to get re-elected and keep the citizenry’s trust. This view of democratic 
society treats it as a (political) machine, which occasionally needs to be greased to ensure it 
doesn’t seize up on you. However, the traditional democratic forums are too, well, political. There 
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might be contention and argument and dissatisfaction with the status quo. The solution then is to 
open up a data portal (a response that positions citizens as passive information receivers) and 
allow people to work on pre-chosen projects (a response that limits how active citizens can really 
be). 
In the technocratic milieu, political processes—such as debating about values and 
striking compromises between competing interests—are treated as mere externalities, which 
must be efficiently reduced. In other words, writes political theorist Jodi Dean (2005: 63), “[t]he 
complexities of politics—of organization, struggle, duration, decisiveness, division, representation, 
etc.—are condensed into one thing, one problem to be solved and one technological solution.” 
Civic discourse and democratic governance simply does not fit into their view of society as an 
optimizable machine. Political degradation becomes acceptable collateral damage.  
In an article for the New Yorker, George Packer (2013) reported how, for the most part, 
Silicon Valley’s forays into government have focused on lobbying for changes that would tear 
down barriers to disruptive innovation and bolster the technology companies’ power. “Technology 
can be an answer to incompetence and inefficiency,” Packer (2013: np) writes. However, the 
problem is that “it has little to say about larger issues of justice and fairness, unless you think that 
political problems are bugs that can be fixed by engineering rather than fundamental conflicts of 
interest and value.” Ignoring these socio-political concerns, hoping that they will just sort 
themselves out, or believing that the right technological solution will address them is likely to lead 
to the further perpetuation of widespread injustices.  
Technocrats believe that difficult social dilemmas can be solved if their core dynamics are 
treated as engineering problems. Availing themselves of the rhetoric and logic associated with 
value-free techno-scientific rationality, they justify paternalist proposals as necessary pragmatic 
interventions. To meet these elusive goals, politicians, legislators, citizens, and consumers simply 
need to comply with the technocrats’ methods and use their technologies. In deferring, 
technocrats insist, these groups won’t be catering to special interests. They’ll just be accepting 
the realistic demands that progress requires—whether it is the type of progress we actually want 
is the real question (Marx 1986). 
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A Brief Politics of Neoliberalism 
The other partner in this ideological marriage is a political economic one known as 
neoliberalism. Many of you have probably heard of it before, although many fewer of you 
probably feel like you really have a clear idea of what it means—besides being in the hands of 
some an accusatory, derisive label. Neoliberalism is a critic’s term. As such it often elicits pre-
established responses from people, depending on where they are situated relative to the critic: a 
nod in knowing agreement, a sigh at a tired phrase, a scoff of vexation. It does not help that the 
term is often bandied about without much clarity or shared meaning—at times simply standing in 
as a signal of political allegiances and sentiments—which ironically causes it to lose its critical 
edge (Peck et al. 2009). 
The dull use of this term is unfortunate since neoliberalism, as an analytic category and 
critical tool, has a lot of explanatory power to offer. Being attuned to details and operations of 
neoliberal ideology can reveal the underlying logic that motivates certain actions, beliefs, and 
systems; it can show how seemingly disparate things are ideologically related and tied together; 
and it can help us anticipate the consequences and effects of those things. But only, that is, if we 
have a lucid understanding of the ideology; otherwise it becomes a confused and confusing 
concept. 
To avoid that fate I will provide an overview of neoliberalism’s constituent elements. In 
doing so, I mostly draw from the recent work done by political theorist Wendy Brown and political 
economist Jamie Peck on describing the characteristics and consequences of neoliberalism. 
There are stacks of good, relevant research that could inform my description here. Perhaps you 
have your own favorites. However, I focus on Brown and Peck’s respective work because they 
are two highly regarded (and cited) researchers who approach neoliberalism in complementary 
ways: Brown hones in on the political rationality, while Peck fleshes out the statecraft. If we only 
understood neoliberalism through their research, then we would be in great shape. 
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Neoliberalism as Political Rationality  
While I have been calling neoliberalism one of the ideologies underlying the smart city—
and, to be sure, it is very much an ideology—Brown (2015: 9) argues it is also something more 
than “a set of economic policies, an ideology, or a resetting of the relation between state and 
economy.” If we want to grasp the elements and effects of neoliberalism in their entirety, then we 
must see it as a “normative order of reason,” which has developed over time. Brown explains:   
[A] widely and deeply disseminated governing rationality, neoliberalism transmogrifies 
every human domain and endeavor, along with humans themselves, according to a 
specific image of the economic. All conduct is economic conduct; all spheres of existence 
are framed and measured by economic terms and metrics, even when those spheres are 
not directly monetized (2015: 9). 
 
What this means is that the various elements that make up society are colonized by an 
economic rationality, which takes over our ontology (what exists and how), epistemology (how we 
know and understand), and logic (what guides our reasoning and decision-making). The political 
is desiccated and hollowed; the social is redefined and reduced; the ethical is instrumentalized 
and calculated. These once differentiated areas are collapsed, becoming subordinate to the 
economic. 
To be clear, neoliberalism is not a process that literally marketizes and monetizes 
everything. Its rationality, rather, is the widespread application of the “model of the market to all 
domains and activities” (Brown 2015: 31). This rationality is one of its distinctive features, which 
separates it from other forms of capitalism. Put differently, we begin to reorder political, social, 
and human life so that it all becomes congruent with market terms, market values, and market 
goals. For instance, people and institutions must become productive entrepreneurs, who invest 
into their human capital and manage their portfolio of skills, that way they strengthen their 
competitive position and grow value. Once you are attuned to the neoliberal rationality—its 
language, its framing, its governance—you will begin to notice how pervasive it truly is.  
Neoliberalism wields influence over so many different domains because it governs as a 
form of “sophisticated common sense” (Brown 2015). It is treated as conventional, even banal: 
nothing to notice, nothing to question. We are now accustomed to thinking about how we conduct 
ourselves and relate to others in economic terms—if not purely, then primarily. In a widely cited 
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article, sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (2001) call neoliberalism the “new 
planetary vulgate,” due to the way its discourse and framings have become, all around the world, 
a colloquial way of speaking about everyday life. When describing neoliberalism writers often 
deploy conceptual metaphors related to virus, contagion, and disease. Its rationality infects the 
organs of society, metastasizing to institutions like school and work, government agencies, public 
services, and social/political discourses (Brown 2015). Part of the reason why neoliberalism has 
been received as, essentially, a commonsense position is because it diffused in a way that Brown 
calls “termite-like,” not “lion-like.” It did not roar and rip, it bored and colonized. Hence, her book is 
subtitled, Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. 
When human beings, institutions, and governments are transformed into economic 
actors, the foundational principles and purposes of their existence also change. For instance, a 
drive for constant competition means you, and perhaps only you, have a responsibility for your 
well-being and your position relative to others, with “no guarantee of security, protection, or even 
survival” (Brown 2015: 37). There are many other changes, some particularly relevant ones 
include: The normalization, even desire, for inequality. According to Forbes columnist John 
Tammy (2014: np), who in a candid moment confessed what many people believe to be the case, 
inequality is “unrelentingly beautiful” and if you deny this fact then you must just be “desperate to 
not seem heartless.” We not only need to come to terms with cold reality, we need to embrace it 
and “start acting like adults.” There are winners and losers, makers and takers. Being a good 
member of the economy is not just expected, it is a moral obligation, and if you fail then it's a 
condemnation of your character (Shamir 2008). Socio-political categories like collective, class, 
union, and solidarity are disparaged. Public goods, social justice, and collective governing are 
trashed, and replaced by profitable operations, economic growth, and financial management. 
“The body politic ceases to be a body,” Brown writes (2005: 43), “but is rather a group of 
individual entrepreneurs and consumers.” People don’t so much organize and cooperate as they 
fend and scrounge on their own. The individual must be an entrepreneur always on the hustle, 
while the government must be run like a corporation.  
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Neoliberal rationality becomes politically actual—a way of shaping and administrating the 
world—through “formulations and practices of governance” (Brown 2015: 122). The concept of 
governance has become part of the standard jargon used by a range of institutions—from the 
United Nations and multinational corporations to governments and schools—to describe what 
they do or aspire to do. To be clear, “governance” is not “govern-ish,” or a lesser form of 
governing. It is rather a hybrid concept that, Brown writes (2015: 123), is “often used 
interchangeably with both ‘governing’ and ‘managing’ […] This interchangeability and promiscuity 
suggest that governance comprises and indexes an important fusion of political and business 
practices, both at the level of administration and at the level of providing goods and services.” In 
other words, by fusing aspects of political governing and corporate management, governance 
offers a powerful way of doing neoliberalism. 
To be sure, governance does not always signal neoliberalism. In theory and practice 
there are modes of governance that do not advance neoliberal aims. There are modes of 
governance that promote processes and outcomes like polycentric decision-making, democratic 
accountability, and public goods. However, in its contemporary use governance does seem to be 
increasingly intertwined with neoliberalism, and as Brown argues, “contemporary neoliberalism is 
unthinkable without governance” (2015: 122). Governance is the “primary administrative form” or 
“political modality” through which neoliberalism—or, rather, the committed advocates and 
unwitting supporters of neoliberalism—structures society and conducts people. One unfortunate 
casualty of this intertwining is the very concept and term “governance,” which is quite useful for 
understanding how society and people are governed in ways that does not (necessarily) mean 
“by the State” or ”by governments.” An argument about recapturing governance from 
neoliberalism is out of this dissertation’s scope, however, we should keep in mind that the two 
terms are not equivalent.   
What, then, does this “political modality” entail? What are the effects of neoliberal 
governance? A shorthand, and admittedly reductive, way of understanding neoliberal governance 
is to think about the politics being sucked out of democratic governing and replaced with 
economized analogs. To see what this shift from governing to governance means in practice 
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consider the following passage from Brown (2015: 129), in which she enumerates some of the 
transitions that have occurred: 
It is a short step from this [neoliberal] reorientation of democracy into problem solving and 
consensus to a set of additional replacements fundamental to the meaning and operation 
of governance today: ‘stakeholders’ replace interest groups or classes, ‘guidelines’ 
replace law, ‘facilitation’ replaces regulation, ‘standards’ and ‘codes of conduct’ 
disseminated by a range of agencies and institutions replace over policing and other 
forms of coercion. Together, these replacements also vanquish a vocabulary of power, 
and hence power’s visibility, from the lives and venues that governance organizes and 
directs. […] In public life, governance displaces liberal democratic-justice concerns with 
technical formulations of problems, questions of right with questions of efficiency, even 
question of legality with those efficacy. 
 
The neoliberal reorientation entails more than just a shift towards rhetoric of governing 
that is inflected with corporate-speak. It also signals a fundamental change in the processes, 
principles, and purposes of governing. For instance, now we talk about the “return on investment” 
of social policy, rather than the public good outcomes. This difference in terminology is not just a 
new way of saying the same thing; the two framings have very different meanings. When social 
policy is evaluated by “return on investment”—and thus, subjected to profitability tests, based on 
financial speculation, and framed around economic consumer-citizens—you will get starkly 
different policies. The same can be said of all the transitions and replacements that Brown lists 
(among others).  
It is no accident that these neoliberal substitutions benefit elites and corporations. After 
all, who do you think fuels the implementation of this political rationality? Which one do you think 
they want: “facilitation” or “regulation”? The arm of the state, merged with the soul of business, 
produces neoliberal governance.6 
 
 
 
                                            
6 Benito Mussolini infamously declared, “Fascism should more appropriately be called 
Corporatism because it is a merger of state and corporate power.” This quotable clip leaves out 
the fact that fascism involves much more than just this merger. It also marshals an accompanying 
ethno-nationalism, combined with total war plus total mass mobilization, which creates a “military 
citizenship” or civilian-combatant who is always somehow acting in support of war against the 
Other(s). The differences and similarities with neoliberalism—e.g., its production of total 
economization and an economic citizenship—are worth exploring, but are far beyond the scope of 
this section/chapter/book. 
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Neoliberal Statecraft 
It is easy to underestimate the role of the state in creating and maintaining neoliberalism. 
Especially since the mainstream political discourse often pits these two things against each other: 
state/government vs. economy/market, progressive/socialist vs. conservative/libertarian. But that 
would be a mistake. 
On one hand, the champions of free-market classical liberalism saw markets as 
naturalistic. When governments (or, rarely, corporations with monopolistic power) intervened into 
the market they meddled in affairs that no person could understand or shape, only mutilate and 
sully. People must simply leave the markets alone, allow them to operate, transmit price signals, 
and incentivize innovation. I venture to say this is pretty close to the common view of how 
markets do or should relate to society. The liberalism here is a “freeing from.” That is, freeing 
markets and economic activity from outside intervention and manipulation. 
On the other hand, the advocates and architects of neoliberalism recognize that markets 
are social constructs, not natural phenomenon. And they embrace this fact—that markets must 
be actively created and economization actively instilled—by seizing the most powerful tool for the 
job: the state. Policies need to be enacted that will nurture markets and open up every part of 
society to economic logics. Institutions need to be built that will spread neoliberal logics into all 
facets of our lives and encourage their normalization. Police powers need to be marshaled that 
will protect the pursuit of profit and enforce the economic rules crafted by corporate-state actors 
(Peck and Tickell 2002; Harvey 2008). The liberalism here is a “freeing to.” That is, freeing 
models of the market and economization to overtake all other domains. 
The distinction between liberal ideologies is a crucial point: neoliberalism is often 
conflated with free-market capitalism, perhaps just as a hyperdrive version—but it is actually very 
different. Neoliberalism is an active project of restructuring society into a playground for 
economization and elite power, largely by reengineering the state into a tool for imposing market 
rule upon political, social, and human life (Brenner and Theodore 2002). Neoliberalism doesn’t 
say, “Laissez faire!” It says, “Construct markets!”  
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As Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002: 389) write, “More now than merely a 
deregulatory political mindset or a kind of ideological software, neoliberalism is increasingly 
concerned with the roll-out of new forms of institutional ‘hardware.’ In the neoliberal heartlands, 
this is associated with a striking coexistence of technocratic economic management and invasive 
social policies.” From that analysis, we should therefore see the smart city—with its hardware of 
expansive technologies and public-private governance, all installed with the software of 
ideological thought leadership—as a prime example of a project that is “rolling-out” neoliberalism. 
Regimes of “actually existing neoliberalism” are diffuse and varied; the “hardware” that 
has been incorporated into rolling-out neoliberalism is multi-scalar (Brenner and Theodore 2002). 
Neoliberalism’s lineage traces back multiple decades; thus, it has been able to evolve and spread 
over time. “In short,” write Peck and Tickell (2002: 384), “there seems to have been a shift from 
the pattern of deregulation and dismantlement so dominant during the 1980s, which might be 
characterized as ‘roll-back neoliberalism,’ to an emergent phase of active state-building and 
regulatory reform—an ascendant moment of ‘roll-out neoliberalism.’” This shift, which began in 
the 1990s, “focused on the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state 
forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations.” In other words, “What began as a starkly 
utopian intellectual movement [in the 1970s] was aggressively politicized by Reagan and 
Thatcher in the 1980s before acquiring a more technocratic form in the self-styled ‘Washington 
consensus’ of the 1990s” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 380). 
This roll-out style of neoliberalism has continued into the present day, arguably becoming 
even more oriented towards the fabrication and facilitation of what is called “financialization.” 
While we won’t get into the complex, technical details of financialization right now, it can be 
broadly understood as a version of economization based on empowering the financial sector and 
injecting its models into every sphere of society. For example, people and families are 
increasingly entangled in a knot of financial relationships: they owe many kinds of debt to many 
organizations; they are judged with scores from credit agencies and data brokers; their 
possessions, (future) earnings, and human capital (e.g. skills, education, health) constitute a 
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portfolio of assets with dynamic value. There are many other relationships just at the personal 
and familial level, let alone at the local, national, and international scale.7 
Even though neoliberalism is a project that relies on crafting the state so it responds to 
market imperatives like “economic vitality,” and relies on establishing “partnerships” or 
“collaborations” that fuse corporate and government power, it still attempts to veil itself in rhetoric 
of apolitical neutrality. And somehow it often succeeds in doing so. The language of 
economization has become a default way of framing everyday topics and major issues; we hardly 
think to question it because it seems like a natural and obvious frame to use. It is no coincidence 
that technocracy and neoliberalism both share this quality of being ideologies of the non-
ideological. As Peck (2010: 108) shows, they are intimately linked:  
We may be spared, for a time, the hubris of free-market zealots, but the current turmoil 
may also strengthen the (supposedly ‘safe’) hands of the pragmatists and technocrats—
the true inheritors of roll-out neoliberalism. […] And technocrats, as we know, tend to 
work quietly. The accompanying political language will surely be more about grim 
determination and cautious pragmatism, in contrast to the rising crescendo of market 
triumphalism over the past two decades. 
 
Unlike free-marketeers, neoliberals never label themselves as such. The economic 
historian Philip Mirowski (2014: 1), who has done extensive work on the origins and operations of 
neoliberalism, has called it “the political movement that dared not speak its own name.” 
Neoliberals don't fight their battles in the arena of politics; they fight from the shadows of 
hegemony. They don’t cast themselves as one contender among many and fight for victory; they 
set the terms of what is accepted as the cultural norm and infiltrate many domains. Their weapon 
is not the cleaving sword (“lion-like”), but the calculating poison (“termite-like”).  
 
Smart Governance8 
In a 2014 article for Foreign Affairs on “The Future of Cities,” John Chambers and Wim 
Elfrink, two chief executives for Cisco, trumpeted the benefits of applying the Internet of 
Everything to nearly all aspects of the city. They promised “intelligent and efficient stewardship of 
                                            
7 For a solid primer on financialization, I highly recommend a 2015 report called “Defining 
Financialization,” by Mike Konczal and Nell Abernathy, two economists at the Roosevelt Institute. 
8 This section is adapted from Sadowski and Pasquale (2015). 
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growing cities” to reduce “traffic, parking congestion, pollution, energy consumption, and crime.” 
Who could be against such a program? The only cost, the executives assured readers, would be 
some reorientations in urban governance and information technology procurement strategies. As 
one of their principles for making smart cities the global “norm” proclaims, “the world can’t be 
afraid of embracing technology in new ways. This means rethinking the contract with citizens and 
the services IT firms and governments provide them” (Chambers and Elfrink 2014: np). Moreover, 
we are told that “hyper collaborative partnerships between the public and private sectors” with 
strict “adherence to deadlines” are essential.  
The shift in political language—in which the social contract is replaced by the corporate 
contract—is subtle, but critical for understanding the politics smuggled into the ideological agenda 
of smart cities. This explains why the six principles the Cisco executives propose are all based on 
admonishing “city leaders” for not valorizing (enough) the products and services offered by the 
ICT sector. Like savvy businessmen, the authors recognize the asymmetry of public-private 
partnerships in an era of neoliberal capitalism. Corporations can afford a phalanx of economists, 
designers, attorneys, and public relations specialists, all skilled in presenting one possible future 
for the city—a smart merger of technocracy and neoliberalism. In the words of Margaret Thatcher, 
“There is no alternative.” 
Of course, Cisco (like IBM and others) has a commercial interest here: designing, 
manufacturing, and installing the hardware for these networks is Cisco’s lifeblood, and future 
profit margins may depend on the firm’s ability to craft alluring narratives of smartness. And 
numerous municipal leaders and non-profit foundations have excitedly jumped on the 
bandwagon. There are material motivations here, too, as political economic analyses of revolving 
door employment patterns between private, public, and “third” sector concerns reveal. When civil 
servants can easily multiply their pay by moving from government to corporate offices, as long as 
they are pliable and cooperative, few have an incentive to ask hard questions (Carpenter and 
Moss 2013). The boundaries between public office and private consulting are porous. 
The problem for smart city advocates is one of overcoming several tensions, if not 
outright contradictions, in their ideal-type of corporatized governance. Who is ultimately in charge 
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of “hyper collaborative partnerships between the public and private sectors?” What are the 
penalties when, say, deadlines are not met? Who imposes them? What are the problems that the 
smart city will use “end-to-end solutions” to solve? How will the imposition of such “solutions” be 
sequenced? 
To take some basic examples: Should new forms of surveillance focus first on drug 
busts, or evidence of white-collar crime, or unfair labor practices by employers? Wage theft is a 
massive problem, but rarely taken seriously by authorities (Bobo 2011). Do the cameras and 
sensors installed in, say, restaurants focus on preventing employee theft of food, stopping food 
poisoning, and/or catching safety violations? Does “traffic control” just make the system more 
efficient, merely aspiring to smooth flows of cars and people into and out of the city? Or, does it 
technologically entrench—and then justify as objective and optimized—common acts of 
questionable discretionary policing, like the charge of “blocking pedestrian traffic” that is 
commonly used by police as an excuse to harass people of color standing on empty sidewalks 
(Taibbi 2014)? 
The ideology of neoliberalism all too often provides rapid, “obvious,” and unchallenged 
answers to such questions, based on dubious cost-benefit analyses and hidden values. Its 
motivating purpose is to improve the business environment and spread economic logics to all 
dimensions of human life. It is, thus, no accident that smart technologies have become widely 
developed and installed in ways that use technocratic methods to advance neoliberal politics. As 
criminologist Roy Coleman writes in a study of closed-circuit television and social divisions, “The 
‘entrepreneurial’ roots of mass camera surveillance provide a clue to the uses of CCTV as a 
social ordering tool […] As surveillance cameras routinely monitor the street prohibitions of the 
neoliberal city, they also reinforce the moral codes, intolerances and normative prescriptions of its 
creators” (Coleman 2004: 301). Many contemporary systems of surveillance and data capture, 
which are central to making cities smart, are descendants of the now ubiquitous (and cruder) 
uses of CCTV. And compared to CCTV, these new technologies are able to enforce neoliberal 
governance in a more totalizing and effective way. 
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For instance, surveillance and other smart systems help promote an image or brand of 
the urban environment as a socially ordered place conducive to consumption and business (Wiig 
2015). The purchase, use, and maintenance of these technologies is easily justified as a rational 
capital investment. It makes good, profitable sense to ensure that your business and 
surroundings are clean and inviting. It’s just that “clean and inviting” doesn’t always refer to litter, 
it can also mean cleansed of undesirables who aren’t part of the privileged social group and 
aren’t good economic citizens. The surveillance technologies, and the larger power relations 
surrounding them, are intended “to create an atmosphere of place and tradition that will act as a 
lure to both capital and people ‘of the right sort,’” says David Harvey (1990: 294). 
The smart systems, moreover, are not merely the result of private companies installing 
security and surveillance on their property. They are typically funded, maintained, and enforced 
using public resources and government power. Thus, making them products of private-public 
partnerships (Coleman 2004)—which often ends up meaning the private sphere molds the public 
sphere in its image. These partnerships, then, possess both the capital and authority needed to 
reshape the urban environment so that it fits with neoliberal ideals. This type of governance is 
part of the politics and conditions of what has come to be called the “urban growth machine” 
(Kirkpatrick and Smith 2011). There is a compelling drive to attract and feed more-and-more 
capital into the city’s maw. Sating this economic hunger, in whatever way possible, becomes the 
main purpose of urban governance. Hence why (tech) corporations, start-up gurus, and 
“visionary” mayors (like Michael Bloomberg) are constantly telling cities to act more like 
corporations with the mayor as CEO. Rather than being motivated by public service and social 
good, the city should be driven by efficiency and profit. 
In other words, within a neoliberal ideology, governments must meet the expectation to 
realize business goals and stoke “economic vitality” by rolling-out favorable policies and creating 
markets. Remember, the state does not shrink, but is rather restructured so that it becomes an 
effective tool of elite power and economic interests. So, as Philip Mirowski (2013: 58) argues, 
there is a neoliberal pattern of “having it both ways: to stridently warn of the perils of expanding 
purview of state activity while simultaneously imagining the strong state of their liking rendered 
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harmless.” These tensions are a formal feature, not a bug, of ideological thought; they are 
required to contain and coordinate commitments that are contradictory either in theory or practice 
(Geertz 1973). 
Although the pernicious ideological beliefs of technocracy and neoliberalism are most 
often pegged to Silicon Valley and Wall Street, they can be found, without much difficulty, in even 
our highest legislative bodies. In February 2015, the United States Senate held a hearing called 
“The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things.”9 The hearing featured statements from 
senators and testimony from a panel of five witnesses. The attitudes throughout were 
overwhelmingly excited for the smarter lives we will all be leading thanks to the IoT. While there 
were occasional mentions of basic issues related to security and privacy, most of the concern 
stemmed from worries about “over regulation,” which meant anything more than a “light touch” 
approach. In his statement, U.S. Senator Cory Booker (D–NJ) neatly encapsulated the political 
economic ideology on display in the hearing—and while he was more enthusiastic and explicit in 
tone than others, his remarks are representative and worth quoting at length: 
This is a phenomenal opportunity for a bipartisan, profoundly patriotic approach to an 
issue that can explode our economy. I think that there are trillions of dollars, creating 
countless jobs, improving quality of life, [and] democratizing our society in ways that 
gives advantages to people who are being marginalized on the edges, breaking down 
barriers of race and class. We can’t even imagine the future that this portends of, and we 
should be embracing that [...] And so a lot of my concerns are really what my Republican 
colleagues also echoed—which is, we should be doing everything possible to encourage 
this, and nothing to restrict it [...] But for us to do anything to inhibit that leap in humanity 
to me seems unfortunate [...] And I also believe that this should be a public-private 
partnership. We all have a role. 
 
Booker’s statements are not radical. He is in fact channeling the mainstream views about 
innovation in society. The least we can do is get out of the way. At best, our duty is to provide all 
the legal, material, and ideological support we can for innovations—and their innovators. Anybody 
who wishes to ask critical questions about the future, let alone actually constrain and slow down 
technological development, is de facto extinguishing an exploding economy and standing in the 
way of a democratizing force for justice. 
                                            
9 The hearing is from February 11, 2015. Accessed May 1, 2016 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=d3e33bde-
30fd-4899-b30d-906b47e117ca&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-
56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a 
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Booker’s language recalls the puffery of finance capital—the same group he vigorously 
defended in 2012 after the leader of his political party, Barack Obama, gently suggested the 
possibility of ending private equity tax loopholes. Overclaiming the value of smart technologies is 
vital to contemporary capital markets and neoliberal governance. The riskier the investment and 
the grander the impact, the more spectacular the potential gains must be: thus the proliferation of 
characterizations of smart cities as epochal, groundbreaking, world-making. 
Of course, the rhetoric is not always so grandiose—there are crosscutting pressures to 
sound cool, analytical, and mechanically objective when describing new technology. Bland 
bipartisanship masquerading as pragmatic neutrality is also a favored rhetorical mood. Boosters 
lard manifestos, manuals, and exhortatory books with simple, straightforward examples of 
problems all can agree need fixing (Newsom 2013; Townsend 2013), in order to obscure the 
stakes of automated surveillance and regimented control of every moment and place. A pothole-
spotting app, for instance, might be a step toward at least informing (if not guaranteeing) the filling 
of an unmitigated, car-harming bad. But what is hidden or neglected by these easy wins and 
shallow solutions?  
Unsurprisingly, not everybody agrees with technocratic programs for public policy, such 
as the kind argued for by Stephen Goldsmith and Susan Crawford (2014) in their celebrated 
book, The Responsive City—which sketches out a “postprogressive” framework for “data-smart 
governance” that focuses on “results not compliance.” At least, that is, least not once the “results” 
desired move far beyond smooth roads or fast trash pickup. Indeed, the very choice to deploy 
resources for road smoothing—rather than, say, train or bus air conditioning or green spaces—is 
an inherently political one, not simply a technical management decision. Characteristically, for 
example, Goldsmith and Crawford praise a new, “smart” fingerprinting initiative aimed at 
criminals, with nary a reflection on the ways in which these records databases create 
underclasses of effectively unemployable individuals. However, agreement is not a problem for 
these policy programs when they rely on pragmatism to bypass political contention and when, as 
Goldsmith and Crawford say, the heroes of the story are leaders “who have forced changes in the 
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status quo by capitalizing on the power of the new tools” (2014: 2). There’s that sentiment again: 
forcing change on behalf of those who just don’t know any better. 
Smart city advocates may counter that such conflicts over resource allocation are 
inevitable in any political order, and stress that their own deployment of sensors, apps, open data, 
and progress reporting cannot be expected to unravel them. But realities of scarcity apply to 
political attention, problematization, and action as well. Time spent organizing to deploy solutions 
that focus on the smart-ification of the political sphere—like Goldsmith and Crawford’s suggestion 
of a “platform for citizens to engage city hall, and each other, through text, voice, social media, 
and other apps” (2014: 4)—is time not spent on other endeavors that focus on rooting out deeper 
problems with real political stakes. 
For instance, rather than highlight the role of tax resistance by the wealthy in creating the 
very shortage of personnel that plagues public agencies, a smart city initiative would propose to 
address the problem through “force multiplication” of the cities’ remaining workers (Winters 2011). 
These programs usually mean regimes of Tayloristic workplace surveillance plus demands to “do 
more with less” (i.e. pay less for more work). Each time a “quantrepreneur” proposes ingenious 
new ways of measuring and maximizing the “output” of government workers, a critical citizenry 
should ask: how did we come to this pass? Where has the constant pressure to “do more with 
less” come from? Focusing on the tech of “doing more” displaces crucial debate and investigation 
on the why of “less” governmental resources and employees.  
It is easy to roll out “postprogressive” projects that fix some popular problem, while also 
advancing neoliberal goals like pushing economic growth and punishing those who aren’t good 
productive citizens. However, when smart city advocates marshal reactionary policies that 
provide easy wins through surface level enhancements, they are sating a political will that should 
be concerned with substantive improvements and structural changes. At least, that is, 
improvements and changes that benefit more than just elite interests. 
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Reflected and Reinforced 
We should not be surprised that one of the most ambitious and large-scale offspring of 
these two ideologies is focused on ICT and the city. Experts in the politics and sociology of 
technology argue that developments in ICT are not simply neutral tools granted to us by 
benevolent technologists, to be used in whatever way we decide; nor are they a mystical force 
that follows a determined path, expresses desires, and appears like manna from heaven. Indeed, 
many of these ICT developments are motivated by the goals of both technocrats and neoliberals 
(see, for instance: Dean 2005; Fourcade and Healy 2013; Harvey 2008; Levenda et al. 2015; 
Neubauer 2011; Noble 1984; Pasquale 2015; Taylor 2014). When meeting ever increasing 
metrics of efficiency and productivity are primary values in society, we see these purposes 
reflected in technologies—the reasons they are built, the ways they are developed, the roles they 
play in our lives.  
  Moreover, according to studies from urbanists, political economists, and geographers, the 
city is a hospitable habitat in which to grow and refine a techno-neoliberal project (see, for 
instance: Beswick et al. 2016; MacLeod 2002; Moreno 2014; Peck and Tickell 2002; Pollio 2016; 
Weber 2002). “In recent decades,” Peck and his colleagues (2013: 1096) write, “cities have 
become increasingly important targets and proving grounds for neoliberal policy experiments, in 
the process becoming incubators for, and generative nodes within, the reproduction of neoliberal 
regimes themselves.” The city is an important stage for testing out systems and policies, refining 
and proving their effectiveness, and then rolling-out and reproducing them in other cities. This 
recognition of cities as “incubators” and “generative nodes” reflects IBM’s strategy of “building a 
smarter planet, city by city” (Palmisano 2010). You can’t just dive into changing the whole world 
at once. You have to start somewhere.  
By this point it should be clear that the smart city movement is not only embedded with 
ideology, it is the outcome of a rationality that is part technocracy and part neoliberalism. What, 
then, does this mean on the ground? We now know what underlies the smart city at the level of 
ideology, but how does this play out at the level of implementation? In the next two chapters, I 
argue that we can analyze the smart city’s operations and implications through two interrelated, 
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driving logics. One is the logic of control, which constructs the city as a “system of systems,” a 
form of networked urbanism wherein the environment and the people can be totally connected, 
surveilled, measured, manipulated, predicted, policed. One is the logic of accumulation (of data 
and profit), which demands we extract all data, from all sources, in whatever ways possible; we 
will then sort it out later and trust the analytics to create “actionable insights” and “economic 
vitality.” 
As I describe these logics keep in mind that attempting to achieve some kind of post-
ideological urbanism is a fruitless endeavor. Ideological systems and normative logics are part 
and parcel of human society. We must critically examine those that exist; otherwise they operate 
as a form of dark matter. We cannot simply escape them by claiming to be paragons of 
pragmatism or conduits of rationality. If we understand what ideologies and logics have power, 
then we can strive to shape their outcomes—or, form alternatives to embed into the city. 
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CHAPTER 410 
SPECTRUM OF CONTROL 
The city, for its part, is transformed for many people into a ‘desert’ in which the 
meaningless, indeed the terrifying, no longer takes the form of shadows but becomes an 
implacable light that produces this urban text without obscurities, which is created by a 
technocratic power everywhere and which puts the city-dweller under control (under the 
control of what? No one knows). 
— Michel de Certeau (1984: 103) 
 
We're moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but 
through continuous control and instant communication.  
— Gilles Deleuze (1995: 174) 
 
 
There is a certain allure to the idea that cities allow a person to feel both at home and like 
a stranger in the same place. One can know the streets and shops, avenues and alleys, while 
also going days without being recognized. But as government and corporate actors, often in close 
partnership with each other, fill cities with “smart” technologies, there is little escape from a 
seamless web of surveillance. Soon, for example, shoppers will be as “known” by a store as they 
are able to know it (Arnsdorf 2010). Facial recognition software, or smartphone emanations, can 
project your identity, likely spending habits, and reputation: shoplifter or big spender, “Mortgage 
Woes” or “Boomer Barons” (to use actual categories from marketers). 
In a 2013 cover story about the “programmable world” and IoT (Wasik 2013: np), Wired 
magazine asks: “Have you ever lost an object in your house and dreamed that you could just type 
a search for it, as you would for a wayward document on your hard drive?” Well you can now, we 
are assured, thanks to a startup named StickNFind Technologies that sells cheap, small, “sticker” 
sensors. Lose a child at the mall? “Smart fashion” RFID tags will keep him or her plugged into the 
network and tracked at all times. And why stop with kids when making sensor-laden sartorial 
choices? Before long your car, house, appliances, and every other part of your environment will 
be engaging in a constant stream of networked communication and coordinated action. 
These IoT consumer goods are typically marketed as next generation upgrades, with 
added convenience and nifty features. We are in the midst of a boom of smart technologies for 
                                            
10 This chapter is a significantly revised and expanded version of a previous article. See the 
appendix for the full article: Sadowski, J. and Pasquale, F. (2015). “The Spectrum of Control: A 
Social Theory of the Smart City.” First Monday 20 (7): online. 
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the home and everyday life. Catalogs and exhibits, like the annual Consumer Electronics Show, 
are filled with examples of domestic goods—ranging from ovens to thermostats to toothbrushes 
to pacifiers—that have been plugged into the IoT. In large part, these devices allow people to do 
the stuff they already do, but in a way that now incorporates sensors, data, networks, and remote 
control. A typical case used to illustrate the IoT-filled world is the smart fridge, which might 
monitor the expiration dates on your food and tell the grocery store when you need milk.  
Just imagine the joy of being surrounded by “enchanted objects,” as one entrepreneur in 
the MIT Media Lab calls them, which “will respond to our needs, come to know us, and even learn 
to think ahead on our behalf” (Rose 2014: 47). But there is no magic or wizards needed for these 
enchantments, only technology and its innovators. The IoT is often cast as a network of 
benevolent sprites that work together to improve our lives in their own special way. The promise 
of convenience and efficiency, brought about by a Fantasia-like world of bewitched objects and 
environments that “talk” to each other, is a hard one to pass up. We have little reason or desire to 
look into the larger dynamics at play or question the motivations behind these smart things—
especially if doing so might break the spell. This vision of the IoT as an all-encompassing, all-
knowing technology—remember, Cisco prefers the term “Internet of Everything” and IBM’s 
ultimate goal is a “Smarter Planet”—sounds like a fairy tale. And it very well could be. But instead 
of the Disneyfied versions we are all familiar with, this fairy tale might be more like the Brothers 
Grimm stories, in which nefarious motivations and not-so-happy endings are common.  
The reality of the IoT is far more invasive than the marketers and boosters make it sound. 
The devices are more spies than sprites. For the businesses that produce these smart objects, 
the real value does not come from you buying them, but from you using them (and them using 
you). As Bruce Sterling (2014: loc. 68) argues, “the genuine Internet of Things wants to invade 
that [smart] refrigerator, measure it, instrument it, monitor any interactions with it; it would 
cheerfully give away a fridge at cost.” The same can be said of other smart appliances, self-
tracking wearables, and other things that are increasingly embedded with sensors, computation, 
and network connections.  
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And this technological tale goes deeper than the devices we carry in our pockets or keep 
in our homes. When journalists, boosters, and critics restrict their focus to consumer goods as 
such—knowingly or not—they fall for a red herring that holds their attention at the surface level, 
halting analyses that should go beyond the alternating currents of absurd farce and gee whiz 
excitement. The technologies matter, but they didn’t come from nowhere and solely for our 
benefit. If they are “enchanted,” somebody had to cast the spell, for some reason. “These grand, 
world-scale [corporate] alliances did not form in order to sell the reader a smart refrigerator,” 
writes Sterling (2014: loc. 68). “Most of them would really like the reader to dwell in a ‘Smart City’ 
where they supply the ‘smartness’ on their own terms—and they’re not much concerned about 
the reader’s consent as a citizen.” When taken at the urban scale, the city becomes a cocoon of 
connectivity that engulfs us—or, alternatively, it becomes a web that ensnares us—as smart 
technologies are integrated into our everyday lives. 
Moreover, and importantly, the smart city is not just a linearly scaled version of the smart 
home in which all of our personal devices and domestic appliance are networked, automated, and 
good communicators. It is not as if the smart city is just a way of bringing the convenient and cool 
capabilities of the smart home into the street. Now you can be smart anywhere! Rather, this 
scaling-up involves a categorical shift in the purpose and power of these technological systems. 
They are fundamentally about infrastructural and civic applications. They are the kind of systems 
that constitute the techno-political ordering of society.  
Calculating the costs and benefits of all this innovation is a Sisyphean task. Who knows 
what sinister or spectacular applications may emerge? While careful theory and scenario 
development can help us anticipate what may come, the dominant corporate and government 
discourses tend to downplay important negative analyses as paranoid projections. This 
convenient blindness to the most worrisome aspects of the “smart city” invites a more critical 
response. This chapter and the next pose such a response by laying out the characteristics and 
consequences of two intertwined logics—of control and of data accumulation—that course 
throughout and tie together many of the various practices, politics, and socio-technical systems 
related to smart cities.  
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In short, “logic” is used here to mean a way of reasoning and decision-making. If you 
understand the logic of a decision then you can know why/how that decision was made, what it 
follows from, and what its point is. This clarity, then, not only shines light on why the smart city is 
(being) constructed in the way it is, but also gives us some indication of how it will continue to 
develop and what the implications will be. By analyzing the logics that motivate the actually 
existing smart city (what is happening now), we can theorize about the plausibly potential smart 
city (where we may be going). 
 
Smart is Strange 
A number of scholars have recently tried to parse out how we should even think about 
the smart city and its social effects. The geographer Rob Kitchin (2014) refers to it as the “real-
time city” to emphasize the speed at which data is collected and analyzed, and the 
responsiveness of managerial action based on that data (such as by remotely controlling 
infrastructural operations or automatically deploying agencies like police). A recent volume of 
work by technologists, architects, and artists explores an alternative label, the “sentient city,” to 
spotlight the sensory and agential qualities of this type of urban system (Sehpard 2011). That is 
to say, its capacity for “sensing” stimuli, “knowing” what is happening, and “acting” based on that 
sensory feedback—with humans in-the-loop or out-of-the-loop. Others go so far as to refer to the 
layers of ICT as a “digital skin” that covers the urban environment; evoking the image of a 
sensory organ “composed of connected, digitally enabled objects, network nodes, communication 
devices and posts for monitoring and analyzing data fed into servers” (Rabari and Storper 2015). 
Part of what makes the smart city hard to wrap our heads around—as a concept, a 
movement, a technology—is the fact that it is not atomistic, self-contained, and singular in nature. 
You cannot easily draw boundaries around it. You cannot observe the whole thing. You cannot 
watch it act, take into account its past actions, and predict its next actions. The smart city is 
composed of massive, sprawling, networked systems. And the array of systems that give rise to 
the smart city are often hidden from sight and mind; their actions can be subtle and stark, 
continuous and intermittent. It gets more complex when these systems come together to create 
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the ultimate urban system—the “system of systems” that can be rendered legible and observable, 
treated as knowable and understandable, subjected to regimes of surveillance and control.  
The smart city is a thoroughly social project; its various systems and policies will act on 
urban dwellers, changing the nature of the built environment and influencing how they interact 
with each other and with state and corporate organizations. Thus, what we need are sharp social 
theoretical tools that can bring clarity to the smart city and highlight the logic of control that is 
woven into its fabric.11 In what follows, I will develop a social theoretic analysis by outlining a 
framework and describing two examples: biometric surveillance and policing technologies. 
 
Three Forms of Power 
To set the stage, it will be helpful to run through a quick history of three forms that power 
has taken in human society, which will orient the analysis and also show that the way society is 
(re)structured by the smart city is not new or even unexpected. These systems, practices, and 
their associated politics did not emerge from nowhere—springing forth, fully formed, from the 
heads of engineers and entrepreneurs. They are products of a long history of social power. 
The first two forms of power were described by Michel Foucault, a philosopher and 
historian whose work has had nearly unmatched impact on contemporary research in the social 
sciences and humanities. The one we perhaps most associate with power as such is sovereign 
power. This type of power is held by a sovereign—such as a patriarch over his family or a king 
over his subjects—and is exercised through means of requirement and punishment. That is, the 
sovereign can require that those he has power over do something: work for his benefit, give up 
their belongings, defend him in war against other sovereigns, or whatever else is commanded. 
And if those requirements are not met, then the sovereign has the power to punish any 
transgressions with imprisonment, exile, execution, etc. In other words, Foucault (2011: 136) 
writes, “Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and 
                                            
11 One relatively straightforward definition of “social theory” describes it as a “systematic, 
historically informed and empirically oriented theory seeking to explain the nature of ‘the social,’” 
where the social “can be taken to mean the general range of recurring forms, or patterned 
features, of interactions and relationships between people” (Cotterell 2006: 15). 
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ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.” The 
sovereign has power over life precisely because he has the power to seize it, to require death. 
This boils down to “the right to take life or let live” by refraining from killing. 
The second form of power, which began to emerge in the seventeenth century and has 
become increasingly refined and widespread, is what Foucault calls “biopower.” This power, 
Foucault (2011: 139) explains, is “centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the 
optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness 
and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured 
by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human 
body.” The “disciplines” Foucault speaks of are institutions—e.g., schools, workplaces, hospitals, 
militaries—which worked by crafting certain types of people: students, workers, patients, soldiers. 
These institutions became the sites for an “explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations” (2010: 14). These disciplinary 
techniques ensured that people and populations were properly administered, managed, and 
molded—at once, creating and instilling social norms. Importantly, though, biopower is not held 
by a person or group, but exists as part of social relationships. In this sense, we all become 
agents of biopower by policing ourselves and those around us, making sure we/they fit with 
expected norms.  
To boil it down again, Foucault (2011: 139) writes, “The old power of death that 
symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and 
the calculated management of life.” Sovereign power is exercised by taking life and letting live; 
biopower manifests by fostering certain kinds and ways of life and disallowing and neglecting 
others—even to the point of letting them die.  
Biopower has real explanatory value when applied to the smart city. It can show us that 
citizens are disciplined according to norms that benefit certain techno-political regimes. For 
instance, smart systems operate on people in a biopolitical way by treating them as embodied 
nodes of information on digital networks. Or, to use sociologist Jennifer Gabrys’ term (2014), 
people become “citizen sensors” who have an obligation to feed streams of data into the urban 
  84 
system, as well as open themselves up to being monitored and managed by that system. 
Similarly, argues Alberto Vanolo (2014: 11) in a paper that applies Foucault’s thought to smart 
cities, “producing ‘smart cities’ inevitably also co-produces what we could call a ‘smart citizen’. In 
fact, the smart city discourse means that people have to be willing to adapt to, and to live in, 
smart cities.” As illuminating as it is, the concept of biopower does not give us the full picture of 
how power operates—in what ways, to what ends—in the smart city. For that we will need to look 
at a different framework. 
The third form of power, and the one that I argue reveals the most about the smart city, is 
control. This form was best theorized by a contemporary of Foucault, who also had an immensely 
influential career: Gilles Deleuze. In a compact, prescient essay that was originally published in 
1990,12 “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Deleuze (1995) sketched out a framework that he 
saw as succeeding Foucault’s framework of “disciplinary societies”—just as Foucault’s work 
succeeded the “societies of sovereignty.”   
One of the primary shifts from discipline to control is from mold to modulation. Discipline 
is enacted through enclosures—the school, the factory, the prison—that confine us in place and 
mold us into certain types of people or “subjects.” We are fit into a set of “distinct castings.” Think 
of it like square pegs for square holes; all the other shapes of pegs are either shaved into squares 
or thrown away. But control works differently. It does not mold the individual and the population to 
fit one cast, Deleuze (1995: 178) says, but rather “controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming 
cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will 
transmute from point to point.” So while discipline sought to normalize and stabilize a way being, 
control is much more dynamic and “metastable”—in that it can adjust at any time and establish 
new rules, new demands, new expectations.  In the control society, the boundaries separating 
disciplinary institutions breakdown and blur into each other. If the school and the factory were 
exemplary institutions of discipline, then what represents control is that these institutions no 
longer have clear stopping points. They are ongoing and constant. 
                                            
12 1990 is its French publication year. The essay then appeared in English in 1992. 
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Some watchwords of control are “flexible” and “continuous.” Under control, you have to 
be highly flexible: ready to respond to changing circumstances; always hustling for the next gig 
and juggling more commitments; working when called upon, with shifting schedules and 
extractive expectations. And nothing ends, everything is continuous and has continuity: 
subcontracted freelancers work from home, probably at the same desk they eat from, watch TV 
shows from, and shop from; different types of emails (work, friends, marketing, scams) go to the 
same account, all causing your phone to ding wherever you are; perpetual training and unpaid 
internships are required to update your skills and prove you are not obsolete. The dams we 
establish to create boundaries in our life all overflow, becoming one single stream. Discipline 
makes you “normal” and invokes rebelliousness. Control makes you anxious and invokes 
volatility. 
Now, of course, the existence of one mode of power does not abolish the others. 
Sovereign power and disciplinary biopower clearly still exist in society. The question, though, is 
which framework explains the dominant logic at hand? As we will see, the smart city is an 
incarnation of the control society. 
 
Societies of Control 
Deleuze recognized from the outset that technologies play a role in spreading, 
channeling, and instigating different forms of society and power: “One can of course see how 
each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine—with simple mechanical 
machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines to disciplinary 
societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies” (1995: 175). So while the 
sword symbolized sovereignty and industrialized factories represented discipline, we should take 
the IoT as a token of control (cf. Benkler 2016).  
But don’t confuse this statement as being swept away by technological determinism. 
Importantly, it is not that “machines determine different kinds of society but that they express the 
social forms capable of producing them and making use of them,” Deleuze continues (1995: 
1980). “The machines don't explain any thing, you have to analyze the collective arrangements of 
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which the machines are just one component” (1995: 175). Here is an important point worth 
emphasizing. So much of our discourse about technology treats it as a discrete thing that can be 
analyzed outside of political economy, social structures, and dominant ideologies—as if it acts 
alone or in a way that can solely explain other phenomenon. But, in reality, technology is very 
much a part of those “collective arrangements.” The “hazard” of technology, as Leo Marx put it, 
comes when we forget these arrangements, when we give causal agency to technology by 
erasing the human and social dimensions that really matter. At the same time, we cannot 
disregard technology or else we risk making a similar but opposite mistake. 
With that in mind, how do societies of control operate? According to Deleuze there are at 
least three crucial components—dividuals, rhizomes, and passwords—which come together to 
form a continuously acting logic. We’ll take all three in turn, and in the context of the smart city. 
 
Dividuals; or, Identity via Synecdoche 
When one person observes another, basic perceptual senses of sight and vision demand 
at least some minimally holistic assessment. It is hard to register what a walking person is 
wearing, for example, without also noticing gender, if the person limps or strides, is tall or short, 
among the hundreds of other bits of tacit information that may be conveyed by an appearance. 
Monitored by sensors, by contrast, city dwellers are becoming less individuals than “dividuals”: 
entities ready to be divided into any number of pieces, with specific factors separated, scrutinized, 
and surveilled. What the person does is less important than the calculated responses to 
emanated data. For instance, the metadata from a phone call—who you call, when, where, and 
for how long—may be far more fateful than the talking which we usually take to be its purpose. 
With digital technologies, the individual is atomized, blown apart into streams of data fed 
into processors. As these sensors gain immediate influence over physical objects like doors and 
automobiles, there is little to no chance of the communicative dialogue that is a hallmark of 
human interaction. Instead, these relations are at their core strategic, rather than communicative. 
Consequences will result not from the “unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas 1996: 
306), or even coaxing and cajoling, but rather by force alone, as programmed by a set of 
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managers and software developers far removed in time and space from particular 
implementations of coded rules. In other words, there is no attempt at persuasion or opportunity 
for discretion. The decisions are final and perhaps no attempt is made to explain that decision 
and give you another option. You cannot argue with an algorithm, debate a data stream, or 
convince a control mechanism. 
For example, facial recognition software enrolls a person’s face, and by extension the 
person it is associated with, into a network, whether the person wants to be enrolled or not. 
Hackers now claim they can even use photographs to identify fingerprints as well, a potentially 
massive boon for law enforcement that happily coopts the hacker ethos (Santus 2014). The 
health wristband paints a picture of a self by collecting and analyzing somatic data. The location-
tracking sensor registers geospatial coordinates and movement. The Department of Homeland 
Security’s Cell-All initiative senses chemical agents using environmental sensors installed in the 
public’s smartphones, which send data to security networks and cloud servers (Monahan and 
Mokos 2013). The RFID reader only cares about the chip on the keycard in your wallet. The 
biometric lock is only concerned with your fingerprint or irises.  
The list of ways that people are dividualized goes on. The units of analysis get smaller 
and ever more precise, as the ability to capture different kinds of data is refined. Dividualization is 
what I call identity via synecdoche: a factor, a data point, a category—which particular one 
depends on the system in question—becomes representative of the whole and becomes all that 
matters. 
 
Rhizomes; or, The Trembling Giant 
The array of underlying technical systems, which are often hidden from sight and mind, 
can be conceptualized as what Deleuze and his collaborator Félix Guattari (1987) call a 
“rhizome”—which in botany refers to a mass of tangled roots that is usually subterranean, 
sending roots and shoots from its various nodes. The idea of rhizomes, philosophically speaking, 
refers to deeply entangled assemblages of concepts, relationships, materials, and actions. These 
different elements seem separate, like individual trees that make up a forest, but in reality they 
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are all tied together through a network of roots, connections, and interfaces. Thus, you end up 
with one entangled system appearing to be many discrete things. Much of which we do not see 
because it is invisible: perhaps it is immaterial like data streams and WiFi signals, or it is material 
but part of the hidden infrastructure, or we simply aren’t conscious of all the various systems we 
interface with daily.  
One of the most striking examples of a botanical rhizome is known as Pando (Latin for “I 
spread”), or The Trembling Giant. This enormous grove of quaking aspens in Utah is, quite 
literally, a single living organism. Even though it looks like a standard forest composed of 
individual trees living together, according to Atlas Obscura, “Each of the approximately 47,000 or 
so trees in the grove is genetically identical and all the trees share a single root system.”13 Pando 
has been able to survive so long (80,000 years) and become so large because it is able to 
regenerate and reproduce itself. Uprooting a large rhizome is a difficult task; you can shear off 
parts of it, but other stems will emerge elsewhere from the mass of roots. The rhizomatic systems 
of the smart city spread and creep, becoming massive and sprawling, while entrenching and 
reproducing the techno-politics they are embedded with. 
Metaphorically, the rhizome is contrasted with the tree, which is organized hierarchically, 
with linear causality, where the source and conclusion of a thing or action can be pinpointed. 
Rhizomes, however, have no distinct boundaries, no starting or ending points; rather, they are 
fluid fields, always acting, pulsating power, emanating from multiple directions and intensities. 
This rhizomatic nature of the smart city means that the effects of the smart systems are often 
dispersed and unequal: for some the systems channel and amplify their capacities, while for 
others the systems monitor and constrain their lives.  
Even as a swarm of disconnected, “dumb” machines, this emerging rhizomatic apparatus 
of monitoring and control can be intimidating. No one wants to be on the wrong side of its 
algorithms. As urban technological networks grow more vast and interconnected, secondary uses 
of data barely imaginable at the time “users” began participating in the IoT may well become 
                                            
13 No date of creation could be found on the article’s webpage. I accessed it on January 25, 2016 
http://www.atlasobscura.com/places/pando-the-trembling-giant 
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commonplace (Hoofnagle 2003). Data gathers and brokers—from corporations to governments—
will find a plethora of uses for the information. Consider the biometric lock: Surely the times, 
places, and identities of who is granted access will be categorized and logged, but what might be 
even more interesting to authorities is the data for who is denied access. 
 
Passwords; or, Access Denied 
People-as-dividuals have freedom only insofar as all their “passwords” are in working 
order. These are the products of dividualization, which mark access or restriction, allowing one to 
move freely or be stymied by the rhizomatic system. Do you wish to enter through a keypad lock? 
Your PIN is the password. Do you wish to purchase something? Your credit card is the password. 
Life is filled with these passwords. Possessing the right passwords is necessary for navigating life 
in a control society. “The password is able to garner, or restrict, such freedom because an array 
of ubiquitous and unseen mechanisms continuously monitors the user’s activity,” write 
surveillance scholars Patrick O’Byrne and Dave Holmes (2009: 61). At any moment a password 
could be rejected—rightly or wrongly, with or without your knowledge—and the amount of control 
those mechanisms have over you become bluntly apparent. Moreover, perfect control and failed 
control exist in a dual relationship; their effects can be indistinguishable and it can be impossible 
to the difference. We live under an illusion of freedom; our actual freedom is precarious and the 
shroud might drop at any moment.  
Deleuze (1995: 182) asked us to imagine “a city where one would be able to leave one’s 
apartment, one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises 
a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain 
hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person's position—licit or 
illicit—and effects a universal modulation.” When Deleuze originally wrote this example twenty-
five years ago, it sounded like cyber-punk science fiction, but now it is an easily realistic 
description of modern cities, let alone a ‘smart’ city. And as the rhizomatic tendrils extend further, 
city dwellers increasingly feel the Kafkaesque frustration such a scenario entails. 
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It is likely you have experienced these password denials. Consider, for instance, one I 
encountered on a daily basis while writing this chapter. Not long ago the apartment complex 
where I live decided to upgrade the security by installing gates at every entrance. Opening these 
gates requires a fob that works like a keycard (by pressing against a receiver at the pedestrian 
gate) and like a garage door opener (by clicking a button for the vehicle gate). To me the new 
electronic gates seemed unnecessary, but I thought it would just be a minor inconvenience: one 
more step to go through, another thing hanging on my keychain.  
Yet, as if to illustrate how arbitrarily they can exercise control, the complex’s managers 
did not make sure the security system worked properly before installing it. So for weeks my fob 
would only work part of the time, effectively locking me out of my home until a fellow resident 
came along and let me in from the inside. Or, if I were feeling adventurous, I could attempt to 
climb the concrete wall and metal gate. People began trying to prop the gate open, but of course 
the complex’s workers were ordered to remove any props. It didn’t matter that the control system 
wasn’t working the way it was intended. Its integrity had to be maintained and its commands had 
to be obeyed. The other residents and I were, thus, forced to experience the exact frustration that 
Deleuze asked us to imagine.  
Compared to other possible consequences of control—perhaps your credit card is 
denied, or your passport has been flagged, or countless other effects stemming from passwords 
we rely upon—this one was only relatively inconvenient and annoying. But it illustrates the logic of 
control that infiltrates everyday life, filling it with checkpoints that require passwords. When 
everything matches up, when everything works smoothly and efficiently, we have no cause to 
pause. We hardly notice the socio-technical systems that are constantly monitoring us—each 
transaction, each gateway, each checkpoint—deciding if our passwords are valid. 
 
Along the Spectrum 
While Deleuze may have intended his theory of societies of control to be a self-
preventing prophecy—alarming individuals to resist new forms of modulation and manipulation—it 
is now recognizable as the shadow side of smartness. For some groups, the smart city is a dream 
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they eagerly await to realize and prosper from. While for others it is more like a Deleuzian 
nightmare, which seems to have interpreted his description of “societies of control” as a planning 
strategy for urban life.  
Technology critics often portray these unexpected developments in technological control 
as a kind of Frankenstein’s monster or sorcerer’s apprentice, one that “we” have unleashed via 
thoughtless adoption of technology.14 But, with the help of social theory, we must push the 
question of causation and agency further, identifying the powerful actors who remain above the 
fray of dividualization, as they weave a web of forces that increasingly constrain the time and 
space of city dwellers (Krieger 1994).  
The overall pattern of relationships in the smart city results in what I call, along with my 
collaborator Frank Pasquale, a “spectrum of control”—with meritorious or merely creepy 
technologies overlapping with deeply disturbing ones (Sadowski and Pasquale 2015). By thinking 
in terms of a spectrum of control we can draw connections between technologies that were 
before thought of as discrete and independent. The innocuous is enfolded with the menacing. 
Any significant technology of the smart city becomes a tool to be repurposed for later, often-
unforeseeable goals. To illustrate the spectrum of control, I will look at two case technologies that 
exist at different ends of the spectrum. 
 
Soft Control of Biometric Surveillance 
At one end of the spectrum of control are the technologies that enact their power in subtle 
ways. They monitor different parts of you, capture data about those parts, log it into databases, 
run it through analytics, track your actions, manipulate your behavior, place you into categories, 
profit from data about you. These technical systems are increasingly ubiquitous and become 
subsumed into the background of everyday life due to their ‘invisibility’ (Star 1999). Again, they 
can be functionally invisible because people no longer notice their relationships and interactions 
with the technologies and/or physically invisible because they are intangible or hidden. 
                                            
14 Langdon Winner (1978) provides several examples in the opening sections of Autonomous 
Technology. 
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A particularly curious form of control emerges from this type of system, one which acts 
through, as political philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2010: 43) explains, an “insidious operation of 
power that does not immediately affect what humans can do—their potentiality—but rather their 
‘impotentiality,’ that is, what they cannot do, or better, can not do.” In other words, you are not 
limited in your capacity to do an action—such as by constraining or confining you—but instead it 
becomes very difficult for you to not do an action. For example, when few people had cellphones 
it was easy to not own or use one, but now that almost everybody does—and increasingly more 
parts of our life our tied to the constant communication and platform capabilities afforded by the 
device—it is nearly impossible not to also conduct your life via a cell/smartphone (Peppet 2013). 
The same can be said of automobiles: nothing forces any given person to buy an automobile, but 
in many places, when infrastructure is constructed with private vehicles assumed, and when there 
are scant other alternatives, how can you not make the choice?  
This power of “impotentiality” expands through various other technologies, too. And the 
consequences extend further beyond, say, feeling compelled to have a Facebook profile if you 
want to keep in touch with friends. A recent headline in Bloomberg Business puts impotentiality 
into sharp relief: “Employee Wellness Programs Not So Voluntary Anymore: Take a blood test or 
lose your health coverage” (Greenfield 2016). These types of programs are becoming quite 
common. Nobody is forcing you to wear a fitness tracker and submit to routine health tests. But 
once insurance companies put the right incentives in place, you face penalties and stigmas if you 
don’t “volunteer” to be part of the wellness program.  
Most people now have data dossiers gathered by government agencies and corporations 
like data brokers and insurance providers. These profiles are rich with information about who they 
are, what they do, the kinds of things they like, and so on. Since having an ever-expanding profile 
is the norm, it starts looking suspicious if you have a thin dossier because, say, you go to extra 
steps to preserve your privacy and not disclose your personal data (Peppet 2011). What are you 
trying to hide? Why do you refuse to be a good citizen of the digital world? The expectation—
even assumption—that you will accept and engage with these ubiquitous surveillance systems 
have made you impotent to do otherwise. 
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In the smart city, urban surveillance technologies—especially as they are rolled out as 
parts of massive, networked systems—anchor the subtle, soft end of the spectrum of control. 
Consider the closed-circuit television (CCTV) arrays that already blanket the streets and buildings 
of major cities around the world. CCTV is now emerging as a kind of “fifth utility” within cities 
(alongside gas, electricity, water, and telecommunications). According to Stephen Graham (2002: 
238), a geographer who studies ICT and urban politics, “Once CCTV systems are installed, their 
logic is inevitably expansionary. Economies of scale are very marked—once a system is built and 
monitoring personnel are employed, it makes sense to cover larger and larger areas.” Indeed, the 
characteristics of these technologies—ubiquity, hiddenness, scale—are likely to ensure they 
continue proliferating (Anttiroiko 2013; Galloway 2004).  
In the smart city, they become a form of “everyware” (Greenfield 2006)—software and 
hardware integrated into almost all facets of daily life: always present, tirelessly watching, but 
rarely noticed. Moreover, surveillance systems like CCTV are flexible, with the potential for added 
layers of sophisticated software incorporated into the hardware. Such as biometrics that are 
linked to the in-depth, personal information held and managed by data brokers and governments 
alike. The proliferation of surveillance systems as part of smart initiatives, which are then 
enhanced by advanced analytics, changes the very political economy of what it means to be a 
city dweller. 
Let’s consider further the example of biometrics, which identify, measure, and collect a 
biological trait or group of traits.15 There are a wide variety of types of existing biometrics, with 
more in development. Some of the most common focus on physical traits: faces, fingerprints, 
irises, retinas and DNA. Others focus on behavioral traits: voice, signature, gait (how a person 
walks) and keystrokes (speed and timing between key presses). In practice, biometric 
technologies employ a standard process across different types. A sample of the biological trait is 
collected using a sensor of some kind, such as a camera for faces or a telephone for voices. 
Through the use of an algorithm that extracts information from the biometric sample, the trait is 
                                            
15 This discussion of biometrics is a revised and expanded version of Sadowski (2014). Thanks to 
Al Jazeera America for allowing me to use parts of this article here. 
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then converted into a digital representation called a “template,” which can be stored in a 
database. The larger the database, the more templates there are to verify or identify subjects. 
The key component, though, is the algorithm used to construct the template. The algorithm is the 
feature that distinguishes one biometric recognition system as ‘better’ than others on markers 
like: can the algorithm quickly extract biometric information? Can it do so in a variety of 
environmental circumstances? Can it create a template that is accurate? 
In his study on the history and politics of biometrics, Nitzan Lebovic (2015: 843) illustrates 
why we should pay attention to this highly consequential technology:  
Computerized recognition systems that translate biological data into metrics are 
becoming common in biometric databases used around the globe—at border crossings, 
immigration offices, police archives, military command centers, hospitals, and banks […] 
Biometrics is the perfect tool for total yet also soft control, single and plural authority, 
sanction from above and demand for bottom-up self-censorship; rather than intervene in 
any obvious way, the masters of the digital archive are always supervising from behind 
the scenes like a surreptitious god. 
 
The potential role of biometrics in the information economy is huge—especially for the 
massive data-brokerage industry. During a 2013 U.S. Senate hearing, Senator John D. 
Rockefeller IV, then Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, said: “In 2012, the data broker industry generated $156 billion in revenues. That’s 
more than twice the size of the entire intelligence budget of the United States Government—all 
generated by the effort to learn about, and sell, the details about our private lives.”16 Thus, not 
only does biometric surveillance offer an effective tool for control, it does so with the promise of 
converting data into profit. 
Think of it as akin to a figurative strip-mining of bodies (and their actions) so that ever 
more data can be extracted from them. This analogy captures the degree of intrusiveness that 
biometrics have when they hone in on particular biological traits and pull them out of the context 
of the rest of the body, person, and environment.  
                                            
16 The transcript of this hearing—called “What information do data brokers have on consumers, 
and how do they use it?”—can be found at 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=a5c3a62c-
68a6-4735-9d18-916bdbbadf01&Statement_id=a47c081a-d653-4272-8d12-
d6edc1e04dc6&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-
e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=12&YearDisplay=2013 (Accessed 18 December 
2013). 
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The finer grain, personalized data provided through biometrics would be like gold in the 
data brokers’ servers, enabling companies to significantly fine-tune the way they create data 
profiles, target potential customers, and sell data to others. And it would provide government 
agencies with additional ways to oversee populations, monitor types of people, and track 
individual targets. The FBI already maintains a biometrics database called the Next Generation 
Identification System, which federal agents and police departments can use to identify people—
say, protestors at a political rally or somebody deemed suspicious. 
Once the profits and “actionable insights” are squeezed out of the data, the incentive is 
there to continue mining for more, and to find new data to use and new ways to extract it. The 
acceleration of profiling and personalization is a natural consequence of big data strategies for 
business and governance alike. Firms at the center of the big data economy claim that their data 
troves reverse the common economic law of diminishing marginal returns. The more data a firm 
has, the more its existing store is worth, since contextualization of profiles enables ever greater 
power of sorting, control, price discrimination—and even blackmail.  
It is appropriate that hidden systems of control would be wielded by shadowy 
organizations. As Leanne Roderick (2015: 740) points out, “Despite consumer data broker 
companies’ clear links with credit rating agencies, revenues numbering in the billions, exemption 
from state regulations to protect consumers from identity theft, and documented data breaches, 
the average citizen has likely never heard of these powerful corporations.” Since these brokers 
collate data and construct profiles through whatever means available, by adding biometric 
algorithms and databases to the mix, these brokers, and crucially their clients, accumulate troves 
of data to the point that they may know more intimate details about persons—including income, 
debt, illness, criminal records, and drugs taken—than their own families do. Some high-end 
stores already use facial recognition software to alert clerks and salespeople that a VIP or a 
celebrity is in the store (Salinas 2013). With large enough databases, what’s to prevent stores 
from identifying even non-VIP customers who walk in the door? Perhaps profiling them based on 
credit score or number of Twitter followers.  
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These implications, among others, are consequences of the ways biometrics allow—even 
encourage—more intensive control and commodification of physical bodies. In her book When 
Biometrics Fail, Shoshana Magnet (2011: 12) writes that, “Biometrics break bodies down into 
their component parts in ways that allow them to be marketed more easily in the transnational 
marketplace […] The flimsy material body is rendered rugged as biometric technologies make the 
body replicable, transmittable, and segmentable.” We’ve heard of the data economy, but how 
about the face economy, the iris economy, or the gait economy? There are entire corporate 
sectors and government agencies eager to strip-mine that data and put it to use in any number of 
ways. Imagine what they, and others, could do with the knowledge and power provided by 
diverse types of biometrics: data brokers construct in-depth consumer profiles replete with 
biometric templates; salespeople and store security use biometric emanations to pull up your 
reputation from the database; and your identity is pinned to your location, which is better tracked 
as you move through the streets, public squares, and shops.  
Thus, biometrics present a way to not only dividualize you at minute scales, but also 
provide the means to intensify your integration into the rhizomatic systems and multiply the kinds 
of passwords you need to traverse urban life. All while the smart city constructs a ready platform 
to support these activities.  
At the subtle end of the spectrum of control, the systems act on us in ways that are 
functionally and/or physically invisible; few even know about data brokers, intrusive surveillance, 
and the ways we become incorporated into the data flows of capital and control. And even then, 
we “consent” by default because the options to not do things that pull us into the techno-political 
logics—such as not using digital platforms, not using smartphones, not going to stores and 
streets without a mask, not living in a populated area—can hardly be considered real choices for 
the vast majority of citizens. 
 
Hard Control of Policing Technologies 
On the other end of the spectrum are technologies of control that enact their power in 
aggressive, violent ways. They too monitor and track you, creating new forms of data, storing it in 
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centralized databases, and processing it with analytics. But here the purpose is to mobilize 
technologies against those who transgress or attempt to escape control. Hard control is often 
blunt; it operates, in part, by making you aware that you are always subject to control if you step 
outside the bounds of the system.   
 
Consider how the current tactical and technological trends of urban policing are 
consolidating power in security and enforcement agencies. An increasing number of highly 
publicized protests from around the world have had the side effect of revealing—and ramping 
up—some of the suppression methods state forces are employing when confronted with an 
organized public. The police responses to protests—large and small, peaceful and riotous—are 
often severe and militarized (Balko 2013). 
 
Clashes between protesters and police at Occupy (in hundreds of sites in the U.S. in 
2011, and in Hong Kong in 2014) and #BlackLivesMatter (in the wake of the Darren Wilson and 
Daniel Pantaleo grand jury decisions) escalated from ordinary policing to paramilitary pacification, 
sometimes in a matter of minutes. Footage of these demonstrations and clashes could easily be 
confused with a battalion of troops holding the line against insurgents in the urban battlespace 
(Graham 2009; Virilio 2005). The science of protest management—replete with “sublethal 
weapons” like ear-paining long-range acoustic devices (LRADs) and nerve-damaging, plastic 
handcuffs—typically manages to disperse the crowd in short order. Violent and even sexualized 
harassment is also distressingly common. When challenged verbally, authorities all too often 
double-down and wield physical force to impose order. Riot gear, rifles, tasers, pepper spray, 
dogs, water cannons, tear gas, monitoring, tracking, arrests, and beatings have all become 
normalized for authorities. 
Smart city technology could make the control of protests less physically violent, but ever 
more precise, continuous, and effective as a deterrent against collective action. In January 2014, 
protesters in Kiev, Ukraine received an ominous mobile phone message from state authorities: 
“Dear subscriber, you are registered as a participant in a mass riot.” That charge—thanks to 
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tough new Ukrainian laws against public gatherings—can come with a sentence of 15 years in 
prison (Walker and Grytsenko 2014). These tactics are indicative of a move towards using 
technologies that break-up protests—or even prevent them from happening in the first place—
without relying (only) on boots-on-the-ground approaches. The psychological effects go well 
beyond immediate confrontations. Just knowing it is possible to be arrested, at home or work, 
days after attending a protest—all thanks to remote registration in police and homeland security 
dossiers—may be enough to thin out the activist ranks and squelch dissent. Or these police 
tactics may (as in the case of Ukraine itself) raise the stakes to the point that protesters feel 
compelled to revolt, given dark possibilities of collective punishment if the regime entrenches 
itself. Once again, the stakes rise very quickly. 
As cultural theorist Paul Virilio (2009) warned in his essay “The State of Emergency,” 
rapid pacification of threats can, in turn, lead to an arms race in the intensity of threats. He has 
observed that “the reduction of warning time that results from the supersonic speeds of assault 
leaves so little time for detection, identification and response that in the case of a surprise attack 
the supreme authority would have to risk abandoning his supremacy of decision by authorizing 
the lowest echelon of the defense system to immediately launch anti-missile missiles.” Similarly, 
as protesters began to anticipate and evade blunt crowd dispersal tactics, the leaders of a 
pervasively “smart city” would be tempted to embed algorithmic deterrence into transport and 
policing enforcement systems—initiatives which are already well underway.  
That escalation of control creates a dangerous dynamic among protesters: for while 
many may simply give up, others may, along the lines of the Ukrainian model, decide that one 
should only strike the king with a killing blow. That is, when control systems prevent petition and 
protest, the only politics worth engaging is the complete overthrow of regimes determined to 
disadvantage peaceful dissenters. The reformist space of democratic politics and collective action 
evaporates between the poles of quiescence and revolution, of anxious compliance and explosive 
volatility.  
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At present, smart policing technologies buttress acquiescence.17 Consider the following 
scenario:  
A police officer stands at the corner of a busy intersection, scanning the crowd with her 
body camera. The feed is live streamed into the Real Time Crime Center back at department HQ, 
where specialized software uses biometric recognition to determine if there are any persons of 
interests on the street (Beck and McCue 2009). At the same time, the area’s threat level is 
monitored and relayed to officers on duty. Data analysts alert an officer that a man with an 
abnormally high threat score is amongst the crowd; the officer approaches him to deliver a 
“custom notification,”18 warning him that the police will not tolerate criminal behavior. He is now 
registered in a database of potential offenders. Overhead, a light aircraft outfitted with an array of 
surveillance cameras flies around the city, persistently keeping watch over entire sectors, 
ensuring order is maintained. 
While this might sound like something from the techno-paranoia stories of Phillip K. Dick 
or Black Mirror, these technologies and many more are all becoming standard parts of how 
policing works. In other words, this isn’t a futuristic dystopia, but an imminent reality. 
Take the work of the firm Persistent Surveillance Systems (as if the name were inspired 
by a Deleuzian parody) (Timberg 2014). Police in cities around the United States have begun to 
test the company’s services, which use a civilian aircraft that allows authorities to cast a wide net 
of surveillance across the city (Friedersdorf 2014). The company’s owner likens it to “a live 
version of Google Earth, only with TiVo capabilities” (Campbell-Dollaghan 2014: np). The 
technology lets police record, rewind, and zoom aerial video so they can track the movements of 
specific vehicles and people within the city. The crowd control potential of having a real-time and 
recorded eye-in-the-sky is vast. The escalation of tracking capabilities isn’t surprising or new. It is 
another layer on top of the extensive technologies already deployed—just one more system 
ready to be integrated into a smart city’s control room. 
                                            
17 This discussion of data-driven policing is an expanded version of Sadowski (2016). Thanks to 
The Guardian for allowing me to use parts of this article here. 
18 Custom Notifications in Chicago – Pilot Program D13-09 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives-mobile/data/a7a57bf0-13fa59ed-26113-fa63-
2e1d9a10bb60b9ae.html?ownapi=1 
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And of course, no smart police squad would be complete without software analytics to 
parse out all the data they are scooping up. Thanks to big data collection and analytics programs, 
police can gather data from just about any source and for just about any reason you can think of. 
“Soon it will be feasible and affordable for the government to record, store, and analyze nearly 
everything we do,” writes law professor Elizabeth Joh (2016: 2). “The police will rely on alerts 
generated by computer programs that sift through the massive quantities of available information 
for patterns of suspicious activity.” 
According to the Washington Post, for instance, one such program called Beware uses 
“billions of data points, including arrest reports, property records, commercial databases, deep 
Web searches and the [person’s] social media postings” to create a threat score about an 
individual, address, or area (Jouvenal 2016: np). A brochure for the program uses a hypothetical 
example of a veteran diagnosed with PTSD, indicating they also take into account health-related 
data.19 Beware then color-codes their scores so officers can know at a glance what level the 
threat is—green, yellow, or red—and respond accordingly. 
Beware is just one among many new technologies incorporated into the rapidly growing 
trend of “data-driven policing.” Indeed, the promise of analytics knows no bounds. Perhaps the 
holy grail—or, rather, crystal ball—of big data-fueled analytics is called “predictive policing,” which 
uses statistical models to tell officers where crime is likely to happen and who is likely to commit it 
(Eligon and Williams 2015). The models are based on a wide variety of data. According to a 
report by The Verge, a predictive policing firm called HunchLab “primarily surveys past crimes, 
but also digs into dozens of other factors like population density; census data; the locations of 
bars, churches, schools, and transportation hubs; schedules for home games—even moon 
phases” (Chammah 2016: np). In February 2014, the Chicago Police Department created a 
media buzz about these techniques when officers preemptively visited residents that were on a 
computer-generated “Heat List,” which marked them as likely to be involved in a future violent 
crime. The officers then personally delivered “custom notifications” to these designated “pre-
                                            
19 The brochure from Intrado is available for download here. Accessed January 28, 2016  
http://www.aclunc.org/docs/201512-social_media_monitoring_softare_pra_response.pdf 
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criminals.”20 (The Orwellian terminology is a little on the nose.) These people had done nothing 
wrong, but the CPD wanted to let them know that officers would be keeping tabs on them. 
Essentially, they were already considered suspects for crimes not yet committed.  
Similarly, predictive policing also works through “hot spot” analysis, which maps out the 
sectors where police should pay special attention—which can mean flooding them with police 
cruisers and beat cops. These are places where, according to the analytics software, crime is 
most likely to occur; thus they are the places where the police should focus their attention, partly 
to be close to the predicted action and partly to serve as a show-of-force deterrent. Chicago is 
only one among many cities implementing “predictive policing” and similar techniques. 
While these analytics and scores can be used to great effect—potentially enhancing the 
ability of police to make more informed, less biased decisions about law enforcement—they are 
often used in dubious ways and for repressive purposes (Citron and Pasquale 2014; Crawford 
and Schultz 2014; Pasquale 2015; Scannel 2015). For example, a report by ProPublica revealed 
that judges use risk assessment scores—marketed and sold by private companies—when 
making decisions about bond amounts, sentence lengths, and parole conditions (Angwin et al. 
2016). In the course of their investigation, ProPublica found that not only are the scores 
“remarkably unreliable in forecasting violent crime,” but they were also “particularly likely to falsely 
flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate 
as white defendants” (Angwin et al. 2016: np). Racial biases that label black people as high risk 
and dangerous, while white people are determined to be the opposite, were reproduced by the 
risk scores and hidden by opaque technical formulas. 
For many of these analytics programs, especially ones developed and sold by private 
tech companies, it is unclear how exactly they even work. What data are they using? How are 
they weighing variables? What values and biases are coded into them? Only the companies 
know these answers—though, in reality, it is likely that even the developers aren’t 100% certain—
and they won’t tell because that would be divulging lucrative details. With Beware, for example, 
                                            
20 Custom Notifications in Chicago – Pilot Program D13-09 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives-mobile/data/a7a57bf0-13fa59ed-26113-fa63-
2e1d9a10bb60b9ae.html?ownapi=1 
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“Exactly how [the software] calculates threat scores is something that its maker, Intrado, 
considers a trade secret, so it is unclear how much weight is given to a misdemeanor, felony or 
threatening comment on Facebook” (Jouvenal 2016: np). This is a common position taken by 
tech companies who rely on their software, algorithm, and platform to generate profits. So when 
police say they are using data-driven techniques to make smarter decisions, what they really 
mean is they are relying on software that spits out scores and models, without any real 
understanding of how. This reliance demonstrates a tremendous faith in the veracity of analytics. 
It is absurd for police not to know what decisions, weights, values, and biases are baked 
into the analytics they use. The factors and decisions that influence how police operate are 
obscured from the public—and even to the police themselves! How could methods that aren’t 
even open to public oversight and accountability even be considered legitimate in a democratic 
society? And yet, even in the face of controversy, police departments continue to use and defend 
these technologies when questioned by the public, the media, and politicians.  
Contrary to the common defense trotted out by technocrats, the big data, analytics, and 
algorithms behind such judgments are not objective arbiters of discretion and punishment. 
Rather, they easily become ways of laundering subjective, biased decisions into ostensibly 
objective, fair judgments. Many researchers and advocates have argued that techniques like 
predictive policing don’t so much see the future as they end up entrenching and justifying 
longstanding practices of racial profiling, over-policing of certain urban neighborhoods, and 
aggressive targeting of already disempowered groups (Joh 2014; New York Times 2015; Upturn 
2014). Those affected lose a chance at individualized treatment and understanding, as technical 
systems treat people as a mere collection of data points. 
Moreover, by integrating these technologies deeper into their operations, police 
departments are opening the way for corporations to have outsized influence over what policing 
means in society. Technologies are not just neutral tools that police use to do what they’re 
already doing, but do it better. They are not divorced from politics, but are designed with certain 
values and goals in mind (Winner 1980). And when large corporations and entrepreneurial 
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startups establish those values and goals, you are likely to end up with policing modeled after 
technocratic motivations for total efficiency and control. 
It is telling that the companies creating these analytics programs also sell tweaked 
versions of their software to more than just police departments. As The Intercept reported, the 
same types of analytics bleed into marketing and military applications (Schwarz 2015: np): 
In 2010, IBM employees delivered a talk at IBM’s Analytics Solution Center in 
Washington, D.C., titled ‘An Introduction to Edge Methods: Business Analytics and 
Optimization for Intelligence.’21 The audience was ‘the Defense and Intelligence 
communities,’ and IBM’s goal was to explain to them how the company could help them 
with ‘managing large volumes of data’ to derive ‘invaluable’ insights […] That is, IBM was 
bringing what it had learned from managing Big Data for corporate America to the military 
and intelligence worlds. […] The Pentagon’s drone program uses data analytics in almost 
precisely the same way IBM encourages corporations to use it to track customers. The 
only significant difference comes at the very end of the drone process, when the 
customer is killed. 
 
IBM is also a major vendor of analytics and other “smart” technologies for law 
enforcement (Dalzell and Kennedy 2014). In the case of policing, then, the “customer” is 
surveilled, harassed, arrested, and perhaps even killed. So, whether for the pursuit of profits, 
geopolitical missions, or law and order, IBM and others are more than happy to provide you with 
an analytics software package that can meet your needs. In a “Smarter Planet,” the goals of 
business, military, and police are in alignment with the methods of smart technologies.  
To that end, IBM recently proclaimed that its analytics could also be used to suss out 
which Syrian refugees are harmless and helpless and which ones are actually ISIS terrorists in 
disguise. “The system could provide a score to indicate the likelihood that a hypothetical asylum 
seeker was who they said they were, and do it fast enough to be useful to a border guard or 
policeman walking a beat,” reports Defense One (Tucker 2016: np). When it comes to justifying 
these analytics, IBM’s top executive, Ginni Rometty (2013b: np), says we should “embrace 
predictive analytics” for two reasons: “First, we can,” and second “because we must.” By 
conflating the normative with the descriptive, Rometty expresses a distressingly common—and 
dangerous—position held by technocrats and authoritarians: we do things because we can. 
                                            
21 The slide deck is available here. Accessed January 28, 2016 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2483499-edge-methods-ibm-bao-intell-v4.html 
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Ultimately, however, this initiative is just another example of IBM continuing its long tradition of 
helping state powers categorize and monitor entire populations. 
Furthermore, the normalization of these surveillance systems and analytics techniques 
lays the foundation for the further development and implementation of the next phase in 
automated law enforcement. As a group of academics—many of them from the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point—warn in a recent article, the typically manpower-intensive methods of 
policing are undergoing technological changes. These “automated systems scale efficiently, allow 
meticulous and tireless enforcement of many laws, promise rapid dispatch of punishment, and 
offer financial incentives to law enforcement agencies, governments, and purveyors of these 
systems” (Shay et al. 2016). By delegating police activities to technological systems opportunities 
for dissent and protest are minimized. While there is a chance that corruption and criminal activity 
in policing could be reduced, it comes at the expense of entrenching the version of law and order 
programmed into the automatic enforcement systems.  Any response by citizens for socio-
political change becomes defanged.  
In the near-term future we can imagine the possibility that authorities will aggressively 
deploy drones and robots to “deal with” political protesters and suspected criminals. For instance, 
the South African company Desert Wolf has developed a riot-control drone they call the Skunk, 
which is armed with a veritable arsenal of “sublethal” capabilities. Along with strobe lights, 
cameras, and speakers, the Skunk comes equipped with four paintball guns that can be loaded 
with “dye marker balls, pepper spray balls or solid plastic balls” in order to “disperse or mark 
people in the crowd” (Doctorow 2014). The Skunk is first being delivered to mining industries to 
deal with employee strikes. It is easy to imagine technology like the Skunk being applied to urban 
protest. After all, responses to strikes and riots share a similar goal: subduing those who seek to 
interrupt and change the current structures of power and capital. Tactics developed for a strike 
are easily applicable to a protest. Police already have access to surveillance drones, and admit to 
using them to film protests. By using some version of the Skunk police forces can deal with 
dissent in ways even more effective, flexible, dehumanized, and safe (for them). Calibrated 
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robotic and drone interventions may eventually become part of the furniture of smart urban 
existence where all glitches in the city system are problems in need of techno-fix responses. 
And the power of “non-violent” police tactics is growing. Technological means threaten to 
even prevent crowds from forming in the first place, thus moving from reactionary to prophylactic 
strategies. San Francisco authorities manipulated both train schedules and wireless access to 
disrupt protests. New York’s MTA has simply forced trains to bypass stations where protests are 
occurring, to keep people from assembling. Police power to surveil large areas, use remote scare 
tactics, automate escalation of enforcement, and practice predictive policing is supposed to lead 
to a more orderly society. To the extent such measures deter legitimate protest and control 
citizens, they entrench a more mechanized, inorganic society—one where technologies of control 
are used to capture, and replay, one set of power relations, over and over again. The body politic 
mummifies into a very different type of social organization: a leviathan machine. 
The logic of control changes the very character of society, degrading aspects that we 
should view as crucial to a healthy body politic. For instance, a pamphlet published by the 
Invisible Committee (2015: 108), an anonymous collective of French intellectuals, argues that 
pro-social feelings like trust become casualties of the control society:  
We’re not experiencing a ‘crisis of trust’ but the end of trust, which has become 
superfluous to government. Where control and transparency reign, where the subjects’ 
behavior is anticipated in real time through the algorithmic processing of a mass of 
available data about them, there’s no more need to trust them or for them to trust. It’s 
sufficient that they be sufficiently monitored. As Lenin said, ‘Trust is good, control is 
better.’ 
 
The result is then a self-reinforcing sense of alienation and passivity in the smart city 
inhabitant who lives under the watchful eye and swift hand of control systems. In this case, an 
underclass is created, whether materially, politically, or (most likely) both. When subjugated by 
hard control systems, the subjects of the smart city are simply herded along toward maximally 
productive activity (via nudges or shoves). They are free to enjoy the enhancements of smart 
technologies—as long as they do not run afoul of the control apparatus, as long as their 
passwords work, as long as they submit to integration into the networks and databases. 
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Stephen Graham argues, in a 2011 interview with Democracy Now!, that cities are the 
“foundation space for democracy.” They can be thought of as a staging ground for public 
reactions and protests—a spotlight on larger social issues. Yet, transforming urban space into a 
highly technologized, secured environment reinforces and normalizes the view that anything but 
subdued acceptance of the status quo is unwelcomed, and thus must be contained and stopped. 
In his book Cities Under Siege, Graham (2011: 121) argues that the capacity for democratic 
action is under attack. He writes, “Militarized police cordons, often supplemented with pre-
emptive detentions and bans on the right to protest, try—often violently—to confine protestors for 
long periods in space where they have little exposure to the media and few opportunities to 
communicate their political message.” In short, the actions of protestors and whistleblowers, 
activists and advocates, are not always valued as integral parts of a flourishing society. And that 
can be just as dangerous as the activities protesters, properly, try to expose and deter.  
The details about what aspects of society that smart systems are used to stabilize and 
reproduce is likely to change according to the political context of the city. The smart city will likely 
reflect different politics in China than in Brazil or the USA than in Spain. The degree of that 
change, however, is uncertain since firms like IBM and Cisco aim to create plug-and-play 
systems and service packages that can be applied to any city (Greenfield 2013). While such 
techno-determinist hopes will likely be frustrated, no matter where these smart systems are 
deployed, we must be vigilant against the impulse for the urban elite to use them to entrench their 
own interests and exclude others from exercising dissent.  
While such trends in policing tactics and technologies are not necessarily caused by 
smart cities—they are certainly occurring in places not touched by ‘smart’ initiatives—the 
purveyors of smart cities are eagerly opening the door for new ways to intensify and entrench 
them. The avid support emanating from tech companies and police department easily drowns out 
questions about whether these systems are accurate, appropriate, and legitimate. Moreover, 
police forces’ eager adoption of data-driven analytics, automated enforcement, and other 
technologies of control—without regard for meaningful public input, safeguards against 
misconduct, and other basic procedures of accountability—illustrates just how willing they are to 
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expand their arsenals. Their ability to monitor the public and mobilize action is enhanced to an 
alarming degree. This threatens to expand the boundaries of what counts as disorder; thus 
justifying the further growth of control and amplifying the reactions against any efforts to object. 
 
Can It Be Dystopic If It Exists? 
The legitimacy of these ever-smarter systems of control depends, in part, on their even-
handedness. There are curious gaps in this apparatus of control. Somehow, certain elite 
groups—such as financier lawbreakers—are rarely, if ever, subjected to monitoring and 
restriction, let alone punished. By contrast, the average person is dividualized by the rhizomatic 
apparatus because the dividual can be better analyzed, penetrated, and controlled. As Cory 
Doctorow (2015: np) has provocatively argued, “Our networks have given the edge to the elites, 
and unless we seize the means of information, we are headed for a long age of [ICT]-powered 
feudalism, where property is the exclusive domain of the super-rich, where your surveillance-
supercharged Internet of Things treats you as a tenant-farmer of your life, subject to a license 
agreement instead of a constitution.” 
Moreover, it is not just that these techno-political regimes change what rights we enjoy, 
but they also change the obligations we have to fulfill. For instance, acting as human information 
nodes in the urban network is becoming another civic and economic duty that smart city dwellers 
are expected to perform. “Monitoring and managing data in order to feed back information into 
urban systems are practices that become constitutive of citizenship,” Jennifer Gabrys (2014: 34) 
explains. “Citizenship transforms into citizen sensing, embodied through practices undertaken in 
response to (and communication with) computational environments and technologies.” 
The state of affairs described by in this chapter can sound dystopic—I am occasionally 
accused of stoking those sentiments. But much of what I describe already exists, and I’m only 
scratching the surface. There are additional technologies and plans being actively developed by 
tech corporations, government agencies, and city leaders. Given that I am not spinning fictions, 
have we somehow slipped into a real life dystopia? If so, shouldn’t we try to do something about 
it? 
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At present, smart city boosters are far too prone to assume that a benevolent intelligence 
animates the networks of sensors and control mechanisms they are installing. The predictable 
result is a failure of imagination: a normative agenda either mired in slight refinements to existing 
patterns, or free-floating utopianism about the inevitability of progress. We cannot afford to 
succumb to this Whiggish complacency. Nor should we fool ourselves into thinking that the 
techno-politics I describe here only operate in some dystopic place that is distance in space/time. 
If we do, then we neuter any possibility for challenging and changing the paradigm of smart 
urbanism. Rather than ushering in different relationships of people-places-technologies and 
achieving stronger rights to shape our cities, we will be left with systems of control that are easily 
mistaken for dystopic fictions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
POWER OF DATA / DATA OF POWER 
It does not matter that the amounts [of data] collected vastly exceed an organization’s 
imaginative reach or analytic grasp. The assumption is that someone, someday, will find 
some use for the data, or perfect the algorithm […] Contemporary organizations are both 
culturally impelled by a data imperative and powerfully equipped with the tools to enact it. 
— Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy (2015: 5) 
 
When the data and software of hundreds of millions of people exist or run in a single 
place, whoever can compromise and gain control over it—legitimately or illegitimately—
can exercise power over these hundreds of millions of people, at least to the extent that 
the data and applications extend power over their users and subjects. 
— Yochai Benkler (2016: 23) 
 
 
We are constantly subjected to systems of data collection, which target us at different 
levels. For instance, it is common for the applications on smartphones to require you grant them 
broad “permissions” to access the lucrative stores of data created from your interactions with the 
hardware, software, and networks. (Why does a flashlight app need access to my contacts, 
calendar, location, browsing history, and text messages?) Your iPhone is likely (by default) 
keeping track of your “frequent locations,” figuring out which places are your “home” and “work,” 
and secretly sending that data to Apple. At least you can turn off this auto-collection—if, that is, 
you find the right buttons buried under multiple layers of settings. And as the public learned in 
early 2015, Samsung’s SmartTV was eavesdropping on your conversations and, like a gossipy 
neighbor, possibly sending that recorded data to third parties (Gibbs 2015). Spying is not a bug, 
but a feature of smart devices. 
Consider, too, the various ways you become part of data scooping while shopping. Of 
course, Amazon and other online stores are watching everything you do on their websites. But 
the data collection doesn’t end, or even lighten up, when you decide to actually venture into a 
brick-and-mortar store. One of the most common methods is the loyalty programs and VIP cards 
at grocery stores and retailers. Such programs are less about offering special discounts to loyal 
customers than they are about gathering data at every transaction to create a profile of you as a 
shopper so the store can track what kind of things people in your demographics buy, what they 
tend to buy together, when they buy it, and other correlations (Turow et al. 2015). Not to mention 
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the many other ways stores monitor and analyze customers: like Wi-Fi nodes that ping your 
smartphone in order to track your movement through the aisles (Datoo 2014). Or, mannequins 
with clandestine cameras installed in their eyes that feed data into facial recognition software, 
which “logs the age, gender, and race of passers-by” (Roberts 2012: np). 
The logic of these data systems is expansionist. They spread to more and larger domains 
of society, further incorporating everything into a regime of big data accumulation. The smart city 
is in the extended family of the smartphone and smart home and smart store. By installing various 
kinds of sensors across the city, governments, businesses, and researchers can turn the urban 
environment into a mighty torrent of always flowing data. Take a project in Chicago called the 
“Array of Things,” which describes itself as a “fitness tracker” for the city. According to the 
project’s website, the array uses “a network of interactive, modular sensor boxes that will be 
installed around Chicago to collect real-time data on the city’s environment, infrastructure, and 
activity for research and public use.”22 Through public-private initiatives like the Array of Things, 
Chicago has worked to become a leader in big data-driven urbanism. According to the Chicago 
Council of Global Affairs (2014: 5), many of the city’s public sectors—like transportation, 
education, and policing—have been retooled to fit with Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s “comprehensive 
plan for employing technology to improve the local economy and the quality of city services.” 
The prevalence of data-driven smart projects, plan, and blueprints like those happening 
in Chicago, New York, London, and elsewhere is not surprising. Big data comes with the promise 
of big profits, big power, and big insights. This promise also means that what Fourcade and Healy 
call a “data imperative”—the logic of accumulating more data from more sources for more 
(potential) purposes—infiltrates nearly all aspects of life and society. The imperative demands the 
extraction of all data, from all sources, in whatever ways possible. Fulfilling the imperative 
involves more than just passively collecting data; it is an active creation of everything as data. 
That is, beyond observing and knowing the world, big data is also central to powerful ways of 
ordering and making the world.  
                                            
22 Array of Things. Accessed February 8, 2016: https://arrayofthings.github.io/  
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When the logic of data accumulation is left unchecked, whether socially or legally—as it 
largely has been—there is no escape and no limits. Think of all the types of data you produce, the 
ways that data is gathered, and the uses of that data. And then realize that you are likely only 
scratching the surface of what already exists, let alone what may come to be in the (near) future. 
“Storing and studying people's everyday activities, even the seemingly mundane, has become the 
default rather than the exception," according to a 2012 analysis by the Wall Street Journal 
(Angwin and Valentino-Devries 2012: np). “Data about a typical American is collected in more 
than 20 different ways during everyday activities.” And for each of those ways of collecting data, 
there could be a host of watchers and gathers. Like the upwards of 100+ companies that track 
you during regular Internet surfing (Madrigal 2012), or the innumerable CCTV cameras that 
record you in public. “Fifteen years ago, more than half of these surveillance tools were 
unavailable or not in widespread use” (Angwin and Valentino-Devries 2012: np). Since 2012, 
methods of data collection that were previously secret have come to light and new ones have 
been developed, while others have become increasingly commonplace. Twenty different ways of 
data collection is now probably a lowball estimate. 
Big data—according to the subtitle of an acclaimed book by Viktor Mayer-Schönberger 
and Kenneth Cukier (2013)—is nothing short of “a revolution that will transform how we live, work, 
and think.” But that revolution does not just happen on its own: It is ushered into being, it is given 
legitimacy, and it is steered by the interests of people—powerful, elite people. As Shoshana 
Zuboff (2015: 75), professor at Harvard Business School, argues, “‘big data’ is above all the 
foundational component in a deeply intentional and highly consequential new logic of 
accumulation that I call surveillance capitalism.” In other words, the logic of accumulation 
underpins the political economic project of surveillance capitalism—perhaps better termed here 
“dataveillance” (Esposti 2014; Dijck 2014)—which marshals the techniques of big data to achieve 
capitalist goals. This entails the (total) datafication and surveillance of people, places, things, and 
the networks they are subsumed into—for the purpose of power and profit, control and extraction.  
To be sure, the benefits are not only enjoyed by elites. Thanks to search engines, mobile 
web, and wearable trackers, for instance, we now have easy access to an unfathomable amount 
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of information about the world and ourselves. Most, if not all, of us are awash in a deluge of data. 
Data-driven devices like my smartphone bring plenty of conveniences and capabilities that I am 
happy to enjoy. But make no mistake: big data is not distributed equally. There are haves and 
have nots, data rich and data poor (boyd and Crawford 2012). Mark Andrejevic (2014: 1674), a 
media and information scholar, points out that there is a stark “big data divide,” and not just in 
terms of possessing data: “Even if users had such access [to all the data collected about them], 
what individuals can do with their data in isolation differs strikingly from what various data 
collectors can do with this same data in the broader context of everyone else’s data.” So, while 
many of us receive great benefits from data technologies, obtaining the real riches of big data 
relies on intensive capacities for data mining, storing, processing, and analyzing. Such capacities 
are concentrated in only a few hands (Andrejevic 2014). To the techno-political elite—not just 
tech corporations like IBM and Google, but also government agencies like the US National 
Security Agency (NSA)—go the spoils of big data. These are the true benefactors of 
dataveillance capitalism.  
In this chapter, I describe four salient principles of dataveillance capitalism: 1) data is 
power; 2) data is universal; 3) data is networked; 4) data is value. These principles are not 
isolated or discreet; they exist as a constellation. From there I conclude the chapter by reflecting 
on two overarching features of dataveillance capitalism: data determinism and data divide. 
A note on structure: before I discuss each principle, I have inserted an interlude in which I 
describe relevant video(s) from IBM, Cisco, or Siemens (each company being, of course, a major 
conductor of smartness). These videos are slickly produced blends of marketing, information, and 
public relations that offer visual vehicles for presenting the companies’ overarching visions of big 
data. They are aesthetic, persuasive, refined distillations of those visions. And they are easily 
digestible by a variety of audiences: on television during your favorite show, a crowd at a 
conference, or a boardroom of executives. After each interlude, I describe the principle partly 
through a critical, interpretative reading of the videos.23 That is, I flesh out their relevance and use 
                                            
23 For canonical work on critical and interpretive social science see, for example: Geertz (1973); 
Rabinow and Sullivan (1988); Taylor (1971). 
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them to ground my analysis of the different principles of dataveillance capitalism. The following 
videos are only a curated selection from the dozens I watched while trying to understand how 
these corporations and their partners envision and implement big data. All in all, I inductively 
derived the four principles from an analysis of the videos and other sources like academic 
literature, popular books, media articles, and corporate and government documents (e.g. 
technical reports, white papers, opinion briefs, marketing brochures, and public speeches). 
 
IBM Interlude 1 
This 2015 video, from the IBM Government channel on YouTube, is titled “Economic 
Vitality 2.0.”  
Earth spins in space as the sound of dramatic music and the sharp contrast of urban 
hubs lighting up the dark globe set an epic tone. The words across the screen say, “Economic 
Vitality 2.0.” The camera quickly zooms from space into Manhattan, showing us rivers of light 
circulating along thoroughfares and whizzing around skyscrapers. Multiple voices, in diverse 
accents, recite a mantra: “The power of data. The power of data. The power of data.” Cut to a 
businessman standing in front of a city skyline. With all the confidence of a thought leader, Dan 
Pelino, General Manger of IBM Public Sector, greets the audience: “Welcome to the fourth 
Industrial Revolution.” His hands move in small, choppy gestures. “This is an exciting time for all, 
where the power of data is driving economic vitality and reinventing our cities for the future. Public 
sector leaders are using data to improve how people live, work in interactive ways we previously 
could not imagine.”  
The video cuts to images of cities around the world, with vehicles again zooming as blurs 
of mesmerizing light and people joyfully interacting with their devices. A disembodied female 
voice says, “I’m using real time data and predictive modeling to make it easier for people to get 
from place to place.” Another voice, this time male, says, “I’m using intelligent water sensors to 
conserve water, improve service, and pass our savings onto our customers.” A series of different 
voices with different accents—clearly meant to symbolize the planetary scale—add their own 
testimonials to the power of data: from shifting global production, to helping “Millennials” consume 
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and share, to “sharing information with an ecosystem of new partners so we all discover new 
possibilities, new momentum, new optimism.” 
After the bombardment of quick cuts, flashing lights, and hollow voices, Pelino appears 
again: “Today’s leaders are turning their cities, regions, and nations into places where people 
want to live and businesses want to invest. They’re removing the barriers, and redefining what’s 
possible for everyone. Why? Because everyone matters. Join us and learn how.” The power of 
data is ready for the taking, and IBM will lead the way in harvesting and harnessing it. 
 
Data Power 
The archaic word “datum” refers to a specific fixed point, a piece of information that can 
contain a near infinite variety of content. But “data”—in its now common use as collective 
singular—represents something more. It has both philosophical and technological elements. Data 
is more than just a collection of information. It is also a form of knowledge and means of power. 
Understanding data requires that we grapple with the relationship between power and knowledge, 
which Michel Foucault famously theorized as “power/knowledge.” Foucault’s work sets out to 
explain how power and knowledge are intertwined (hence why he conjoins them with a “/” rather 
than “and”). They reinforce, reproduce, and legitimate each other. This relationship is 
simultaneously, he says, “the deployment of force and the establishment of truth” (1975). 
Foucault shakes up our typical understanding of power and knowledge by showing that they are 
not separate things, but symbiotic. 
A common aphorism states that we ought to “speak truth to power.“ After all, we are told 
by another aphorism, “knowledge is power.” Both of these aphorisms, however, misunderstand 
the relationship between power/knowledge. Symbolically, it is not “knowledge => power” or 
“power => knowledge,” but rather “power <=> knowledge.” A more appropriate injunction, then, 
would be for us to “reveal truth as power” (Morozov 2013a). As Foucault (1980) puts it, “There 
can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which 
operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth 
through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.” To know 
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the world is to exercise power over it and to exercise power is to know it—to examine its features 
and characteristics, to sort it into categories and norms, to render it legible and observable, to 
exclude other metrics and methods (Bowker and Star 2000).  
IBM understands this relationship between regimes of truth and exercises of power. It 
has just reformulated the relationship, replacing knowledge with data to give us “power/data.” The 
mantra in the video—“the power of data”—only makes explicit one side of the relationship. But 
the other side—“the data of power”—is also present, even if unspoken.  
With its technologies (e.g. sensors) and techniques (e.g. analytics), IBM, along with its 
peers and partners, intends to turn everything into networked data flows existing within a unified 
system of systems—a Smarter Planet. And IBM aims to construct ways of knowing and 
controlling everything that happens, and everything that will happen, within that global system. Its 
visions of smartness promise a new era of power/data, with outcomes that “we previously could 
not imagine.” Of course, the “we” who gets to wield this power/data is not all-inclusive. It is rather 
select groups who create and anoint others with the ability to possess power/data. For instance, 
as we saw last chapter, IBM provides government agencies like police and planners with the 
capacity to exercise power/data over the city and its inhabitants. In return for submitting 
themselves to the authority of databases and analytics, they can “pull operationally relevant 
knowledge from the data collected”—as LAPD’s Chief of Detectives put it in article for a trade 
magazine, The Police Chief—for the purpose of managing populations, predicting people’s 
behavior, and optimizing society-as-system (Beck and McCue 2009). Here we see the power of 
data, and the data of power, in action. 
IBM is not alone in using carefully chosen rhetoric to express the goals of power/data: 
“driving economic vitality”; “reinventing our cities for the future”; “using data to improve how 
people live [and] work.” When cast this way, they all come off as laudable objectives. How could 
anybody be against such things? However, if you parse out the techno-politics of these smart 
initiatives—lifting the rhetorical veil and displaying the ideology and implications—then you are 
left with a familiar story about accumulation, competition, and control.  
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The prominent metaphor of “vitality” is telling. It not only expands the standard 
shibboleths about “economic growth,” It illustrates the vital role data plays in keeping both the 
logic of accumulation and the socio-technical systems alive. Data is the lifeblood that must keep 
circulating and regenerating. Thus, we must continue “reinventing cities” so they become 
platforms that support systems of power/data. Improvements to life and work are then measured 
against how well these activities plug into the demands of dataveillance capitalism. In the 
networked, data-driven versions of life and work, it is easier to dynamically modulate people in 
order to fit the flexible needs of dataveillance capitalism. Consider, for example, the widespread 
use of scheduling software that deny workers a stable schedule: alerting them to each week’s 
shifts with scant notice, demanding they work at erratic times, cutting them mid-shift to save labor 
costs. This data-driven scheduling wreaks chaos on workers’ lives in the service of more 
efficiency and larger returns (Kantor 2014). It is certainly an improvement to how people work, but 
not for the workers. Such technologies are not anomalies. They are smart upgrades in a long 
trend of Tayloristic interventions for scientifically managing how people live and work (Head 2014; 
Kanigel 2005). 
To be sure, gathering data and exercising power are not inherently wicked actions that 
are only undertaken in the service of domination and extraction. What matters is the context: who 
gathers and exercises, in what ways, for what reasons, and so on. In short, the question must be: 
“By who, for whom?” That said, when IBM and police chiefs, for instance, celebrate their new 
capacities for managing, predicting, and optimizing, we have reason to be wary. A statement from 
a 2007 textbook on data mining and predictive analytics is candid about the power granted by 
these capacities: “If knowledge is power, then foreknowledge [via predictive analytics] can be 
seen as battlespace dominance or supremacy” (McCue 2007). Those techniques are readily 
exported to many domains of society. They are not limited to military and policing applications, 
just as dominance and supremacy are not limited to the battlespace. And unless you are part of 
the elite who can analyze the data and issue the commands then the tools of power/data are not 
always wielded for you—they may very well be wielded against you. 
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IBM Interlude 2 
This 2014 video, from the IBM channel on YouTube, is titled “A world made with data. 
Made with IBM.”  
Title card: “Dispatches from a Smarter Planet: No. 31.” A voice identified as “Megan 
Daniels, IBMer” says in a casual tone, as if we were already in the middle of a conversation, “You 
know what’s so funny? I was actually thinking about this the other day. I was watching one of my 
favorite TV shows and they said, ‘Think about something that’s not made of carbon.’ And I 
thought to myself, ‘You could probably replace that with data.’ Which was kind of a random way 
of thinking about—but it’s true. Everything is made of data these days. You can capture data on 
anything. So no matter what business you’re in, you’re really in the business of data.” 
This 2014 video, from the IBM channel on YouTube, is titled “Context made with data. 
Made with IBM.” 
Title card: “Dispatches from a Smarter Planet: No. 32.” A woman in business attire, 
identified as “Inhi Cho Suh, IBMer,” stands against a white background. Next to her float the 
words: “Data-fying everything.” She informs us that, “In order to make sense of data, historically 
people used everything from paper and pen, to maps, to diagrams in order to make relative 
context of things. Now we can augment that with software capabilities that go far beyond 
spreadsheets, to algorithms and context and sense making. Data has completely changed every 
aspect of what we make and how we live.” 
This 2010 video, from the IBM Healthcare channel on YouTube, is titled “IBM 
Commercial: A Smarter Planet Relies on Data Analysis.” 
We seamlessly move through a series of dynamic scenes—a city, a hospital, power lines, 
and the whole planet—all composed of computer-generated particles of light. The pacing is fast 
and the aesthetics draw you in. A simple melody plays while the narrator, his tone matter-of-fact 
and soothing, provides the message: “Our planet is alive with data. It’s generated by cars on a 
freeway; patients in a hospital; electricity in the grid. The more we understand data, the more 
answers we find: patterns of easing traffic in over 400 cities; detecting disease faster; reducing 
energy cost by ten percent. On a smarter planet, we can analyze all the data we now see, to 
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make the world work better. Let’s build a smarter planet.” The logo for IBM then fills the screen, 
ensuring you know who has the smarts around here. 
 
Data Universe 
What does it mean to see the world through data-tinted glasses? To look at everything 
through a lens that not only finds data everywhere, but also asserts that everything is data? 
These types of statements could be ontological—meant to make claims about what exists, to 
posit theories of being, to argue for the best methods of metaphysical exploration. They could 
also be epistemological—meant to make claims about knowledge, to posit theories of knowing, to 
argue for the best methods of epistemic analysis. While they surely contain elements of both, 
there is also a third function. As the intellectual historian Daniel Rosenberg (2013: 18) has pithily 
remarked: “Facts are ontological, evidence is epistemological, data is rhetorical.” He goes on to 
explain, “Data has no truth. Even today, when we speak of data, we make no assumptions at all 
about veracity. Electronic data, like the data of the early modern period, is given. It may be that 
the data we collect and transmit has no relation to truth or reality whatsoever beyond the reality 
that data helps us to construct” (2013: 37). 
A statement like, “Everything is made of data these days,” is not just a neutral 
observation about the nature or substance of the world. Such statements function rhetorically. 
They do not merely reveal or reflect the world; they frame and construct the world. They change 
how we understand and interact with the world, and they place IBM in a position of access and 
authority. Data does not exist out there somewhere, like raw material in the ground waiting to be 
mined. Data is constructed by people. It has to be collected, processed, interpreted, stored, 
retrieved, and communicated. And people then have to convince other people of its value. IBM is 
doing that, in part, by attempting to convince us that data has a life of its own—thus cutting out 
the people and processes that actually make data. 
We risk getting a bit meta here: if data serves a rhetorical function, then the rhetoric 
about data—namely, that is everywhere and everything—also serves to support and strengthen 
the rhetorical value of data. To be colloquial, the assertive rhetoric in the videos, for instance, is 
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meant to persuade you into thinking: “You know what, IBM is right. I guess everything really is 
data.” It seems so self-evident, like a casual revelation you can have while watching a TV 
commercial. And with that revelation, the idea is impressed upon you that: “Well if IBM has 
figured this out, then surely they should be the one to tell me how best to operate in this brave 
new ‘data-fyed’ world.”  
I don’t mean to imply that these discourses and positions are bereft of ontology and 
epistemology—of course they are not—but rather that the rhetorical function is primary. In other 
words, the concern is not so much about what is true or what exists, but about what happens. 
Once we realize the world is made of data—and made by data—what actions should we take? 
For IBM to say “our planet is alive with data” is to establish that the next logical step is for them to 
“capture” the teeming vitality of data and harness it for their purposes. They invite us to “build a 
smarter planet,” but this is a task that can only be accomplished with IBM’s expertise. We must 
rely upon their authority as builders, knowers, and managers of the data universe. 
Consider a speech by Samuel Palmisano (2010: np), in which he stated: “Over the past 
year we have also validated what we believed would be true—and that is, the most important 
aspect of smarter systems is data—and, more specifically, the actionable insights that the data 
can reveal.” This supports an observation by geographer Rob Kitchin (2016: 19) in his work on 
smart urbanism: “Smart cities technologies are precisely about making cities data-driven: 
enabling city systems and services to be responsive to and act upon data, preferably real-time 
data. It is thus no coincidence that the drive to create smart cities dovetails with the unfolding 
data revolution.” Nor is it a coincidence that data acquires the attribute of universality right at the 
time when there is so much to gain for whoever can lay claim to that data and extract it from 
every source.  
As we saw last chapter, there is a feedback loop: many control systems rely on the 
constant gathering and processing of data, and in turn those control systems enable more data to 
be generated. If we think in terms of power/data, there can hardly be better news for 
organizations like IBM than the discovery that everything is made of data. When flows of data 
correspond to flows of power and profit, the imperative is to accumulate as much data as 
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possible. Why stop at dividualizing people—breaking them down into ever finer component parts 
to be aggregated in databases—when you can conduct dataveillance on the universe and reap 
the rewards. 
Even with bold imperial plans of making a Smarter Planet and conquering the data 
universe, the oft repeated rhetoric is: “There’s no ideology here, so don’t bother looking!” 
Palmisano (2011: np) has said as much: “If these city leaders do share an ideology, it is this: ‘We 
believe in a smarter way to get things done.’” It is revealing that he said this during the speech 
that kicked off IBM’s plans to conduct a large-scale overhaul of Rio de Janeiro, transforming it 
into a Mecca of smart. IBM, Cisco, and Siemens are all straightforward about their intentions to 
create blueprint models for smartness that can then be reproduced in cities around the globe. As 
if there were nothing ideologically contentious about the implementation of smart systems at the 
urban scale. As if changing a city and placing powerful technologies in the hands of corporations, 
governments, and police forces would not have questionable socio-political implications. Yet, the 
smart elites justify their initiatives, in part, by claiming to be data-driven pragmatists who derive 
legitimacy and authority from that data’s supposed neutral objectivity. When data is everywhere, 
there is no need for an agenda or ideology—just follow the data. Big data, then, not only causes 
the death of theory, it also sounds the dirge for politics and ethics (Anderson 2008; cf. Andrejevic 
2014). 
 
Cisco Interlude 
This 2014 video, from the Cisco channel on YouTube, is titled “Barcelona Embraces IoE 
to Create a Smart City.” 
It is sunrise over Barcelona. During a quick tour of a day in the city, a female voice says, 
“As the world continues to urbanize, with 180,000 people a day moving into cities, the competition 
between cities will continue to grow—economically, environmentally, and even socially. The cities 
that embrace technology will surface as the winners.” A series of executives from Cisco and the 
city of Barcelona then share laudatory statements about smart networks: “Think about it,” says 
Wim Elfrink, Cisco’s Executive VP and Chief Globalization Officer, “only one percent of what can 
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be connected is connected today. Imagine the possibilities! The Internet of Everything has arrived 
and it’s ready to change the world.” To emphasize the point we are shown boxes with sensor 
arrays hooked onto light poles with animated signals pulsing from them as they connect with a 
passing city bus. In this future scenario, the city will be filled with objects—not just buses and 
sensor boxes—that are always speaking a silent language with each other.  
Anil Menon, Cisco’s President for Smart+Connected Communities, says, “Cisco is 
extremely excited about Barcelona because the city is utilizing the Internet of Everything. By 
connecting its people and things to a city WiFi, Barcelona is creating new services, richer 
experiences, and unprecedented economic opportunity for its people, for its businesses, and for 
its partners.” We next hear from Barcelona’s Deputy Mayor for Urban Habitat and from 
Barcelona’s Chief Information Officer. They tell us that with sensors, connectivity, and data 
Barcelona is able to smartly solve the problems that “every city in the world faces.” “What we are 
trying to put in place is a common solution for all the cities of the world,” the Deputy Mayor says. 
Barcelona is both blueprint and testbed. This is only the beginning. First Barcelona, then the 
world!  
Now the urban images we see are happier. They are overlaid with symbols that indicate 
the flow of data, the connectivity of everything, and the apps providing software solutions. As the 
narrator explains, “A city-wide network of sensors provides city officials with concrete information 
so that they can make decisions based on real-time data.” Menon appears again, buttressing the 
narrator’s claims: “Getting information on the flow of citizens, on noise, on pollution, on traffic, on 
weather conditions allows cities to streamline the city operations, reduce costs, and also improve 
overall sustainability—economic sustainability, social sustainability, and environmental 
sustainability.”  
 
Data Network 
We have already learned everything is data. But, as Cisco is sure to emphasize, the 
power of data—and data of power—is severely depleted if everything is not also connected to the 
“Internet of Everything.” Specifically, that is, via a network of networks built by Cisco for its client-
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partners, which permeates the city with sensors, connects all things, monitors the environment, 
tracks flows of people, automates decision protocols, and pipes data to the command center. The 
city is made of networked data, and as such can be known, ordered, and managed with smart 
systems, smart solutions, and smart values. Networks serve to amplify the ability for Cisco and 
city leaders to accumulate, analyze, and act on data.  
Dataveillance capitalism is at the heart of this constant drive towards increasing 
connectivity, collection, competition, and control. The various merchants of smartness—all selling 
their own, but very similar, technologies and techniques—share unifying ideologies and logics. 
Hence, their rhetoric and initiatives can become nearly indistinguishable from each other. For 
example, while describing the ideas that drive their “Smarter Planet” initiative, IBM issues a stark 
warning about the urgent need to get smart now: “When every company, every city, every 
country—every individual—is increasingly interconnected with millions of others, the cost of a bad 
call can be devastating. But analytics is increasingly helping business and government leaders 
look beyond their own biases to discern real patterns and anticipate events.”24 There’s truth to 
this warning. Networked, interdependent systems are vulnerable to security flaws and cascading 
failure. However, it is worth noting that interconnectivity is already presupposed. There is no room 
to question whether something like an Internet of Everything is wise and prudent. Instead, they 
propose that the problems arising from interconnection can be solved with more data, more 
analytics, more networks. For these technology corporations and their partners in government, 
there is no debate: data must be networked to realize its full potential. Any other option has been 
foreclosed as a possibility. 
According to a Cisco report on the IoE and smart cities: 
People themselves will become nodes on the Internet, with both static information and a 
constantly emitting activity system […] Rather than just reporting raw data, connected 
things will soon send higher-level information back to machines, computers, and people 
for further evaluation and decision making. This transformation from data to information in 
IoE is important because it will allow us to make faster, more intelligent decisions, as well 
as control our environment more effectively (Mitchell et al. 2013: 2). 
 
                                            
24 IBM Smarter Planet Website. Accessed February 28, 2016 
http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/overview/ideas/ 
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It is crucial to recognize that projects like the Internet of Everything do not just intensify 
the degree of dataveillance; they also transform the kinds of dataveillance that are possible.  
For instance, consider a new capability that stems from connecting together different 
databases—whether stored in a single database or accessed via a central portal—is called “data 
fusion.” This practice refers to the sharing and combining of data from multiple sources to reveal 
new information, patterns, and correlations, which can then enhance the accuracy of profiles, 
extrapolations, and predictions. Fusion not only unearths novel data about people and places, it 
can also uncover previously private information and circumvent data protection. There is a lot of 
power and value to be gained for any organizations that can mine, process, fuse, and use this 
networked data. The big data networks are not flat. While a relative few can capture, fuse, and 
analyze data, most of us cannot open the black box of these esoteric, technical processes. As 
urban ICT scholars Jim Thatcher, David O’Sullivan, and Dillon Mahmoudi (2016: 6). write in a 
recent paper on the political economy of big data:  
Conversion from an individual datum to an aggregated, digital commodity necessitates 
linking data across users, spaces, and times […] The very obscurity of transformation 
from individual data point to commodified, aggregate ‘big data’ also masks the 
asymmetrical power relations between users of technology and the almost exclusively 
corporate entities which algorithmically collect, link, and analyze the data points of many 
users. 
 
While it is certainly true that corporations like Cisco hugely benefit from the mass 
networking of things and data, we cannot forget that government intelligence agencies also take 
advantage of the “actionable insights”—and asymmetrical power relations—captured from 
ubiquitous dataveillance.  
Case in point: the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has created “a robust 
network of ‘fusion centers’ to disseminate and analyze data on suspicious individuals or activities, 
assist with investigations, and identify potential threats” (Monahan and Regan 2012: 301). There 
are at least 77 DHS-sponsored fusion centers, not including the “many unofficial public- and 
private-sector intelligence analysis organizations that perform similar functions” (Monahan and 
Regan 2012: 302). Fusion centers also rely on databases and software from private tech firms, 
like IBM’s “i2 Coplink” and Microsoft’s “Fusion Core.” According to fusion center personnel 
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interviewed by surveillance researchers Torin Monahan and Priscilla Regan (2012), the centers 
are treated like a “one-stop shop” where police and security agencies can access a staggering 
amount of data drawn from many different sources. The exact extent and capabilities are 
unknown since, due to the nature of their work, the centers are secretive and guarded about their 
operations. What is clear, though, is that the scope of fusion centers has quickly expanded, 
shifting from an initial focus on “counterterrorism” to general application for “all crimes” (Regan et 
al. 2015; Regan and Monahan 2013). 
In February 2016, the US director of national intelligence, James Clapper, admitted to a 
Senate panel that government agencies may treat networked smart technologies as a portal into 
your home and life: “In the future, intelligence services might use the [internet of things] for 
identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain 
access to networks or user credentials” (Ackerman and Thielman 2016: np). The message is 
clear: when everything can be a listening device, everything will be treated as a listening device. 
It’s just that now those devices record much more than audio. Moreover, it is not only federal 
intelligence agencies that turn the IoT into a surveillance network. Police departments have 
already sent requests to Dropcam—a company owned by Google that makes small internet-
connected cameras for personal use—for access to video from its customers’ cameras (Hill 
2015). Effectively they are looking for open windows to peek into private homes. While at this 
time police have to go through legal procedures to access that data, the barriers for government 
intelligence and corporations are less clear. It is likely you have already signed away your rights 
to privacy and recourse by clicking “agree” on the Terms of Service. At any rate, the very fact 
there is now the option to access those stores of sensitive data is significant in its own right.  
When it comes to big data and smart systems, we should expect mission creep. The 
shifts from “counterterrorism” to “all crimes,” or from the Internet of Things to the Internet of Spies, 
is not surprising. While businesses and governments might collect data for a primary reason, the 
data is all too often repurposed for secondary (tertiary, etc.) uses. This is easy to do when the 
data is already collected, ready available in digital databases, just begging to be analyzed. 
Indeed, as Rob Kitchin (2016: 36) points out, the principles of “data minimization”—only 
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collecting, storing, and using the data needed for a specific purpose—“are largely antithetical to 
the rationale of big data and the functioning of data markets which seek to generate and hoard 
large volumes of data to extract additional value.” 
As we can already see with DHS fusion centers and smart city operations centers, all that 
data does not exist in isolation. It is part of massive networks, stored in cloud databases, fused 
for analysis, and accessed via user-friendly interfaces. In Cisco’s video, Wim Elfrink exclaims, 
“Imagine the possibilities!” But here’s the rub: It is difficult to even imagine the possibilities that 
open up—for tech corporations and government agencies alike—when it is not just a home 
networked with smart technologies, but an entire city. 
 
Siemens Interlude 
This 2014 video, from the Siemens channel on YouTube, is titled “Siemens Smart Data.” 
A beam of neon green light races across the screen as dramatic music begins to 
crescendo. A river of binary, 0’s and 1’s, flows into the beam. The futuristic aesthetics are kitschy 
and cliché. A movie trailer voice (male, deep, booming, confident) begins speaking: “We live in a 
universe of data that gains not only in volume, but importance, every day. The question of how to 
generate business value from it becomes more and more essential to us. We need to understand 
that data is everywhere, and it is generated every second of the day. We need to understand data 
as an asset—and turn it into a value.” The soundtrack becomes increasingly epic, driving us 
forward into the future. There appears a network diagram of lines, nodes, and symbols, all 
connected together. The camera zooms into the different symbols, each showing graphic 
representations of their operations and the data generated from them as the voice-over plays. 
First symbol: wind power. “Data evolves in all products and technologies along our 
customers’ value chain.” Second symbol: smart factory.  “With our domain expertise and device 
know-how, we can turn data into value if we understand the importance of data analytics and new 
business approaches.” Third symbol: rail. “By combining data analytics with cloud strategies we 
can offer our customers new services for optimizing their business.” Fourth symbol: healthcare. 
“But it is also about transforming information into knowledge, for smarter business decisions. 
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About transforming Big Data into Smart Data.” Fifth symbol: smart city. “Imagine how we build 
data-driven ecosystems that gain value and profit for us and our customers.” Sixth symbol: data 
analytics. “Learn how to design, build, and operate globally available services that generate value 
for our business by combining cloud strategies and data analytics. Smart data: generate value by 
bridging technology to business.”  
The camera zooms out to show the whole network, which then transforms into a globe. 
Showing us how everything is connected in the future world built by Siemens: “Explore the 
universe of data. Explore the opportunities with us. And leverage our technological core 
competencies. The universe of data is our world.” The music crashes on the last word. The 
subtext seems to say: Do you feel invigorated? Do you feel excited? Do you feel anxious for the 
future to arrive? Siemens will take you there. 
 
Data value 
Metaphors about (big) data often make reference to its value. It is called the “new natural 
resource” and the “new oil” (Toonders 2014; Frank 2013). These are allusions to data’s capacity 
to generate vast amounts of value for those who have it. We were once in an era of “information 
scarcity,” the story goes, but now we are rich with data “superabundance” (The Economist 2010). 
There’s no worry about peak data when we “live in a universe of data.” While the oil wells dry up, 
the geysers of data begin to spew. In a 2015 article for Siemens’ magazine, Pictures of the 
Future, the former head of the Research and Technology Center at Siemens says, “Anyone 
reading forecasts regarding the growth of data worldwide in the near future will probably feel like 
a gold digger in the Rocky Mountains” (Heuring 2015: np). There are “veritable gems” that are 
waiting to be dug up, he tells us, “But how can today’s ‘gold diggers’ find nuggets in the 
mountains of data?” 
Wringing the value from data requires more than just collecting it. You need techniques 
like analytics to extract, refine, and use it. That is where Siemens comes in—but they are selling 
more than just hardware and software. Like other smart firms, Siemens has pivoted toward 
offering consultancy services that are informed by their own brand of thought leadership (cf. 
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McNeill 2015). You need more than top-line sensors and analytics to find those data nuggets; you 
must also throw out the old ways of thinking about data. Allow Siemens to show you how to 
“understand data as an asset,” which produces magnitudes of value for whoever can best strip-
data-mine this raw material from the universe. 
If businesses and cities want to stay competitive, then smart technologies coupled with 
thought leadership is the only way to achieve success. As Palmisano (2010: np) has said, “You 
may be thinking that the last thing we need is more information raining down on us, more noise. 
But we now have the capability, with advanced software analytic tools, to extract value from 
data—to see the patterns, the correlations and the outliers.” And similarly, Cisco executives John 
Chambers and Wim Elfrink declared, in a 2014 essay for Foreign Affairs, that with “new tools to 
collect and share that data,” combined with analytics, “the value that [data] will bring will be epic.” 
Therefore you have two options: drown in the crashing waves of data or harness the epic value 
and surf the rising tide. 
All of this illustrates—in dense corporate speak—a central imperative of dataveillance 
capitalism: the drive to collect as much data and extract as much value as possible. The material 
restrictions of reality are speed bumps that slow down the logic of accumulation. However, the 
shift towards dataveillance offers an opportunity to overcome the annoying constraints of finite 
resources. If data is infinite and dynamic, and if data contains value, then with the right tools and 
mindset value can be found constantly emanating from everything.  
Importantly, “value” here means more than just monetary gain. While it surely does refer 
to profit, it also means power. Value can come from data being packaged and sold as a 
commodity, or being used to make a process more efficient. But value can also arise from data 
being used to derive "actionable insights” about a group or a person, or being channeled into 
technologies of control that feed on data. So when corporations and governments alike talk about 
the value of data, they are not only referring to the bottom line.  
The quest for data-as-value fuels what Shoshanna Zuboff describes as a: “ubiquitous 
networked institutional regime that records, modifies, and commodifies everyday experience from 
toasters to bodies, communication to thought, all with a view to establishing new pathways to 
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monetization and profit” (2015: 81). In other words, under dataveillance capitalism every thing 
and every body, every connection and every action, is a source of value.  
While some sources of data are benign, others require invasive methods of monitoring. In 
an essay on the “smart home,” design critic Justin McGuirk (2015: np) argues that, “the 
proliferation of smart, connected products will turn the home into a prime data collection node. It 
is estimated that there will be 50 billion wi-fi-connected devices by 2020, and all of them will 
collect data that is transmitted to and stored by their manufacturers. In short, the home is 
becoming a data factory.” And there is no guarantee we will be the owners of that data factory. 
Our job is instead to ensure the home-as-factory—let alone the city-as-factory—continues 
producing value for others: perhaps for corporations that want to refine their product, or city 
governments that want to know about citizens’ behavior, or intelligence agencies that want to 
monitor groups and individuals. When data is an asset, which generates profitable rents, the data 
owners are impelled to find new ways of producing more data. 
Dataveillance has become so common and so varied that few people know about the 
vast majority of the systems that target them inside the home, on the Internet, at stores, in public 
spaces, and nearly everywhere else. These systems are used to sort and categorize us, they 
fuse data from many sources, they create data dossiers about us, and they do so without our 
knowledge—all to better extract value from that data, our data.25 For instance, in 2012 the data 
broker industry alone generated $156 billion in revenues.26 This shadowy industry, which collates 
data from hundreds or even thousands of sources, has wide-ranging impacts on society. 
According to a 2014 report by the Federal Trade Commission:  
Of the nine data brokers [analyzed], one data broker’s database has information on 1.4 
billion consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements; another 
data broker’s database covers one trillion dollars in consumer transactions; and yet 
another data broker adds three billion new records each month to its databases. Most 
                                            
25 See, for instance: Andrejevic 2014; Graham 2005; Pasquale 2015; Roderick 2014; Turow et al. 
2015. 
26 From a 2013 US Senate Hearing called: “What Information Do Data Brokers Have on 
Consumers, and How Do They Use It?” Accessed February 17, 2016 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=a5c3a62c-
68a6-4735-9d18-916bdbbadf01&Statement_id=a47c081a-d653-4272-8d12-
d6edc1e04dc6&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=b06c39af-
e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=12&YearDisplay=2013 
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importantly, data brokers hold a vast array of information on individual consumers. For 
example, one of the nine data brokers has 3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. 
consumer (2014: iv). 
 
Data brokers use this data to slice society into market segments that are then given 
irreverent names like “Rural and Barely Making It,” “Probably Bipolar,” and “Gullible Elderly” in 
order to target people more effectively. The profiles and scores they create about us are used to 
make choices that effect many facets of our lives, such as obtaining a loan or renting a home or 
finding a job (Taylor and Sadowski 2015). Indeed, there is evidence that techniques used by data 
brokers “played a critical, but largely invisible, role in the recent subprime-mortgage debacle” 
(Mierzwinski and Chester 2013: 851). Since 2008, when the financial crash occurred, the 
capabilities for tracking and targeting have become only more sophisticated. 
Experts frequently criticize the accuracy, legitimacy, opacity, methods, and implications of 
these data-driven systems27—but that does not stop the logic of dataveillance capitalism from 
operating and expanding. “While ‘big data’ may be set to other uses,” says Zuboff (2015: 76), 
“those do not erase its origins in an extractive project founded on formal indifference to the 
populations that comprise both its data sources and its ultimate targets.” For Siemens, then, 
these technologies simply represent “new business approaches” and strategies that their clients 
can implement “to design, build, and operate globally available services that generate value.” Yet, 
this begs the question: what kind of value and for whom?  For many of us, these strategies 
ultimately represent the further infiltration of dataveillance capitalism into our everyday lives and 
into every facet of society. Behind the neoliberal promises of prosperity are technologically 
updated mechanisms of value extraction for unequal benefit. 
 
On Determinism and Division 
Like the market, information is often treated as an autonomous agent in society. In all its 
omnipresent immateriality, “big data” can appear to be an otherworldly force and infinite resource 
here to rescue us from the old world of information scarcity and blind ignorance. That is, as long 
                                            
27 See, for example: Citron and Pasquale 2011; Citron and Pasquale 2014; Crawford and Schultz; 
Fourcade and Healy 2013; Gangadharan et al. 2014; Graham 2005; Kitchin 2015; Mierzwinski 
and Chester 2013. 
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as we don’t constrain its power. As the oft-repeated slogan goes: “Information wants to be free.” It 
also wants and does many other things, or so we are told. The similarities between free 
marketeers and free informationists are not coincidental. Both ideologies find a welcome home in 
the techno-political culture of Silicon Valley, where they have merged into what scholars have 
called, among other labels, the “Californian Ideology” or “iCapitalism” or “cyber-libertarianism,”28 
all characterized by the belief in the invisible hand of the market combined with the inevitable 
progress of technology. As common and innocuous as views like this may seem, such agency-
granting determinism is a mistaken and dangerous position.29 
Deterministic proclamations don’t just emanate from over-excited boosters and self-
interested gurus. Even astute observers of social structures and political economic systems, who 
carefully analyze complex issues, all too often fall into the trap. Their commentaries on politics 
and economics can be incisive, yet when they turn their attention to technology that critical stance 
becomes diluted. It is not hard to find competing prophecies about how technology will, for 
instance, either be the savior of capitalism or be the cause of its collapse.30 Either way, the 
analyst argues, technology will accelerate society into its next phase. No matter where you stand 
on the political spectrum, there are technological forces in society for you to rally behind.  
Perhaps this deterministic view is so infectious because the vast majority of us are 
disconnected from the development and deployment of new technologies. We don’t see the 
various design decisions, values, disagreements, and failures that are behind each technology. 
The successful designs seem to follow evolutionary laws of nature, or they just spring forth fully 
formed from the mind of a Great Innovator. As author Meghan O’Gieblyn (2016: np) puts it, “For 
most consumers—who learn about new technologies only when they brighten the windows of an 
Apple store or after they’ve already gone viral—it’s easy to imagine that technological progress is 
                                            
28 Respectively: Barbook and Cameron 1996; Duff 2016; Golumbia 2013. 
29 One example among many: Kevin Kelly, the founding executive editor of Wired magazine, 
followed up his 2010 bestseller What Technology Wants with a treatise titled, The Inevitable: 
Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future. 
30 A version of this story from the Left can be found in Paul Mason’s 2015 book, PostCapitalism: 
A Guide to Our Future. In his book, which received high profile attention and acclaim, Mason 
outlines how the inevitable outcome of the information age will be the end of capitalism and 
emergence of an egalitarian political economy.  
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indeed dictated by a kind of divine logic; that machines are dropped into our lives on their own 
accord, like strange gifts from the gods.” We become passive recipients who are relegated to 
accepting the outcomes of a seemingly linear technological progression. A hardline version of 
determinism even insists that technological transformations, and therefore social transformations, 
will happen in a certain way because they must happen that way.  
The historian Leo Marx (2010: 577) observes that, “By treating these inanimate objects—
machines—as causal agents, we divert attention from the human (especially socioeconomic and 
political) relations responsible for precipitating this social upheaval.” In other words, we focus so 
intently on the technology itself that we loose sight of the human relationships that catalyze 
change and propel action. I am not claiming that technologies have no material consequences. 
They most certainly do! But technologies stem from human relationships and structures, rather 
than emerging separately as a transcendent force.31 As Richard Sclove (1995: 17) succinctly puts 
it: technology is “influential, not determining.” We can, and should, recognize the materiality and 
politics of technologies without succumbing to thinking they are therefore natural or inevitable or 
autonomous.  
Information does not want to be anything. There is nothing destined about the outcomes 
of this “information revolution.” It does not march us lockstep toward the end of history (whether 
that endpoint is capitalist or socialist). While I have shown in this chapter how dataveillance is 
implemented in the service of capitalist regimes, it should be clear that these systems are the 
result of decisions made by people. People have constructed them for specific purposes and 
under the aegis of certain interests. Whether the determinists mean to or not, obscuring those 
people and interests only serves to make their decisions appear to be the result of an 
unassailable force—with no option for recourse or protest.  
We must be careful, then, not to get the causality wrong: That data-driven, smart systems 
are used to advance capitalist regimes is not evidence that capitalism is technologically 
determined, it is instead evidence that capitalist interests have great influence over how 
                                            
31 For more productive, nuanced ways of thinking about technological determinism see Dafoe 
(2015). 
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technologies are created and used. As Torin Monahan (2010: 99) points out, “These surveillance 
systems absorb and reproduce the dominant cultural values of the contemporary political 
economy.” There should be little doubt that we are embedded in a political economy largely 
defined by neoliberal ideology and power elites pursing their interests (Gilens 2014; Winters 
2011). Thus, it should be no surprise these technologies are designed in ways that reflect and 
entrench the logic of dataveillance capitalism. 
Like any technological system, smart cities are a contingent creation: they can be built in 
different ways, with different purposes, and to achieve different goals. However, when we lack a 
critical techno-politics of design, and instead rely on deterministic explanations, we end up 
securing the authority of engineers, executives, and entrepreneurs who decide what kind of 
technologies will be created. This group has grown comfortable with their outsized influence and 
wealth. Indeed, it is worth noting—and a bit unnerving—that Silicon Valley elites have no problem 
expressing authoritarian sentiments and acting accordingly. Consider this passage from a 2016 
article in the New York Times on the future of the Internet of Things (Hardy 2016: np): 
Who will ultimately control that data, from the sensors to the cloud and back, is one of the 
most contentious questions in tech. “You’ve got Amazon knowing everything about 
purchasing, Google knowing everything about what people do on the Internet, and 
Salesforce knowing everything about the revenue side of a business,” said Scott Raney, 
a venture capitalist at Redpoint Ventures […] “Lay computer processing on all that, and 
it’s powerful to a point where a little creepiness sets in; no one else will have the data,” he 
added. “I’m buying the stock of all the companies. I just hope they’ll be benevolent 
dictators.”  
 
With industries that are monopolistic, power concentrations that are oligarchic, and 
sentiments that are authoritarian, it sure seems the information revolution is really more of an 
information coup d’état—replete with benevolent dictators. The only thing we can do, it would 
appear, is hope that the systematic accumulation of data, power, and value ends up granting the 
rest of us some degree of benefit. Perhaps potholes get filled faster and traffic flows smoother. 
Maybe your neighborhood becomes safer. Now you have mobile access to information—like the 
location of open parking spots—that makes your everyday life more convenient. But, when 
compared to what the elite side of the “big data divide” gains, the public benefits of this data are 
more of a pittance than a windfall. 
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The common belief is that people—especially Millennials who grew up with digital 
technology—no longer care about privacy. They are comfortable with trading privacy for 
convenience. Businesses point to this supposed shift to justify putting people under constant 
dataveillance. However, in his research on the big data divide, Mark Andrejevic (2014) challenges 
these assumptions. Andrejevic conducted a survey of 1,106 adults and interviews with focus 
groups where he asked questions related to data collection and privacy. What he found is that 
people were not indifferent to these concerns; rather, they expressed feelings of being 
“powerless” to do anything about dataveillance. As one respondent said, “My biggest thing from 
loss of privacy isn’t about other people knowing information about you but kind of being forced or 
bribed to share your information” (Andrejevic 2014: 1682). Compounding that sense of 
powerlessness is a lack of knowledge of when, how, or why dataveillance operates, and what the 
consequences might even be. Another respondent said, “We really don’t know where things 
collected about us go—we don’t understand how they interact in such a complex environment” 
(2014: 1685). It’s not that people don’t care about privacy and data collection. They are denied 
the opportunities to care and do something about it. 
Based on his study, Andrejevic (2014: 1685) concludes: “People are palpably aware that 
powerful commercial interests shape the terms of access that extract information from them: they 
must choose either to accept the terms on offer or to go without resources that in many ways are 
treated as utilities of increasing importance in their personal and professional lives.” The choice is 
not really much of a choice. It is more like impotence to do otherwise. These systems have 
become infrastructural parts our lives, our cities, and our societies. All without most people having 
any idea to what extent they exist, let alone how they work or what they do or what the 
consequences are. We should not mistake resignation for legitimacy. 
Dataveillance capitalism thrives off of determinism and division, which work together to 
close down our imaginations and render us powerless to effect change. However, by getting clear 
on how these ideologies and systems operate—as an integral part of the smart city, and 
beyond—we can deny their inevitability. We can escape the trap of thinking that what is the case 
means the same as what must—let alone ought—be the case.   
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CHAPTER 6 
IMAGINING ALTERNATIVES, CLAIMING THE CITY 
To the extent that the contours of the future city can be outlined, it could be defined by 
imagining the reversal of the current situation, by pushing to its limits the converted 
image of the world upside down. 
— Henri Lefebvre (1996: 172) 
 
Ask my guy how he thought travelling the world sound / Found it hard to imagine, he 
hadn’t been past downtown 
— Black Star, featuring Common (1998: np) 
 
 
Among radical intellectuals and activists there is a well-known phrase: “It is easier to 
imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” I have experienced this 
cognitive difficulty, and I have witnessed others struggle with exercising their political 
imaginations. There is no shortage of detailed writings that probe our potential post-disaster 
world: Consider the expanding literature of doomsday scenarios, scientific models, and climate 
fiction that all take planetary death as their subject. Yet the urgent need to halt unsustainable 
rates of capitalist growth and accumulation does not receive the same level of attention and 
innovation. Instead of producing antidotes for the poisons coursing through the body politic, we 
seem better equipped to contemplate—even fantasize about—the end of the world.  
As we saw in chapter one, the smart city takes advantage of these crisis narratives—and 
our ability to imagine their endpoints. It plays on our desire for a deus ex machina to descend at 
the last minute and save us. Thus, we are offered a futuristic city that staves off collapse, while 
also further entrenching neoliberal capitalism. The future it offers is a tragic settling: We don’t get 
a utopia that solves our tough social problems; we get high technology for fixing and enhancing 
the status quo. This reactionary project cannot be the limit of our imaginations.  
The phrase about the end of capitalism is loosely attributed to different people (it is 
unclear who actually said the pithy remark). It appears, however, to be the essence of remarks 
given by Donna Haraway, a celebrated theorist of technology and politics, during a 1995 talk. It is 
worth quoting Haraway at length to provide more depth and texture to her critical observation:   
I think that the most difficult problem that I face, if I own up to it, is I have almost lost the 
imagination of what a world that isn’t capitalist could look like. And that scares me. I really 
don’t, in any kind of thick way, know how to imagine, at the scale that such imaginations 
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would have to work, both little and big. And I think this is a shared deep, deep problem 
and that it’s part of the loss, the systematic loss, of rhetorical battles going on these days 
across the world. We are losing effective social imaginaries, and it matters in concrete, 
specific issues […] Capitalism seems so ubiquitous that I don’t know how to imagine 
another. That’s maybe just a psychological fact for me at this moment. But I fear many of 
us share the trouble (Harvey and Haraway 1995: 519). 
 
The feeling of mental block that Haraway expresses in this passage is both provocative 
and pointed. She illustrates how capitalism’s position in society is so established, so extensive, so 
naturalized that it has even inhibited one of the most creative thinkers alive from conceiving of a 
different world. We are steeped in capitalism. It has saturated the fabric of society and the fiber of 
our being. It is a core part of material processes (how things happen), discursive practices (how 
we represent things), and ideological systems (how we think things). It takes a great cognitive 
feat to step outside the confines of capitalism and imagine an alternative. Grabbing hold of our 
collective imagination is one of the most insidious, effective tactics for shaping society and 
maintaining hegemony. After all, what threat could there be from people who literally cannot 
imagine another way of living?  
The firms involved in creating smart cities might make use of phrases like “participation” 
and “inclusion.” Perhaps they open up a data portal (a response that positions citizens as passive 
information receivers) and allow people to comment on a menu of pre-chosen projects (a 
response that limits how active citizens can really be). But, ultimately, their initiatives are not open 
for change, let alone transformative alternatives. This mode of political engagement is more like 
participation-as-pacification. Citizen input can be valuable for tailoring how smartness is sold to 
the public. After all, marketers routinely rely on focus groups to test out brands and products. The 
goal is to enroll us into their vision of the urban future.  
Like other political projects, the smart city is a battle for our imagination. We should think 
of the movement—with its initiatives and ideologies, texts and technologies—as a campaign to 
direct and delimit what we can imagine as possible. Notice that the merchants of smartness do 
not set out a suite of scenarios that represent radically different visions and politics. There are 
variations to the services they offer, but rarely do they deviate from reflecting and reinforcing the 
technocratic and neoliberal precepts that motivate this vision of the smart urban age. The aim is 
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to establish their version of smartness as the future—the only one available or possible. By 
capturing our imagination through a combination of material, discursive, and ideological 
strategies, all other techno-political arrangements are effectively closed off. 
 
Toward an Alternative Techno-Politics 
The smart city, however, is also a future-in-the-making. While the dominant visions we 
have explored so far are offshoots of deeply rooted structures in society—like capitalism, like 
neoliberalism, like technocracy—they have not yet settled and stabilized as inextricable parts of 
the smart city. There is nothing inherent in these systems that dictates they can only be driven by 
logics of control and accumulation. We must not mistake a contingency for inevitability. The task 
at hand is to reimagine what the smart city means, to usher it towards an alternative form, to 
design it with a different set of values and politics. Indeed, by mapping out the smart city’s logics 
and trajectories, my goal in this dissertation has been to keep an eye on the near future. By 
understanding how smartness is unfolding as a thoroughly techno-political project we can have 
some sense of where we are heading if we do not change course. 
There is good reason to disavow smart as a paradigm. It is the progeny of technocratic 
and neoliberal parents; their characteristics are in its genetics. However, that does not mean we 
ought to abandon all of the technologies. We should strive to repurpose and redesign them. We 
should take advantage of their potential, while changing the politics they reflect and reinforce. As 
Rob Kitchin (2016: 60) argues: “Ignoring or deliberately avoiding smart city technologies is not a 
viable approach; nor is developing smart cities that create a range of harms and reinforce power 
imbalances. Rather we need to create a particular kind of smart city that has a set of ethical 
principles and values at its heart.” 
Plotting a new course will not be easy, though. There are powerful interests that have a 
large stake in seeing their visions of the smart city realized. We have seen the amount of 
resources that organizations like IBM and Cisco put towards tightly controlling the way smart city 
initiatives are deployed and understood. They benefit from fortifying the cognitive blockades that 
Haraway described. A lack of imagination—an inability to envision things differently—fuels 
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acquiescence to the existing order of society. Achieving an alternative arrangement of the smart 
city—one based on democratic ideals like equity, access, and consent—will require creativity and 
resistance. These both go hand-in-hand. A different world is possible. The existing order is not 
final and determinate; it can be challenged and changed. But doing so requires that we 
problematize these models of smart urbanism and conceive of different visions.  
In terms of strategy, I don’t think it is helpful to play dictator-for-a-day and draft a political 
blueprint for a shining smart society. This critical project, like others, however, will surely provoke 
retorts from people who demand they be given such a blueprint. A curious thing about critique—
whether fierce and sharp, or nuanced and detailed—is that it is often met with dismissal unless 
you have a neat set of solutions ready to deliver. And even then, that does not preempt dismissal. 
Such reactions work to delegitimize criticism by changing the rules and making the critic play an 
impossible-to-win game. They maintain the status quo against reforms, let alone radical changes, 
which might threaten the position of the powerful and privileged. David Graeber (2013: np), an 
anthropologist and activist, provides a pointed reply to these all-too-common demands: 
Normally, when you challenge the conventional wisdom—that the current economic and 
political system is the only possible one—the first reaction you are likely to get is a 
demand for a detailed architectural blueprint of how an alternative system would work, 
down to the nature of its financial instruments, energy supplies, and policies of sewer 
maintenance. Next, you are likely to be asked for a detailed program of how this system 
will be brought into existence. Historically, this is ridiculous. When has social change ever 
happened according to someone’s blueprint? It’s not as if a small circle of visionaries in 
Renaissance Florence conceived of something they called “capitalism,” figured out the 
details of how the stock exchange and factories would someday work, and then put in 
place a program to bring their visions into reality. In fact, the idea is so absurd we might 
well ask ourselves how it ever occurred to us to imagine this is how change happens to 
begin. 
 
It is true that criticism often neglects that next step, in part because it truly is hard to 
imagine what a radically different world would look like. However, the positive move of saying 
what should be the case is crucial if we hope to spur change. But that does not mean it has to be 
done in the form of how-to manuals and authoritative programs. Instead, a positive political 
project must emerge through the collective intellectual and organizational efforts of diverse 
groups of people.  
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With that in mind, I offer an opening salvo for reimagining the techno-politics of smart 
cities. I take inspiration from what Nick Dyer-Witheford (2013: 14), a political economist of 
technology, has deftly called “‘red-prints’—approximating orientations to revolutionary 
possibilities.” None of what follows is meant to be final or finished. My goal is to kick-start different 
ways of thinking, spotlight the types of issues that deserve attention, provide guidance for how to 
approach them, and invigorate the critique and action necessary to build future cities that will 
contribute to ideals like social justice and human flourishing—rather than elite interests and value 
extraction. In short, instead of settling for a smart city driven by logics of control and 
accumulation, we should strive for an alternative founded on logics of emancipation and 
empowerment. 
I will first outline a theory called “cyborg urbanization,” which ought to orient our 
understanding of the entangled relationships of (information) technologies, urban environments, 
and city dwellers. The features of this theory should be familiar by now, but it is worth being 
explicit. From this theory I draw support for what scholars and activists have recently begun 
calling an “informational right to the city.” I describe this project and argue it should be a core 
aspect of an alternative techno-politics of the smart city. I conclude by showing how this theory 
and project can help us rethink important issues—and even pose an alternative paradigm: the 
cyborg city. 
In short, the argument goes like this: 1) If making the city is a way of making ourselves 
(descriptive theory), 2) then our right to make ourselves is a right to make the city (normative 
politics), and 3) therefore we need a new paradigm for urbanism based on this theory and politics 
(alternative arrangement). 
 
Cyborg Urbanism 
The boundaries between body-technology-city are blurred, if not breached. We tend to 
think, “There’s technology over there, there’s the city all around me, and then there’s me, 
complete in myself.” But this disjunctive way of thinking can blind us to the interconnections that 
are constituent parts of who we are. There are not so much discrete entities—the person, the 
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building, the device—as there are entanglements of flesh, concrete, and information. These 
entanglements should be thought of in relational terms. While they may not manifest as visceral 
biological hybrids, like a Terminator-style cyborg: “Part man, part machine. Underneath, it's a 
hyper-alloy combat chassis, microprocessor-controlled, fully armored. Very tough. But outside, it's 
living human tissue: flesh, skin, hair, blood” (Hurd and Cameron 1984: np). The lack of viscera 
does not mean the entanglements are inconsequential or immaterial. We are not separate and 
independent from the technologies we use, the environments we live in, and the systems we rely 
upon.  
These relational interconnections are not new. They are a feature of being human. 
Phenomenological research revealed almost a century ago how we routinely incorporate external 
objects and environments into our sense of self: like a blind man using a cane as a natural 
extension of his body, or a driver whose experience of space shifts as she speeds down a street 
(Merleau-Ponty 1945). Importantly, the objects are more than just tools that expand our 
capabilities; they change our dispositions, our perceptions, our relations to the world (Latour 
1994; 2002). Philosophers and cognitive scientists, like Andy Clark (2004), have argued that 
people can be thought of as “natural-born cyborgs” because we so readily form “mergers and 
coalitions” with technologies and environments. While these things are (typically) external to our 
biological body, if we think relationally then we can see how the connections we make are 
actually very much part of who we are. Clark (2004: 7) writes, "As our worlds become smarter 
and get to know us better and better, it becomes harder and harder to say where the world stops 
and the person begins." 
Thus, with smart cities that envelop us, those boundaries are broken down even further. 
The human-technology-city connections are multiplied, they become more invasive and 
pervasive. Smart systems gain power and efficacy by ensuring we—or, at least, aspects of us—
are always connected to them. They react to us, and actively interact with us, just as we interface 
with them. Our everyday life is linked to their operations, and vice versa. The relationship is one 
of mutual reliance. As geographer Matthew Gandy (2005: 28) puts it: 
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The emphasis of the cyborg on the material interface between the body and the city is 
perhaps most strikingly manifested in the physical infrastructure that links the human 
body to vast technological networks. If we understand the cyborg to be a cybernetic 
creation, a hybrid of machine and organism, then urban infrastructures can be 
conceptualized as a series of interconnecting life-support systems. 
 
The contemporary city, then, should be understood in terms of “cyborg urbanization.” The 
city dweller is better understood as an urban cyborg: one who does not live in the city, but who 
lives as part of the city. If we can see ourselves as part of a cyborg relationship, simultaneously 
wholes and parts of a whole—not only interfacing with the urban assemblages, but also existing 
as part of them—the valence of the cyborg metaphor shifts. It becomes less and less of a 
“metaphor” than a descriptor of the intertwining, dynamic relations of people, technologies, and 
environments (McFarlane 2011; Smith 2016). The “body politic” takes on new meaning. It is not 
merely a collection of individuals living in a common location or society. Nor is it a singular 
entity—a kind of individualism writ large in the way we talk about nation-states and corporations—
as if it were like a person with its own existence, interests, and actions. The focus is, instead, put 
on the meaning and effects of relations and assemblages. 
Cyborg urbanization helps us recognize the ways in which urban planning is also human 
planning. When IBM or Cisco, for instance, have a hand in redesigning the city, they are not just 
building a physical environment infused with digital technologies, they are also creating the urban 
subject who will be part of the smart city (Vanolo 2014). That is, the person who becomes a 
necessary node, a component installed into the city; just as the city’s totalizing environment 
becomes an integral part of life as a smart urbanite. 
The urban cyborg’s life is mediated and structured by technologies in ways large and 
small, obvious and unnoticed. Our entanglements with both analog and digital infrastructures 
have only deepened the cyborgian integration (Fisch 2013). The watchword here is “natural user 
interface,” which aims for frictionless interaction (Black 2014). It is cybernetic existence without 
kinetic interference. As our lives increasingly take place within “coded space”—spaces that are 
augmented by digitally inscribed information—and “code/space”—spaces that are so infused with 
information that it is a necessary component of their functioning—the power of computerized 
processes becomes even more pervasive and inescapable (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Just as we 
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think of the role physical architecture plays in guiding and sustaining city dwellers, we must now 
also think of the role software architecture has in urban governance.  
In her famous essay “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway (1991: 302) wrote, “No 
objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with any 
other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing signals in a 
common language.” We see this process at work in attempts to create an Internet of Everything 
with universal interoperability, which can subsume all conceivable “things”—a category that 
includes in/animate objects and data flows, along with people and places. Such projects are 
features of the large-scale “transitions from the comfortable old hierarchical dominations to the 
scary new networks” that Haraway calls “informatics of domination.” The smart city is both a key 
harbinger and a material manifestation of that transition. The networked system of systems 
amplifies the ability of those in power to coordinate and channel apparatuses of control and 
accumulation throughout the smart city. The passwords needed to manage the consequences of 
constant modulation—whether soft manipulation or hard force—are multiplied as people become 
dividuals subsumed further into the rhizomatic systems.  
The cyborgification of city life raises critical questions about an interlocking series of 
existential and social questions. Computerized implementation of rewards and penalties, welfare 
and policing, are premised on a series of decisions as to whether any given in/dividual should be 
controlled, or granted opportunity; should be invested in, or treated as a site of extraction. The 
city dweller must decide whether to compete for investment, or to challenge existing power 
structures, or simply to drift, swept along by the decisions of those who create the circumstances 
that others merely endure.  
By thinking in terms of cyborg urbanization we are better equipped to grapple with the 
techno-politics of the (smart) city; that is, the role socio-technical systems and their creators play 
in molding and modulating our very existence (Luke 1996: 218). In other words, as urban 
sociologist Rob Shields (2006) explains: “A cyborg analysis would then suggest that social and 
political thought needs to include an engagement with the biotechnical, its relations, objects and 
  142 
spaces, along with our traditional attention to the socio-technical and its laws, statecraft, and 
political economy.” 
With all the optimistic promises and hopeful visions surrounding smart cities it can be 
easy to lose track of the politics that are coded into these technologies and initiatives. If we 
conceptualize these urban transformations as merely neutral enhancements that bring unalloyed 
goods of efficiency and security, then we miss out on the social, even ontological, aspects of what 
it means to be assimilated deeper into the functioning of the smart city. The theory of cyborg 
urbanism spotlights the fusion of human-technology-city and directs our attention to the vital role 
of these social and material connections. It is an alternative to the theory of smart urbanism 
propagated by corporations, governments, and consultants.  
Smart urbanism hands over the city to engineers and executives who promise to take 
advantage of networked interconnections and turn the city into a machine for control and 
accumulation. Whereas cyborg urbanism recognizes the multiplicity of mergers and the 
expansion of embodiment, which give rise to important questions about politics, agency, and 
rights that accrue to people who do not just live in cities, but live as part of them. 
Indeed, we should see cyborg urbanism as a source of emancipatory politics that urges 
us to democratically manage—if not altogether seize—the means of producing the city. For these 
are also means of producing ourselves. In other words, urban cyborgs see the process of 
designing and constructing the city as intimately linked with their own lives. And rather than cede 
the city to corporate capital and smart governance, they call for the ability and freedom to at least 
collectively guide the city. 
 
Right to the City 
Countering smart urbanism with an alternative political vision requires that people be 
empowered and mobilized to act against injustice and subjugation. One way of doing so, I argue 
here, arises from affirming what is called “the right to the city” (RTC). The idea of the RTC 
originated in 1968 from the sociologist Henri Lefebvre. In short, Lefebvre meant it as a means for 
people to take back the urban social space by challenging the abuses of capital through a re-
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imagination of the duties and prerogatives of citizenship. He refers to it as “like a cry and a 
demand,” which “cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional 
cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life”—to inhabit, 
create, and participate in the city’s milieu (Lefebvre 1996). It is a right to not be alienated and 
excluded from urban life, to not be cast into the gutters while the privileged class claims the city 
for themselves (Busà 2009; Mitchell and Heynen 2009).  
The idea is experiencing a contemporary resurgence of attention in urban scholarship 
and activism (Brenner et al. 2011), thanks in part to a landmark paper by David Harvey (2008: 23; 
2013), which forcefully explained the importance of the RTC: 
The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of 
social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire. 
The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is 
a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than 
an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a 
collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and 
remake our cities and ourselves is […] one of the most precious yet most neglected of 
our human rights. 
 
We make the city, and the city makes us. Although, a more accurate statement is: they 
make the city, and the city makes us. Therein lies the rub. Authority over how cities are 
developed and governed is transferred to institutions that operate on a global scale (Purcell 
2003). They include not just tech corporations like IBM and financial firms like Blackstone—
entities that a group of urban development scholars recently deemed “global corporate landlords” 
(Beswick et al. 2016)—but also transnational bodies like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. These architects of neoliberal restructuring disenfranchise the citizenry, stripping 
them of any capacity to actively produce and participate in cities that are more like citadels of 
private capital (Lefebvre 1991; MacLeod and Johnstone 2012). 
Instead, “a select few do the imagining and designing,” writes Harvey, and so "for the 
mass of the population the full play of human creativity is denied” (Harvey 2001: 124). We live in 
cities that are not our own. They are the products of interests and forces that we have little to no 
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influence over.32 The RTC, thus, seeks to rebuke this arrangement by affirming that city 
dwellers—not the nexus of corporate-capital-state power—deserve “the right to command the 
whole urban process” (Harvey 2008: 28). 
In the scholarly literature, there has been thoughtful discussion about just what kind of 
“right” best explains the RTC.33 In my use, the “right” is not founded on metaphysical grounds. It 
does not emerge from natural essence or divine providence. Nor do I mean it in a strictly legal 
basis, like a bill of rights to the city, though it certainly could spur legal reform and aspects of it 
could be enshrined in law. I am intentionally not getting mired in the tar pit of nailing down the 
exact kind of right we mean. While it is a worthy task, there is strategic attractiveness to allowing 
an openness that “can serve to unify the struggles of various marginalized groups around a 
common rallying cry” (Attoh 2011: 674). I therefore prefer to view the RTC as a slogan for 
solidarity, as a demand for justice, and a tool for ethico-political practice. In other words, the RTC 
ought to operate in multiple forms: as a rallying call, as a social movement, as an agonistic 
politics. 
 
Informational Right to the City 
As we have seen throughout this dissertation, ICT is a core part of the urban process. 
The urban environment is crisscrossed, undergirded, and overlaid with digitality: we make data 
and data makes us. To fully account for the importance and impact of ICT I aim to extend the 
RTC by fleshing out what has recently been call an “informational right to the city” (iRTC).34 Joe 
Shaw and Mark Graham, geographers at the Oxford Internet Institute, justify an iRTC by pointing 
out that “the production and control of urban information plays a central role in the reproduction of 
                                            
32 This is another consequence of the oligarchic regimes that dominate politics around the world. 
For evidence in the American context see: Gilens (2014); Gilens and Page (2014). 
33For a discussion of different politico-legal theories and their application to the RTC, see Attoh 
(2011). For a discussion of the RTC in terms of critical theory and critical practice, see Marcuse 
(2009). 
34 See this series of panels—titled, “An Informational Right to the City?”—from the 2016 annual 
meeting for the American Association of Geographers: http://cii.oii.ox.ac.uk/2015/11/17/aag-
sessions-an-informational-right-to-the-city/ 
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contemporary cities. Yet, these digital augmentations are often controlled by only a handful of 
dominant institutions” (2015: np).  
An iRTC ought to play a critical role in our rejoinder to these techno-political projects that use 
ICTs to remake the city. We can think of an iRTC as a form of “dynamic resistance.” According to 
Stella Darby, a scholar of social change, “Dynamic resistance is not a roadmap to a destination 
but rather a framework of concepts and practices for navigating, responding to and creating 
ongoing stories of change, and for recognizing processes of holistic resistance where we might 
otherwise see defeat” (Darby 2016: 19). In what follows I reflect on tenets and applications of an 
iRTC. My hope, then, is to provide notes towards a theory and practice of claiming the (smart) 
city. 
• An iRTC is a heuristic for helping us identify illegitimate concentrations of techno-political 
authority, reject those forces of urban production, and reimagine the city as a place 
founded on social justice and human flourishing.  
• An iRTC is a rallying call for claiming power from the political and technical elites who 
reconfigure the city as a platform for corporate smartness. It is a banner that says, ‘We 
will not allow you to extract data from people and places, only so you can then use that 
data to dispossess us of dominion over our cities.’  
• An iRTC is more than a request for transparency and accuracy. It does not seek to ratify 
systems of control and accumulation—as if they would be legitimate if only we could see 
their mechanisms and correct their data. It is a counter force to the power dynamics and 
social relations those systems reproduce. 
• An iRTC is a demand for antagonism, an affirmation of techno-political contestations. It is 
open and ongoing dissent: against the stabilization of power; against the securitized 
enclosure of the city; against data-driven stratification and automatic enforcement; and 
against allowing the city, and thus ourselves, to be molded by the techno-political elite. 
•  An iRTC is not an eventual endpoint that we can reach and say “Mission Accomplished!” 
Nor, is it like a static state of being: we possess it or we don’t; we’re in it or we’re not. 
Rather, it should be thought of as a process of urban politics and a practice of everyday 
life. It orients our relationship towards how cities are created, how technologies are 
designed, and how we live as part of those urban systems. In this view, an iRTC works 
like muscles in the human body—or, the body politic—which have to be exercised, 
developed, and strengthened to avoid the risk of atrophy and weakness. 
 
With these tenets in mind, we must not forget that the RTC, and by extension an iRTC, is a 
radical project for advancing a politics of emancipation and empowerment (de Souza 2011). In 
other words, it is a project for emancipating people from exploitation and control by techno-
political regimes. And for empowering them to shape their own lives by shaping their 
environments, technologies, and political processes. This project is achieved, in part, by opening 
the way for people to appropriate urban space and participate in the production of the city. Such 
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participation cannot be a right reserved for a small elite; privilege, whether social or economic, 
cannot be a prerequisite.  
The political philosopher Nancy Fraser’s work on what she calls “parity of participation” is a 
useful goal to strive for: “According to this norm, justice requires social arrangements that permit 
all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers” (2003: 36). For parity to be 
realized we must fight against two prevalent forms of injustice: First, “forms and levels of 
economic dependence and inequality that impede parity of participation.” The poor are often 
excluded because, for instance, they cannot afford to take time off work, and/or they are 
geographically remote, and/or they are not informed. Second, “institutionalized norms that 
systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them” 
(Fraser 2003: 36). These are the subtle and overt systems of racism, sexism, ableism, and other 
discriminatory relations that devalue and disrespect certain people.  
As a normative principle, parity of participation is a useful standard for judging if a system or 
structure is unjust. If people are excluded from participating in political society and social life—
perhaps they are part of an exploited class or subordinated group—then it is a safe bet there are 
injustices that must be addressed. In the context of an iRTC, parity of participation applies to 
people’s ability to participate in producing, using, and giving meaning to their city. Parity does not 
translate to everybody gets to do whatever they want. Rather, it means that everybody has the 
right to come together—to interact, contest, deliberate, organize—as peers with equal standing. 
More generally, an iRTC gives us a framework for imagining and working towards alternative 
arrangements of techno-politics-in-society. Indeed, there are many cases where an iRTC can 
help us recognize, reshape, and replace systems that could lead—or already are leading—us 
towards egregious outcomes. Our aim should not be to preserve the status quo; nor should we be 
content with slight refinements to existing patterns. To be perfectly clear, the road ahead for any 
radical proposals is a bumpy one. The route is uncertain; it is filled with dead ends, detours, and 
obstacles. But that is not a reason to stop critically analyzing our current path and creatively 
imagining different possibilities.  
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In the next sections, I sketch three short snapshots that portray near futures. These 
snapshots are not predictions in the sense that naïve futurists like to peddle, as if they had crystal 
balls that reveal the world-to-come. Nor are they fully fleshed out scenarios. Rather, these scenes 
of plausible futures are meant to be conceptual tools. For these snapshots, I have taken 
inspiration from the excellent anthology series Black Mirror, which uses speculative fiction to 
depict dark themes, social issues, and human dimensions of technology-in-society. As the show’s 
creator, Charlie Brooker (2011: np), has described the series: “Each episode has a different cast, 
a different setting, even a different reality. But they're all about the way we live now—and the way 
we might be living in 10 minutes' time if we're clumsy.” I also want to try to explore the way we 
might be living if we’re careful. The first snapshot focuses on how unjust relationships could arise 
from current trends and logics. The next snapshot focuses on how reforms could assuage harms 
of smart systems and provide social stability. The final snapshot focuses on how liberational 
outcomes could come from a radical movement toward an alternative techno-politics. I should 
preface this by saying that I do not fully endorse any of these scenarios. Specifically, #2 and #3 
should not be seen as hard recommendations, even if they sound like policy blueprints. I would 
much rather that they help spark the imagination and generate other alternatives, than for them to 
be taken literally. 
 
Snapshot of Exclusion and Enforcement 
The following snapshot is based on only somewhat intensified versions of existing 
systems. It is not an outlandish fiction, scientific or political. The scenario it portrays is more than 
plausible. Indeed, it could be easily realized in the imminent future. The unnamed place in the 
snapshot is influenced by a US context. However, precursors to the technologies and policies I 
describe are present in cities around the world. We can similar situations emerging in places from 
London and Rio de Janeiro to Johannesburg and Singapore. To be clear, this snapshot should be 
seen as a self-preventing prophecy. 
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Snapshot #1 
“We’re sorry,” reads the screen on the gated entry to the boutique mall, “our systems 
indicate that your credit score is not sufficient to enter this location. Access denied.” The gate’s 
auto-locks engage, while notifications sent to private security forces alert them to a possible 
situation.  
Few urban spaces are truly public anymore. Parks, monuments, neighborhoods, and 
shopping areas are now products of private management. They are patrolled by security forces, 
governed by conduct codes, and enclosed by physical barriers. The “business improvement 
districts” used to carve out parts of the city—and formally hand socio-political control of them to 
private property owners—were a step towards making cities more entrepreneurial. However, the 
managerial problem plaguing these landlords had, for a long time, been the effective regulation of 
access. But that is now quickly changing thanks to smart solutions. While they once had to rely 
on reactive tactics like harassing people who aren’t welcome to shop or relax, they now marshal 
proactive technologies that prevent people with the wrong profile from accessing those spaces. It 
is easier to prevent access than to kick out. 
With the help of data systems and automatic enforcement, the city is filled with enclaves 
that stymy or allow mobility at a fine-grain level. These checkpoints ensure that places can be 
governed with surgical precision. The credit score detector targeted low-credit people, while at 
the same time picking out the high-credit VIPs who would be given special attention and perks. 
And credit scores are only one possible metric to use. People are subjected to innumerable 
scoring systems—innumerable because they are proprietary products of guarded industries—that 
process anywhere from hundreds to billions of data points about individuals and groups.  
Credit score too low? Don’t even try to enter protected shopping districts, where you’ll 
just window-shop anyway and make the good citizens uncomfortable. Civic profile flagged? This 
pristine park isn’t for you; perhaps you should instead go find a vacant lot or a stoop if you want to 
just laze around. But hey, if you work hard and make responsible decisions, maybe one day you’ll 
be able to access that mall you’ve always been curious about. You too can experience the joys of 
a city where the frictions of everyday life drop away.  
  149 
The beauty of score-based auto-enforcement is that the right kinds of people can pass 
through these checkpoints seamlessly. They no longer have to deal with the security theater—
and the inconvenience and discomfort it produces—used to weed out and deter nuisances. For 
others, though, the presence of inhuman, non-human security technologies is bluntly apparent. 
“Alert! Due to your abnormally high threat score you are not permitted to be in this zone. 
Exit immediately or be detained and deported.” The announcement blares from the speakers on 
the drone, drowning out the whir of its quadcopter blades. The drone’s “sublethal” armaments—
pepper spray balls, dye markers, mid-range tasers—are more than capable of subduing 
noncompliant targets. 
The old ways of keeping a community safe were so crude and manpower intensive: nosy 
residents channeled their energy into being neighborhood watchers; cops patrolled the streets in 
their slow-rolling cruisers; people were deemed suspicious if they appeared to fit the profile of an 
outsider. These methods changed once cities began instituting “safety zones,” which designated 
certain areas of the city as protected sectors that were a privilege to enter, not a right. What 
signaled access? Your data is the key to entry. There is no longer a need to rely on biased 
profiling, when each person has a data-driven profile—which collates countless data points and 
applies predictive analytics to paint a picture of your history, present, and future. 
Thanks to generous grants from the Department of Homeland Security and Safety, police 
departments can focus resources on cordoning these zones with technologies that ensure tireless 
law enforcement and promise rapid dispatch of punishment. For instance, quadcopter drones 
hover throughout the sector, reading the profiles of every pedestrian. Any trespassers—perhaps 
their threat score is over the allowed threshold or a predictive “heat list” marked them as likely to 
commit a future crime—are issued a warning to vacate the zone or be treated as hostile. With 
techniques like this, the police are able to take back the streets and spread safety one sector at a 
time. 
Moreover, by implementing Aerial and Environmental Responsive Intelligence (AERI) 
centers, police can break free of the panoptical paradigm. It is no longer the case that people 
might be watched at any time. The AERI centers, instead, use a network of surveillance systems, 
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which continuously monitor, encode, and analyze the city at multiple layers. There was little that 
happened without the AERI’s systems recording it. The ultimate goal is to break free of 
time/space constraints. That is, not only will all space be captured by the AERI, but so too will 
time be opened up: With enough processing power and storage capacity, past instances and 
future scenarios of the city could be modeled and examined. In effect, one could press rewind on 
the city, pause it at any point, and watch it unfold over time. Or, hit fast-forward and come up with 
predictive models used to inform preemptive policing and anticipatory planning. 
These types of technologies provide police and city managers with powerful capacities 
for urban governance. Rather than dealing with the vagaries of a chaotic system, they can bring 
order to the city. 
 
Snapshot of Participation and Protection 
The next snapshot offers a view of where we could be going if social democratic reforms 
were put in place. These positions and policies are already in the air. In a US context, they are 
circulating in the political discourse and finding supporters among larger parts of the population. 
While social democracy is not yet politically mainstream—at least not in the corridors of power—
its influence could continue to grow. Such reforms aim to increase social welfare and economic 
stability. The goal is to address harms and risks created by capitalism, without replacing it with a 
different economic system. This reformist characteristic might make the snapshot more practical 
and, depending on your view, more or less desirable.35 My intention is for snapshot #2 to be 
something of a middle ground between #1 and #3. 
                                            
35 It is worth considering a critical assessment of social democratic programs—but from the 
political left, not the right. They are often administered like a painkiller that numbs the pain and 
masks the symptoms of economic injustice without addressing the root causes of exploitation and 
inequality. Such painkillers can be humane ways of easing suffering, but the trouble comes when 
these programs are used as a way of merely making capitalism more tolerable for people. That is, 
when they are treated like adequate endpoints, rather than transitional steps towards addressing 
core issues. In this case, the class that benefits the most is what Marx called the “petite 
bourgeoisie.” This class largely benefits from capitalism—thus, they do not want to wholesale 
change the system—but are still subjected to the squeeze of exploitation and alienation. So they 
prosper from policies that assuage some harms of capitalism, but do not dismantle it. We might 
think that these policies are antagonistic to capitalism—that they threaten the profits and position 
of capitalists—but that is not necessarily the case. Marx and Engels, writing in 1850, succinctly 
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Snapshot #2 
“A New Deal for the 21st Century.” That is the slogan of the Digital Deal, a political 
platform spearheaded by a generation of leaders who grew up at the turn of the Millennia. They 
were born into a strange nexus of global events: the rapid rise of digital ICT, the aftermath of 
multiple financial crashes, the violence of neoliberal social policy, the spread of social justice 
movements. The outcomes and lessons of those events are imbued in the politics of people who 
knew no other world. The Digital Deal is, in many ways, a response to those events. It is the type 
of political project that many who grew up in this generation—savvy on technological issues, 
supporters of progressive causes, skeptical of corporate overreach—wanted to see decades 
earlier.  
Like its predecessor from a century ago—which was modeled after three R’s of Relief, 
Recovery, and Reform—the Digital Deal advances a framework based on three P’s of 
Participation, Protection, and Progress. While the New Deal focused on the economy, the Digital 
Deal focuses on techno-politics.  
First, enhancing citizen participation and service provision through the use of digital 
government systems that can make radical, responsive democracy a reality. For example, rapid 
polling online is used to take the pulse of the population(s) on public issues, open data portals 
provide citizens with up-to-date information and user-friendly interfaces, and social services are 
managed by cognitive computation that makes certain individuals receive the maximum amount 
of assistance allowed. Once government agencies migrated over to a singular platform—
My.Gov—everything became noticeably more efficient and accessible. Not just accessible as in 
the platform was easy to use, but also accessible in that you felt like you actually had access to 
                                                                                                                                  
delivered a critique that still holds relevance: “The democratic petty bourgeois, far from wanting to 
transform the whole society in the interests of the revolutionary proletarians, only aspire to a 
change in social conditions which will make the existing society as tolerable and comfortable for 
themselves as possible. […] As far as the workers are concerned one thing, above all, is definite: 
they are to remain wage labourers as before. However, the democratic petty bourgeois want 
better wages and security for the workers, and hope to achieve this by an extension of state 
employment and by welfare measures; in short, they hope to bribe the workers with a more or 
less disguised form of alms and to break their revolutionary strength by temporarily rendering 
their situation tolerable” (1850: np). 
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the government. You knew where to if you had questions or needed help, and your ratings and 
comments really seemed to matter. 
Second, instituting new protections that recognize the realities of people as datafied 
beings. These safeguards don’t operate on some dualism of online and offline. Built into them is 
the fact that we exist in networked environments—always interacting with spies, sprites, and 
sniffers. Rather than evaluating dataveillance in terms of a cost-benefit analysis—the cost of 
privacy vs. the benefit of profit—such practices are regulated as issues of power asymmetry and 
social production. Moreover, digital labor laws now account for what is called “the work of being 
watched” by granting people stronger rights against exploitation in digital workplaces, such as 
profiting from the free labor of platform users.  
Third, steering technology towards social progress by promoting projects that contribute 
to public benefit and human flourishing—instead of merely reflecting the desires of privileged 
groups. This involves an ensemble of initiatives: incentives via R&D funding for the private sector 
to develop and deploy different technologies; frameworks and support for engaging with socio-
political concerns and integrating ethical values into the R&D process; and audits used to analyze 
an impactful technology, ensure any hidden values/politics are made explicit, and issue advice for 
redesigning the technology. These are forms of soft regulation, which advise and provide 
resources. They don’t restrict the design, deployment, and adoption of other technologies. But the 
goal is to exert pressure and promote only progressive technologies. 
It is no accident that the Digital Deal has had a large effect on urban regions, influencing 
how they are planned, built, and managed. Cities are places where society, governance, and 
technology collide in unique ways that have huge impacts on the lives of urban inhabitants. Most 
of the population now lives in cities, and the effects of socio-economic injustices can be amplified 
by this combination of concentrated people, totalizing environments, and techno-political 
planning. Indeed, much of the rallying for the Digital Deal came from the urban citizenry who felt 
helpless to effect change, who felt repressed by their cities, rather than embraced by them.  
The integration of cities with info tech has gone through many waves. The Digital Deal 
offers the scaffolding to build the next wave—one designed to provide everybody with the social 
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support and political resources needed to fully participate in this fusion of two epochs: the urban 
age and the information age.  
 
Snapshot of Emancipation and Empowerment 
While the next snapshot may not represent outcomes of our current trajectory, neither is 
it an unrealizable dream. It is, instead, a brief vision of what could happen and what could be 
achieved if we made different—even if difficult—decisions about techno-politics. I maintain that 
we still have the ability to change course. Doing so, however, will require a critical combination of 
theory, creativity, politics, and practice. My hope is that this next snapshot will be a step towards 
inspiring us to envision alternative futures and make a new present. 
 
Snapshot #3 
It was the tech companies and financiers who first argued that data must be seen as 
more than merely a technological issue. They argued data should, instead, be treated as capital 
and commodity, as a valuable asset that must be accumulated as such.36 Thought leaders 
consulted with capitalists. Financial elites plotted about how best to generate value from all the 
data constantly being gathered from every person, process, and thing. They relied on the opacity 
of these esoteric matters to shield them from inquiry. The impacts of designating data as capital 
were not obvious, nor were they immediate. But others were catching on that data was more than 
just a thing that excited geeks. Data was now an important part of contemporary political 
economy.  
The rampant practices of data extraction and hoarding became too difficult to ignore. 
There was an arrogance to it; a sense that tech platforms and service providers could get away 
with mass surveillance and behavioral manipulation. The standard narrative was that people 
didn’t know or didn’t care because the “free” products were all worth it. In reality, people just didn’t 
know what to do about it. They didn’t know there were better options.  
                                            
36 See, for instance, a recent white paper released by MIT Technology Review Custom and 
Oracle (2016) called, “The Rise of Data Capital.” 
  154 
The accumulation of data—of this capital and commodity that seemed to define the info 
age—grew at an unprecedented rate. It generated value for so many, and in so many different 
ways. Ironically, even with all that data at their fingertips, there was both willful and unwitting 
ignorance to the growth of an enormous data bubble. This bubble touched nearly all aspects of 
society: it affected how policing was done, how cities were governed, how production was 
managed, how finance was organized. And when it burst—like an unfortunate spawn of the dot-
com bubble in the late 90’s and the financial crash in the late 00’s—the trust and tolerance people 
had towards unconstrained economies of data began to evaporate. No longer just the concern of 
specialists, data ownership became a battleground for debate and protest. 
As issues of inequality became more prevalent—serving as catalysts for social 
movements and as central parts of political platforms—the vast data divide was criticized as 
another way in which Wall Street and Silicon Valley cross-pollinated for their own mutual benefit. 
Protesters and politicians alike raised concerns about huge concentrations of data in the hands of 
a small class of elites. The ownership of so much data-as-capital nurtured the growth of 
monopolistic companies with vast wealth and power—plus the ambitions to match. By some 
estimates these data-driven tech titans wielded more capital and influence—and several were 
more vicious—than the robber barons of the first Gilded Age. It became clear to many people 
that, for these executives and entrepreneurs, “disruption” was more like a scorched earth 
technique for obliterating competition and “innovation” meant finding a way to secure market 
position. 
People began questioning why corporations should own all that data about the world, 
about us, in the first place. What right did they have? Was the ability to extract, store, and analyze 
the data reason enough for them to hoard and use it for whatever purposes they wished? Why 
should the means of data production and the data banks be owned by a small class who use 
those systems to dividualize, control, and commodify everybody and everything else? The 
answers to these questions often relied on reasserting the status quo—this is how things are 
done, how could it be otherwise, changing things would be perilous—but those reasons were no 
longer good enough.  
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After the bubble burst many social movements took on new energy, reinvigorated by a 
fresh harm caused by an old regime. There were demonstrations and direct actions, boycotts and 
protests, organizing and lobbying. Politicians could hardly ignore the vox populi: The groundswell 
of demand for sanctions and for a new paradigm that would benefit society, not subject it to the 
impulses of dataveillance capitalism. The crux of the movement came when political pressure 
finally translated into legal action. These new rules focused on one of the root issues: the 
economic status of data.  
Data is no longer treated as a kind of private capital, which companies can accumulate 
and profit from simply by owning, selling, and/or renting the data. Instead, data is designated as 
personal property and as public good. People are free to gather and use data about themselves 
for their own personal purposes, such as the kind created by wearable trackers or home devices. 
But when it came to the large data banks—which aggregate and analyze big data sets about 
society, governance, and infrastructure—a new institution had to be created to manage them: the 
People’s Data Repository.  
The PDR administers the collection, access, and use of data-as-a-public-good. Rather 
than, for instance, a company like Uber—monopolistic, extractive, politically ruthless—gathering 
all that data about mobility for their own benefit, the data is used to enhance and expand public 
transportation. With the data, analytics, and applications provided by the PDR, nothing precludes 
publically owned, non-profit agencies from building services that take full advantage of 
information technology. It is now no longer acceptable to allow private entities to claim ownership 
over what ought to be common goods and public services. Additionally, the PDR does more than 
provide support to public agencies. It also assists companies that are organized with social 
ownership in mind, like employee cooperatives and citizen equity firms. Such companies are 
given the resources to produce and are encouraged to innovate. They are rewarded for providing 
goods and services that contribute to society; if they work towards the public benefit, the amount 
of data they can access from PDR far outstrips what they would likely have collected on their own 
under the old system. By setting terms on access to the data needed to operate technological 
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systems, the idea is to begin weakening the techno-capitalist imperatives that incentivize 
exploitative and extractive structures. 
In terms of institutional structure, the PDR is similar to the Federal Reserve, in that it 
oversees data policy, regulates data services, and is independent within the government. 
However, unlike the technocratic structure of the Fed, the PDR incorporates regular democratic, 
participatory processes into its decision-making. This constant feedback, accountability, and 
oversight helps ensure the PDR supports programs that people need and desire—rather than 
ones driven by profit and privilege. The PDR’s founding principles are simple: If data comes from 
the people, then it should belong to the people and be used for public goods.  
 
Toward the Cyborg City 
In this chapter, I have tried to outline a response to the rapid expansion of smart cities. 
However, this response should be seen as more than just a counter-proposal that aims to tweak 
and rehabilitate smartness. It is a call for a paradigm shift. We might label this alternative the 
cyborg city: cyborg urbanism is its philosophical core (how we understand urban society) and an 
iRTC is its techno-political project (what we are working towards). Urban planning and 
governance involves more than just constructing and managing the city. It also means designing 
the type of people and societies that can exist, the type of lives that can be lived, and the type of 
relations that can be built. There is simply too much at stake to sit idly by while the city is molded 
by the imposition of corporate designs and the brutality of neoliberal demands.  
The cyborg cities detractors will likely cast this alternative paradigm as merely another 
form of reactionary Neo-Luddism: How could you be against innovation? Don’t all the benefits of 
smartness, efficiency, and convenience sound great? You must be anti-technology and anti-
progress, scared of the inevitable change. The responses are predictable; yet they 
misunderstand the cyborg city. Don’t get me wrong, there are indeed machines we should 
dismantle and systems we should throw a wrench into. But this is not smashing for smashing’s 
sake. The focus is not on technology as such. Rather, our target must always be the techno-
political regime.  
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These technologies—or, at least, versions of them—offer powerful potential for making 
the world a more just, equitable, flourishing place. But the politics they have embedded—the 
logics of control and accumulation—must be abandoned and/or altered. We have to repurpose 
these technologies for different values and goals. But repurposing can only go so far. We must 
create new innovations, which embody different ideals of social and political life, and in ways that 
are informed by participatory input and iterative feedback. Disregarding technology is not an 
option; nor is surrendering its design and implementation to the interests of elite groups. As 
political scientist Alyssa Battistoni (2014: np) argues: 
Decisions about these technologies—about how to organize the patterns of work and life 
they seek to disrupt, about which kinds of natures to preserve and create, about how to 
build future cities and economies—should be made publicly and democratically, rather 
than by small groups of scientists or corporations with an eye on a new space of 
accumulation. […] The profusion of liberal and libertarian techno-utopianism in recent 
years can make it easy to forget that utopian socialist projects have long imagined a 
better world built from the combined abilities of humans, nature, and technology. 
 
We, therefore, need a critical techno-politics that can push back against the smart city, 
can empower people to contest these regimes, can nurture our relations with people-places-
technologies, and can create space for us to imagine alternatives. The cyborg city should be seen 
as both a catalyst and outcome of this shift in how we engage with the techno-politics that shape 
urban society. 
We now have the analytical tools for cutting through much of the ambiguity surrounding 
the visions sold by the likes of IBM and Cisco. We are able to strip away the veil of apolitical 
neutrality, thus revealing the ideologies at the heart of the smart city. We can point to the logics of 
control and accumulation that underpin so many seemingly disparate systems, ideas, and 
initiatives. While these tools allow us to explain and interpret the smart city, it is not enough to 
know more clearly how the techno-politics operate. We must also challenge and transform the 
smart city. If creating the city is a way of creating ourselves, then we have a duty and a right to be 
stewards of the city—to be active participants in the production and use of our cities, ourselves. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
 
I have attempted to clarify the techno-politics of the smart city movement by analyzing its 
discourses and ideologies and by theorizing its logics and implications. This dissertation is made 
up of five chapters, each of which approaches the visions and politics of the smart city through a 
different lens: discourse analysis, ideology critique, social theory, political economy, and 
normative prescription. When taken together, the chapters build on each other in way that 
provides the reader with a multi-faceted understanding of various smart city initiatives and ideals. 
My hope, however, is that the chapters also stand alone as individual contributions to the critical 
study of smart cities. In the following sections I will describe each chapter’s main argument and 
highlight its key points, concepts, and examples.  
 
Corporate Visions of the Smart City 
There is much at stake with the smart city. This urban governance movement is 
predicated on infusing ICT into nearly all aspects of the built environment, while at the same time 
transforming how cities are planned and managed. In short, the smart city is global in scale with 
initiatives being rolled out all over the planet, driven by proponents with deep pockets of wealth 
and influence, and a lucrative opportunity with market projections in the billions or trillions of 
dollars (over the next five to ten years). Governments at all levels—from towns and metropolises 
to nation states and multinational institutions—are partnering with technology corporations to 
develop and implement smart city initiatives. These initiatives promise to help both parties 
achieve their own social, political, and economic goals.  
The smart city label can be nebulous and amorphous, seemingly subsuming unrelated 
technologies, practices, and policies as necessary. Yet, even with this ambiguity, or perhaps 
because of it, the smart city vision is still able to colonize urban landscapes and capture the 
political imaginations of elite decision-makers. In order to know just what the smart city entails I 
worked to bring analytic clarity to the actions, visions, and values of this movement. I did so by 
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focusing my study on two organizations, IBM and Cisco, which have become dominant figures 
that possess great influence in the smart city sector. Both firms have been deliberately and 
successfully conducting the ways we understand, imagine, and enact smartness. If you want to 
think about the smart city, implement initiatives, and coax this urban future into being, then you 
must pass through IBM and/or Cisco’s concepts, frameworks, and solutions. 
Thus, in Chapter 1 I undertook a deep dive into each company’s large body of discursive 
materials. I report on the results of my close reading and holistic analysis of IBM and Cisco’s 
documents and initiatives. Contrary to many studies by consultants and academics, my aim was 
not to practice purification by providing the essential definition of the “smart city” and showing you 
what really is a smart city and what does not pass some standard. Nor was I looking to the 
corporations to provide that singular essence. Instead, my goal was to flesh out how these 
powerful players are framing the smart city, embedding certain values into those frameworks, and 
actively shaping what this movement might mean and become. 
From my analysis I discovered a narrative structure that scaffolds the smart city visions. 
1) The narrative begins with crises, the catalytic catastrophes and challenges that cities will 
inevitably face now and in the near future. There are three major crises that are repeatedly 
emphasized. Due to rapid urbanization, the infrastructure and public services we rely upon will 
encounter additional stress from the mass influx of people into cities around the world. Thanks to 
financial crashes and weak economies, cities must grapple with fiscal austerity, tight budgets, 
public unrest, and fierce competition. The environmental disasters brought about by climate 
change will threaten social and economic health. Yet, rather than despairing in the face of these 
oncoming crises, we must take advantage of the chance to “seize opportunities and build 
sustainable prosperity by becoming smarter” (Dirks and Keeling 2009: 1). 
2) Then come the theories for how to transform cities into smart places, which do not 
contribute to crisis or fall in its wake, but rather stand strong and thrive. We can think of these 
theories as their frameworks of the smart city—ways of approaching, knowing, governing, and 
developing urban environments. Both corporate “thought leaders” share an urban theory of the 
city as a “system of systems” (IBM) or a “network of networks” (Cisco). Each company then 
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fleshes out a prescriptive theory—a technological politics—of how to develop smart city initiatives. 
For IBM it is the three i’s of instrumentation (using devices to turn the city into a source of data), 
interconnection (clustering and integrating the cities systems), and intelligence (analyzing data 
produced from the networked systems). For Cisco it is the Internet of Everything (IoE), which 
connects people, data, things, and processes into an ever-expanding network.  
3) Next come the smart solutions. These are the socio-technical systems and services 
that put the theories to practice. The solutions are ultimately what corporations are selling, 
implementing, and maintaining for their city-clients. They include: the control room complexes that 
serve as the central clearinghouses for city data and the sources of commands for various city 
systems; the integration of sensor arrays, networked connections, and data analysis into 
infrastructure, which grant city managers the ability to monitor and manipulate the urban 
environment; and new models of urban governance that drive cities towards being more 
entrepreneurial, which is to say impelled by competition, growth, and investment.  
4) Without implementation strategies, however, the framework and solutions won’t come 
to fruition and the smart city won’t be actualized. The implementation process is shaped by 
aspects such as the local context and social/physical structures of the target city, the challenges 
and desires that motivate city leaders, and the profitability and feasibility for tech corporations. 
Making smartness a reality requires using a plurality of methods. By far the most common 
“actually existing” smart cities are those that are retrofitted and renovated with upgrades that 
transition current cities from dumb to smart. Rather than stripping out “legacy systems” and 
replacing them with smart updates, many retrofits involve the “use of ICT as an overlay for 
existing infrastructure” and incremental changes to current institutions (Green 2011). There is 
also what I call the “smart shock” method wherein a city undergoes a quick, large-scale 
integration of smart ideals, technologies, and policies into an existing landscape. Then there is 
the idealistic, and still rare, method where a smart city is built from scratch as a greenfield project. 
5) Last are the promises of desirable outcomes. We learn about all the beneficial 
enhancements the newly minted smart cities will enjoy. The ability to get things done and achieve 
tangible benefits is an integral part of the narrative used to sell the movement’s technological 
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politics to world leaders, city managers, citizen groups, and whoever else wields influence and 
makes decisions. Many of the intended outcomes are quite ambitious and totalizing in nature. 
Urban issues will be solved using the latest “killer apps.” City services will be provided by tech-
centric, public-private partnerships. Ultimately, the city itself will be turned into a platform for the 
proliferation of smart systems. 
This overarching narrative provides a good vehicle for the techno-political content that 
IBM, Cisco, and others are selling. It is an understandable narrative that people can see 
themselves as characters within. And it has germinated quite successfully so far. As of 2013, 
Rometty said that IBM has been involved in “more than 2,000 Smarter Cities engagements,” in 
which IBM has helped “mayors and other urban leaders manage, analyze and use data for 
economic growth, increased profitability and the public good.” Whereas, A 2014 report from Cisco 
says they have “deployed solutions in many cities worldwide—some 120 deployments of varying 
sizes.” Those numbers have only increased since then. In terms of initiatives, influence, and 
investment, the smart city movement is still growing. 
 
Ideologies, Reflected and Reinforced 
Part of the smart city movement’s attractiveness comes from the way it is explicitly 
framed as pragmatic, neutral, and non-ideological. Its advocates claim to eschew the partisan 
politics of ideology, in favor of embracing the technical rationality of getting things done. 
Advocates of the smart city style use carefully crafted—and endlessly repeated—rhetoric to veil 
how deeply ideological these urban transformations really are. However, ideologies are integral to 
the smart city. The choices about how smart cities are built, operated, and maintained are very 
much political decisions about the world. They involve value-ladened choices, competing 
interests, and power dynamics. In Chapter 2, I argued that the smart city reflects and reinforces 
two ideologies: technocracy and neoliberalism.  
Technocracy can be thought of as a kindred spirit to authoritarianism, but with a 
pragmatic drive focused on rationally solving society’s problems—or, at least what they conceive 
of as “problems.” At its core, technocracy is a methodological ideology, “a belief in the ability to 
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arrive at the optimal answer to any discussion through the application of particular practices,” 
writes sociologist Miguel Centeno (1993: 312). Unlike force wielding, iron-fisted dictators, 
technocrats derive their authority from a seemingly softer form of power: scientific and 
engineering prestige. The technocrat’s preferred means—such as, technological fixes and social 
engineering—repose upon metaphysical convictions, which presuppose a world where politico-
ethical values can be ignored, downplayed, or recast as equations. In the technocratic milieu, 
political processes—such as debating about values and striking compromises between 
competing interests—are treated as mere externalities, which must be efficiently reduced. Civic 
discourse and democratic governance simply does not fit into their view of society as an 
optimizable machine. 
Neoliberalism, as a rationality for ordering society, is the widespread application of the 
“model of the market to all domains and activities” (Brown 2015: 31). Political, social, and human 
life is reordered so it all becomes congruent with market terms, market values, and market goals. 
Put differently, the political is desiccated and hollowed, the social is redefined and reduced, and 
the ethical is instrumentalized and calculated. These once differentiated areas are collapsed, 
becoming subordinate to the economic. Enacting this neoliberal rationality requires an ongoing 
project of creating and maintaining markets. The advocates and architects of neoliberalism 
recognize that markets are social constructs, not natural phenomenon. And they embrace this 
fact—that markets must be actively created and economization actively instilled—by seizing the 
most powerful tool for the job: the state. At different times in recent history, the state has focused 
on rolling-back policies that stood in the way of unfettered marketization and on rolling-out modes 
of governance that aided in constructing markets. 
A hallmark of both ideologies is that, when confronted with hard questions about social 
policy, they all too often provides rapid, “obvious,” and unchallenged answers based on dubious 
cost-benefit analyses and hidden values. When meeting ever increasing metrics of efficiency and 
productivity are primary values in society, we see these purposes reflected in the design and use 
of socio-technical systems. That is, the reasons they are built, the ways they are developed, and 
the roles they play in our lives. It is no accident that the smart city is widely implemented in ways 
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that use technocratic methods to advance neoliberal politics. Indeed, we should not be surprised 
that one of the most ambitious and large-scale offspring of these two ideologies is focused on ICT 
and the city. The city is an important stage for testing out systems and policies, polishing and 
proving their effectiveness, and then rolling-out and reproducing them in other cities. This 
recognition of cities as “incubators” and “generative nodes” reflects IBM’s strategy of “building a 
smarter planet, city by city” (Palmisano 2010). So while the smart city reflects and reinforces two 
ideologies—which are dominant aspects of contemporary society—it also provides an opportunity 
to refine and spread the socio-technical implementation of technocratic neoliberalism. 
 
Logic of Control 
We have seen how visions of the smart city are structured and how the methods and 
goals of the smart city are infused with ideology. But, what does this mean on the ground, at the 
level of operations and implications? In Chapters 3 and 4 I detailed two interrelated, driving logics 
that underlie many of the various practices, politics, and socio-technical systems related to smart 
cities. One is the logic of control, which constructs the city as a “system of systems,” a form of 
networked urbanism wherein people and places can be totally connected, surveilled, measured, 
manipulated, predicted, policed. One is the logic of accumulation (of data and profit), which 
demands we extract all data, from all sources, in whatever ways possible; we will then sort it out 
later and trust the analytics to create “actionable insights” and generate value. I will go over 
control in this section and accumulation in the next section. 
Part of what makes the smart city hard to wrap our heads around—as a concept, a 
movement, a technology—is the fact that it is not atomistic, self-contained, and singular in nature. 
You cannot easily draw boundaries around it. You cannot observe the whole thing. You cannot 
watch it act, take into account its past actions, and predict its next actions. The smart city is 
composed of massive, sprawling, networked systems. And the array of systems that give rise to 
the smart city are often hidden from sight and mind; their actions can be subtle and stark, 
continuous and intermittent. It gets more complex when these systems come together to create 
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the ultimate urban system—the “system of systems” that can be rendered legible and observable, 
treated as knowable and understandable, subjected to regimes of surveillance and control. 
In a prescient essay originally published in 1990, titled “Postscript on the Societies of 
Control,” the philosopher Gilles Deleuze outlined a framework that provides valuable explanatory 
power when applied to the smart city. According to Deleuze there are at least three crucial 
components—dividuals, rhizomes, and passwords—which come together to form a continuously 
acting logic in society. With digital technologies, the individual is atomized, blown apart into 
streams of data fed into processors; thus, becoming a dividual: an entity ready to be divided into 
any number of pieces, with specific factors separated, scrutinized, and surveilled. This is identity 
via synecdoche: a characteristic, a data point, a category—which one depends on the system—
becomes representative of the whole and becomes all that matters. And all of these underlying 
socio-technical systems, which are often hidden from sight and mind, can be conceptualized as a 
rhizome. While each system seems to be a separate thing—appearing to exist and act on its 
own—they are better thought of as an entangled assemblage, a massive interconnected 
apparatus of monitoring and control. Moreover, people qua dividuals have freedom only insofar 
as all their passwords are in working order. Passwords are the products of dividualization, which 
mark access or restriction, allowing one to move freely or be stymied. When everything matches 
up, when everything works smoothly and efficiently, we have no cause to pause. We hardly 
notice the rhizomatic systems that are constantly monitoring us—each transaction, each gateway, 
each checkpoint—deciding if our passwords are valid. At any moment, however, a password 
could be rejected—for instance, your door keycard or debit PIN is denied—and the amount of 
control those mechanisms have over you become bluntly apparent. 
The overall pattern of relationships in the smart city results in what I call a “spectrum of 
control”—with meritorious or merely creepy technologies overlapping with deeply disturbing ones. 
By thinking in terms of a spectrum of control we can draw connections between technologies that 
were before thought of as discrete and independent. The innocuous is enfolded with the 
menacing. Any significant technology of the smart city becomes a tool to be repurposed for later, 
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often-unforeseeable goals. To illustrate the spectrum of control, I focused on two case 
technologies that exist at different ends of the spectrum.  
Biometric surveillance is representative of soft control, which enacts power in subtle 
ways. These technologies are used to monitor different parts of you, capture data about those 
parts, log it into databases, run it through analytics, track your actions, manipulate your behavior, 
place you into categories, and profit from data about you. Policing technologies are 
representative of hard control, which enacts power in aggressive, violent ways. The use of 
persistent surveillance, data-driven analytics, automated enforcement, and other techniques for 
ensuring social order provide police with the means to mobilize against those who transgress or 
attempt to escape control. 
 
Logic of Accumulation 
Big data comes with the promise of big profits, big power, and big insights. Many 
powerful organizations—smart tech firms like IBM, social media platforms like Facebook, search 
engines like Google, data brokers like Acxiom, government agencies like the NSA—are, as 
Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy (2015) put it, “culturally impelled by a data imperative and 
powerfully equipped with the tools to enact it.” This imperative demands the extraction of all data, 
from all sources, in whatever ways possible, whether there is current use for it or not. The logic of 
these data systems is expansionist. They infiltrate nearly all aspects of life and society, further 
incorporating everything into a regime of data accumulation, which underpins a political economic 
project I called dataveillance capitalism. In chapter 4, I described four salient principles of 
dataveillance capitalism and identified how IBM, Cisco, and Siemens marshal the techniques and 
visions of big data to achieve capitalist goals. I fleshed out each principle by, in part, undertaking 
a critical, interpretative reading of videos produced by those corporations. 
Principle 1: Data Power – Data is more than just a collection of information. It is also a 
form of knowledge and means of power. To know the world is to exercise power over it and to 
exercise power is to know it—to exam its features and characteristics, to sort it into categories 
and norms, to render it legible and observable, to exclude other metrics and methods. We must 
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look at both “the power of data” and “the data of power.” With their technologies (e.g. sensors) 
and techniques (e.g. analytics), IBM, along with their peers and partners, intends to turn 
everything into networked data flows existing within a unified system of systems—a Smarter 
Planet. And they aim to construct ways of knowing and controlling everything that happens, and 
everything that will happen, within that global system. Their visions of smartness promise a new 
era of power/data. To be sure, gathering data and exercising power are not inherently wicked 
actions that are only undertaken in the service of domination and extraction. What matters is the 
context: who gathers and exercises, in what ways, in whose interests? That being said, unless 
you are part of the techno-political elite who can analyze the data and issue the commands then 
the tools of power/data are not always wielded for you—they may very well be wielded against 
you. 
Principle 2: Data Universe – A statement like, “Everything is made of data these days,” is 
not just a neutral observation about the nature or substance of the world. Such statements 
function rhetorically. They do not merely reveal or reflect the world; they frame and construct the 
world. They change how we understand and interact with the world, and they place certain 
organizations in a position of access and authority. Data does not exist out there somewhere, like 
raw material in the ground waiting to be mined. Data is constructed by people. It has to be 
collected, processed, interpreted, stored, retrieved, and communicated. And people then have to 
convince other people of its value. IBM and Cisco, for instance, are doing that by attempting to 
convince us that data has a life of its own—thus cutting out the people and processes that 
actually make data. For IBM to say “our planet is alive with data” is to establish that the next 
logical step is for IBM to “capture” the teeming vitality of data and harness it for their purposes. 
They invite us to “build a smarter planet,” but this is a task that can only be accomplished with 
IBM’s expertise. We must rely upon their authority as builders, knowers, and managers of the 
data universe. 
Principle 3: Data Network – The city must be part of an Internet of Everything, which 
permeates it with sensors, connects all things, monitors the environment, tracks flows of people, 
automates decision protocols, and pipes data to the command center. Networks serve to amplify 
  167 
the ability for corporations and city leaders to accumulate, analyze, and act on data. However, it 
is crucial to recognize that projects like the Internet of Everything do not just intensify the degree 
of dataveillance; they also transform the kinds of dataveillance that are possible. For instance, it 
opens the way for techniques of data fusion, which refers to the sharing and combining of data 
from multiple sources to reveal new information, patterns, and correlations. This fusion can then 
enhance the accuracy of profiles, extrapolations, and predictions. Fusion not only unearths novel 
data about people and places, it can also uncover previously private information and circumvent 
data protection. For these corporations and city leaders, data should not exist in isolation. It must 
be part of massive networks, stored in cloud databases, fused for analysis, and accessed via 
user-friendly interfaces. 
Principle 4: Data Value – Metaphors about (big) data often make reference to its value. It 
is called the “new natural resource” and the “new oil.” These are allusions to data’s capacity to 
generate vast amounts of value for those who have it. We were once in an era of “information 
scarcity,” the story goes, but now we are rich with data “super-abundance.” Yet, wringing the 
value from data requires more than just collecting it. You need techniques like analytics to extract, 
refine, and use it. And you must also throw out the old ways of thinking about data by allowing 
Siemens, for instance, to show you how to “understand data as an asset,” which produces 
magnitudes of value for whoever can best data mine this raw material from the universe. 
Importantly, “value” here means more than just monetary gain. While it surely does refer to profit, 
it also means power. Value can come from data being packaged and sold as a commodity, or 
being used to make a process more efficient. But value can also arise from data being used to 
derive "actionable insights” about a group or a person, or being channeled into technologies of 
control that feed on data. So when corporations and governments alike talk about the value of 
data, they are not only referring to the bottom line.  
I then ended the chapter with two reflections on data determinism and data divide. An oft-
repeated slogan is that: “Information wants to be free.” It also wants and does many other things, 
or so we are told. As I argued, this is a dangerous way of talking and thinking. Information does 
not march us lockstep toward the end of history (whether that endpoint is capitalist or socialist). 
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Whether the determinists mean to or not, obscuring those people and interests behind these 
systems of dataveillance only serves to make their decisions appear to be the result of an 
unassailable force—with no option for recourse or protest. Moreover, I argued that we must be 
aware of the fact that big data is not distributed equally. There are haves and have nots, data rich 
and data poor. According to Mark Andrejevic (2014), a media and information scholar, this divide 
refers to more than just who possesses data: “Even if users had such access [to all the data 
collected about them], what individuals can do with their data in isolation differs strikingly from 
what various data collectors can do with this same data in the broader context of everyone else’s 
data.” So, while many of us receive great benefits from data technologies, obtaining the real 
riches of big data relies on intensive capacities for data mining, storing, processing, and 
analyzing. Such capacities are concentrated in only a few hands. These are the true benefactors 
of dataveillance capitalism. 
 
Alternative Techno-Politics 
In this final chapter of the dissertation, I provided notes towards imagining alternative 
arrangements of the smart city. And, in doing so, invigorate the critique and action necessary to 
build smart cities that will contribute to ideals like social justice and human flourishing, rather than 
elite interests and value extraction. 
Among radical intellectuals and activists, there is a well-known phrase that says: “It is 
easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” I have experienced 
this cognitive difficulty and I have witnessed others struggle with exercising their political 
imaginations. Indeed, this is not an accident—but it is the result of being steeped in ideologies 
and structures, like capitalism, that permeate society. And like other political projects, the smart 
city is also a battle for our imagination. We should think of the movement—with its initiatives and 
ideologies, texts and technologies—as a campaign to direct and delimit what we can imagine as 
possible. Notice that the merchants of smartness do not set out a suite of scenarios that 
represent radically different visions and politics. There are variations to the services they offer, 
but rarely do they deviate from reflecting and reinforcing the technocratic neoliberal precepts that 
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motivate this vision of the smart urban age. The aim is to establish their version of smartness as 
the future—the only one available or possible. By capturing our imagination through a 
combination of material, discursive, and ideological strategies, all other techno-political 
arrangements are effectively closed off. 
The smart city, however, is also a future-in-the-making. While the dominant visions we 
have explored so far are offshoots of deeply rooted structures in society they have not yet settled 
and stabilized as inextricable parts of the smart city. There is nothing inherent in these systems 
that dictates they can only be driven by logics of control and accumulation. We must not mistake 
a contingency for inevitability. The task at hand is to reimagine what the smart city means, to 
usher it towards an alternative form, to design it with a different set of values and politics.  
With that in mind, I argued that a new paradigm—the cyborg city—could help move us 
towards alternative theoretical, political, and action-oriented ways of engaging with the city. This 
paradigm is constituted by a philosophical core of cyborg urbanism and a political project of an 
(informational) right to the city. 
The boundaries between body-technology-city are blurred, if not breached. We tend to 
think, “There’s technology over there, there’s the city all around me, and then there’s me, 
complete in myself.” But this disjunctive way of thinking can blind us to the interconnections that 
are constituent parts of who we are. There are not so much discrete entities—the person, the 
building, the device—as there are entanglements of flesh, concrete, and information. With smart 
cities that envelop us, those boundaries are broken down even further. The human-technology-
city connections are multiplied, they become more invasive and pervasive. The contemporary 
city, then, should be understood in terms of “cyborg urbanization.” The city dweller is better 
understood as an urban cyborg: one who does not live in the city, but who lives as part of the city. 
Cyborg urbanization helps us recognize the ways in which urban planning is also human 
planning. When IBM or Cisco, for instance, have a hand in redesigning the city, they are not just 
building a physical environment infused with digital technologies, they are also creating the urban 
subject who will be part of the smart city. By thinking in terms of cyborg urbanization we are better 
equipped to grapple with the techno-politics of the (smart) city; that is, the role socio-technical 
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systems and their creators play in molding and modulating our very existence. Smart urbanism 
hands over the city to engineers and executives who promise to take advantage of networked 
interconnections and turn the city into a machine for control and accumulation. Whereas cyborg 
urbanism recognizes the multiplicity of mergers and the expansion of embodiment, which give 
rise to important questions about politics, agency, and rights that accrue to people who do not just 
live in cities, but live as part of them. 
Countering smart urbanism with an alternative political vision requires that people be 
empowered and mobilized to act against injustice and subjugation. One method of doing so, I 
argued, arises from affirming what is called “the right to the city” (RTC). The idea of the RTC 
originated in 1968 from the sociologist Henri Lefebvre. In short, Lefebvre meant it as a means for 
people to take back the urban social space by challenging the abuses of capital through a re-
imagination of the duties and prerogatives of citizenship. He refers to it as “like a cry and a 
demand,” which “can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life”—to 
inhabit, create, and participate in the city’s milieu (Lefebvre 1996). It is a right to not be alienated 
and excluded from urban life, to not be cast into the gutters while the privileged classes claim the 
city for themselves. 
As David Harvey (2008: 23) has written: “The freedom to make and remake our cities and 
ourselves is […] one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.” In short: we 
make the city, and the city makes us. Although, a more accurate statement is: they make the city, 
and the city makes us. Therein lies the rub. Sovereignty over how cities are developed and 
governed continues to be sapped away from citizens and transferred to institutions that operate 
on a global scale. These architects of neoliberal restructuring disenfranchise the citizenry, 
stripping them of the capacity to actively produce and participate in cities that are more like 
citadels of private capital. Instead, Harvey (2001: 124) writes, “a select few do the imagining and 
designing,” and so "for the mass of the population the full play of human creativity is denied.” We 
live in cities that are not our own. They are the products of interests and forces that we have little 
to no influence over. The RTC, thus, seeks to rebuke this arrangement by affirming that city 
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dwellers—not the nexus of corporate-capital-state power—deserve “the right to command the 
whole urban process.” 
I then extended the RTC by fleshing out what has recently been call an “informational 
right to the city” (iRTC). While I am not able to go into depth right now, in brief: The urban 
environment is crisscrossed, undergirded, and overlaid with digitality: we make data and data 
makes us. An informational right recognizes the critical importance of ICT in that urban process. It 
is a rallying call for claiming power from the political and technical elites who reconfigure the city 
as a platform for corporate smartness. It is a banner that says, ‘We will not allow you to extract 
data from people and places, only so you can then use that data to dispossess us of dominion 
over our cities, ourselves.’ And ultimately, it is a radical project for advancing a politics of 
emancipation and empowerment: for emancipating people from exploitation and control by 
techno-political regimes; for empowering them to shape their own lives by shaping their 
environments, technologies, and political processes. 
I thus outlined a critical techno-politics that can push back against the smart city, can 
empower people to contest these regimes, can nurture our relationships with people-places-
technologies, and can create space for us to imagine alternatives. The cyborg city should be seen 
as both a catalyst for and an outcome of this shift in how we engage with the techno-politics that 
shape urban society. 
The smart systems—or, at least, versions of them—offer powerful potential for making 
the world a more just, equitable, flourishing place. But the politics they are embedded—the logics 
of control and accumulation—must be abandoned and/or altered. We have to repurpose these 
technologies for different values and goals. And we need to create new innovations in ways that 
are informed by participatory input and iterative feedback. Disregarding technology is not an 
option; nor is surrendering its design and implementation to the values and interests of a small 
elite group. 
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